DISSENT

ONE YEAR ALONG THE NEW FRONTIER

Paul Goodman Devolution of Democracy

PLUS A ROUND-UP OF ARTICLES ON THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION:

David Carper
on the unions and the government

William Newman
on official liberalism

Ben Seligman
on economic policy

Michael Walzer
on the political style of JFK

and

Stephan Thernstrom Politics of Civil Defense

WINTER 1962

95c.

DISSENT

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOTICE TO OUR READERS

A steady rise in the cost of printing, as well as other costs, oblige us to announce reluctantly an increase in the price of DISSENT and in the subscription rate as follows:

Single copy	95 cents each
Bundle orders (3 or more)	50 cents each
Subscription rates:	$3.50 for 1 year; $6.00 for 2 years

(For foreign subs, add 50 cents postage for each year.)

The special rate FOR STUDENTS ONLY remains $2.50 per year (no special two-year rate.)

We are sure our readers understand that only necessity forces us to raise our rates. DISSENT remains a voluntary, non-profit publication depending upon its readers and subscribers as well as the generosity of its contributors.

NOTE: *Subscription raise is effective March 1, 1962; subscripions will be accepted at the old rate only until March first.* **—The Editors.**

DISSENT, issued January 1, 1962, is published quarterly by Dissent Publishing Association, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N. Y. Subscriptions: $3.50 for one year; $6.00 for two years; $2.50 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, add 50 cents mailing costs per year. All payments from foreign countries must be made by U. S. money orders or checks payable in U. S. currency. Single copy: 95 cents. For special rates on bulk orders from organizations, teachers, etc., write directly to DISSENT. For information on newsstand and bookstore distribution, write to: Eastern News Co., 255 Seventh Avenue New York 1, New York.

© 1962 by Dissent Publishing Association. Permission to reprint any article must be obtained from the Publishers. • Manuscripts will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. • Entered as second-class matter at the post office at New York, New York on April 1, 1954 under the authority of the act of March 3, 1789. • Volume IX, Number 1. (Whole Number 34.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSENT

VOLUME IX
WINTER 1962

NUMBER 1

EDITORIAL BOARD

Joseph Buttinger
Lewis Coser
Emanuel Geltman
Irving Howe
Norman Mailer
Henry Pachter
Stanley Plastrik
Bernard Rosenberg
Milton Sacks
Meyer Schapiro
Michael Walzer

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Travers Clement
Erich Fromm
Michael Harrington
Murray Hausknecht
Sid Lens
Frank Marquart
A. J. Muste
Herman Singer
Norman Thomas
George Woodcock

A QUARTERLY OF SOCIALIST OPINION

CONTENTS

	Page
JOURNAL OF THE QUARTER	
The Urgency Is Greater — *by I. H.*	3
Food for China—*by S. P.*	4
ARTICLES	
One Year on the New Frontier: The Devolution of Democracy—*by Paul Goodman*	6
Courage and Economics in Washington — *by Ben B. Seligman*	23
The Mood and the Style—*by Michael Walzer*	29
Open Poem to John F. Kennedy—*by Norman Mailer*	33
Kennedy and the Unions—*by David Carper*	35
Official Liberalism and National Nervousness—*by William J. Newman*	40
Civil Defense of the New Frontier—*by Stephan Thernstrom*	46
How George Meany Is Helping to Elect a Negro President of the AFL-CIO — *by David Carper*	58
Youth Work Camps — *by Paul Goodman*	64
Europe 1961—Notes on the Margin—*by Lewis Coser*	73
Notebook:	
Journey to the End of Right —*by Irving Howe*	79
Social Mobility Among the Dead—*by L. C.*	82
The Structure of Socialist Parties—*by André Philip*	84
COMMUNICATIONS	
New Styles in American Social Protest — *by Anne Parsons* (reply by *Coser and Howe*)	88
BOOKS	
"And Where Will I Get a Malted?" — *by Moishe Nadir* (Herman Kahn's *On Thermonuclear War*)	93
A Tract for Our Times — *by Bernard Rosenberg* (Seymour Melman's *The Peace Race*)	95
The Tragedy and the Glory—*by Herman Singer* (Hugh Thomas' *The Spanish Civil War*)	97
INDEX 1960-1961	100

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"We call on all the people of the world, in all countries, and of all political convictions, to join us in this strike. We warn those in power to stop the Cold War, to stop testing nuclear arms that are poisoning us, to begin serious negotiations toward settling their differences, and to begin bold measures for total disarmament. The governments must disarm. We are not concerned with who begins. We urge them to begin to disarm even prior to negotiations."

The statement above is quoted from an appeal by the New York Committee for the General Strike for Peace which has enlisted world-wide support for a demonstrative peace strike during the week of January 29th.

"A non-violent work stoppage [writes the Committee] is a refusal to participate in the normal functions of the community, except for those absolutely necessary for health and sanitation. This strike will last a week. You can strike for one week, one day, one hour. *Strike action will take place during strike week: from Monday, January 29th through Sunday, February 4th, 1962.*

"If necessary this will be the first of a series of general strikes. Such a series will continue until we can live in peace, free from a further increase in the terrible effects of fallout, and free from the threat of a war that might annihilate most, if not all, human beings."

Further information can be obtained by writing to the Committee at 789 West End Avenue, Apt. 2C, New York 25. The same address can be used for financial contributions which are urgently needed to encourage the Committee's work. Meetings of the Committee are held Wednesday evening's at 7, at the Living Theatre, 530 6th Avenue, New York City.

Many peace demonstrations have already been held—among them a picket line before the U.S.S.R. headquarters in New York, a peace discussion on various campuses, notably Cornell, during which teachers devoted their class time to the issues of war and peace, rather than regular subject matter, etc., etc. Still others are planned. Immediately ahead are the Strike Week and a Washington Action called by Student Peace Union, Student SANE, Turn Toward Peace Student Committee, and others for February 16, 17.

"The Student Peace Union, in cooperation with Tocsin (Harvard) and several other organizations, is calling for students to converge on Washington on February 16 and 17 to demonstrate before U. S. Government offices and the Soviet Embassy to make clear their demand for an end to nuclear testing, an end to fraudulent civil defense, and a beginning of concrete initiatives for peace. There will also be opportunities for groups and individuals to visit Congressmen, Senators, and other Government officials to discuss with them alternatives to the arms race."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE URGENCY IS GREATER

As this issue is being completed, it appears that the Kennedy Administration has finally decided to resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere. This decision, leaked to the press after the Kennedy-MacMillan meeting in Bermuda, is to be carried out in the Spring.

It is a catastrophic decision, a terrible mistake, and we believe that all liberals and radicals should occupy themselves in the coming months trying to bring public pressure on the Administration to change its course. For the only consequences of this decision are to intensify the nuclear arms race, to increase the danger to mankind that results from fall-out, to magnify the hysteria which prevents a peaceful resolution of issues, and to enlarge the threat of an "accidental" outbreak of nuclear war. With one stroke of self-destructive *realpolitik,* the Kennedy Administration forfeits the moral-political advantages that had accrued to the West when Soviet Russia resumed the testing of nuclear weapons.

Kill and over-kill, "deterrence" and provocation, bombs powerful enough to destroy a city and bombs powerful enough to wipe out a nation—the fatal pattern of Cold War is again to be resumed. And not, mind you, that there are lacking in the Kennedy Administration men of sufficient intelligence to realize how hopeless and destructive this course is.

When the Soviet Union first resumed nuclear testing, the Kennedy Administration clearly saw the enormous political-moral advantages suddenly opened to the West. For a moment, it stumbled toward these advantages; but then its weaknesses and opportunism—of the kind graphically described by Paul Goodman, Michael Walzer, and other writers in this issue—took over and it retreated shamefacedly, into the tradition set by it-

---

AGAINST NUCLEAR TESTING

We propose:

- that the United States announce to the world that it will not follow the lead of the Soviet Union in resuming tests of nuclear weapons;
- that, after setting this example of conscience, the United States then conduct a world-wide campaign (through the U. N., diplomatic channels and agencies of popular expression) to bring moral and political pressure to bear upon the Soviet Union and France to cease their testing;
- that the United States declare that it will refrain from nuclear testing no matter what any of the other powers may do.—[Reprinted from the Autumn issue of DISSENT.]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

self. It feared to incur the opposition of the political Right at home; it succumbed to the political psychology of the Pentagon; it reverted to the mania of Cold War militarism.

The resumption of testing would be a disaster in its own right; it would also be an ominous portent as to the political course the Kennedy Administration may be expected to follow in world affairs—a course of hollow and false "toughness."

In our last issue we presented some of the arguments against the resumption of nuclear testing. Here we need only add that these arguments seem stronger to us now, at the start of 1962, than they did several months ago. We hope for a reversal of policy; we urge public protest and pressure; we stand with those who believe that nuclear testing by any nation drags us closer to the apocalypse of our age.

I. H.

FOOD FOR CHINA

We now have sufficient information confirming that the Chinese Communists have approached American officials and private exporters with proposals to buy large quantities of American surplus wheat and grains to feed China's hungry millions. One such report states that China wants 6 million tons of wheat per year to raise the daily city food ration to 1500 calories, a minimal survival diet.

Only America has sufficient surplus food stocks to meet these needs; Australia and Canada—not to mention Russia and her satellite nations—can not meet these demands. Thus far, the preliminary negotiations have produced no results. Congressional action at the last session prohibits the sale of farm products receiving price parity support, such as wheat, to any Communist country. Hence, the issue of food for China is a national one, touching each citizen of the country. Only an act of Congress could open the food graineries to China.

Such are the simple facts of the situation. We may add to this the open admission of the Chinese authorities that starvation on an almost unprecedented scale even in a land familiar with such disasters, is taking place. There are basic political and moral issues involved here.

First of all, the senselessness of our refusal to have any relations with Communist China becomes more apparent. For the first time there exists a large body of corroborated information (*cf.* the excellent scholarly journal published in England, *The China Quarterly*) which indicates the shocks and crises that have brought the violent transformation of China by Mao Tse-tung and his party to a halt. Successively, there has been an abrupt abandonment by the regime of its programs in agriculture (collectivization, state farming, communes etc.) and in forced industrialization. The aging party leadership, known to be sharply divided internally, appears to have lost the fanatic elan and drive which made so notorious its early years in power. On top of this have come the disagreements of the XXth Russian Party Congress and the disputes with the Russians.

From the standpoint of the Chinese

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government, beset by crises and anxious to find time in which to readjust its hopeless industrial and agricultural targets, what could be more convenient than the rigid "bamboo curtain" raised by the Chinese and patrolled and reinforced by the American insistence on an inflexible boycott? The outrageous Communist position on admission of China to the United Nations (expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan plus advance approval by the UN of a Communist onslaught on that besieged island) indicates that Mao Tse-tung has no serious intention or wish, at present, to entertain normal diplomatic or other relations with the world. He prefers to remain entrenched, isolated and sealed off; a preference in which he is reinforced by American intransigeant attitudes and policies. Politically speaking, the act of supplying large quantities of needed food could, if properly handled, reap its own rewards—and this would mean acceptance of the premise that such generosity and solidarity on the part of the American people could not have, to be effective, any strings attached to it. The regime would be compelled to establish certain technical and other relations with the suppliers, for the problem of receiving and distribution alone would require this. Nor could it suppress knowledge of the source of the grain and bread. Other possible political consequences cannot be foretold.

And even if there are no guarantees that new relations, entirely to the advantage of the West and America, would open up, need Americans be reminded of their own historic picture of themselves as generous providers in the cause of humanity and the relief of suffering? The hungry Chinese men, women and children—the most immediate victims of the stiff totalitarian regime under which they live—appeal to no political principle in their cry for bread beyond that of elementary human solidarity. For us, that suffices. Unless, of course, we consider ourselves as waging war upon the Chinese people in their present helpless state; war in its ultimate form —the denial of life.

The conditions can and must be worked out; there is more than one international agency available to regulate the terms. America ought to open its overflowing graineries to the Chinese people—now.

S. P.

COVER DRAWING *by Jules Feiffer. Random House has just published Feiffer's latest book, "Boy, Girl, Boy, Girl."*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE DEVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY

Paul Goodman

Democratic power springs from an enlightened electorate. The neglect of this possibility in America, the failure to protect and advance it with new form and content during a century and a half of expanding area and population, of complicating economy and frequently revolutionized technology, and broadening relations with the rest of the world, has resulted in an electorate so demoralized that it is a question if it is possible to govern democratically at all. We tend to take lightly Jefferson's famous remark about the necessity for a revolution every twenty years, every new generation, but it is probably literally true, to renew democracy as he conceived it. (Jefferson was not, in fact, given to ill-considered slogans nor even dogmatism; but in stupider times his Enlightenment daring seems outlandish.) Meantime, during that century and a half, while the democratic power was being corrupted and was dwindling, other kinds of power and inertia have boldly filled up the vacuum, up to our present feudal system of monopolies, military and other bureaucracies, party machines, communications networks, and Established institutions.

The Kennedy Administration came in—one speaks as if it were there a thousand years; will we get out of it alive?—after a marvelously established regime of business as usual. And it was going to "make America move." It would be a rule of things by active personalities instead of a bureaucratic staff; it would be a "disorderly" Administration, in the sense that ideas and people could leap-frog the chain of command and clash and have it out; it would be rich with ideas, as guaranteed by putting in or near power such notorious thinkers of new thoughts as academics from prestigious colleges. What the activity and thought were to be toward, what the purpose was, was not clear—there were no issues in the campaign, no effort to enlighten the electorate—but it was called the New Frontier. Now in this essay I want to show that this *image* of a government, of active persons with no idea, indeed fits the real situation better than its only rival did, and the voters were esthetically wise to choose it—by a squeak.

After a year, including a Hundred Days and everything, and having learned that it is powerless and irrelevant except to "lead" in an intensified Cold War (which is itself, of course, powerless and irrelevant to any human good), the boyish *élan* is more sober. A philosopher close to the President now explains to me that the best to be hoped from gov-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ernment is to "mitigate the evils of modern life." This Niebuhrian political theory is not very wise, for if the aim is *merely* to mitigate, and not attack the structure and causes of the evils, one will not *even* mitigate, for the structure aggrandizes itself and produces new evils. It is as with civil liberties: if one merely protects them, without increasing the opportunities of freedom, one loses them. So I demur. I am then lectured to the effect that "if you had lived in the Administration of Jefferson, you would have been dissatisfied in the same way." That is, after a year in "power" under the present conditions, the Administration has begun to rewrite American history and prove that democratic power is a myth.

Since, by this philosophy, man is incurably stupid and his institutions evil, we must not get too hot to reform this or that present evil. And so they think. For instance, when three or four of us ask another Harvard professor to put a little zip into counteracting the nausea of the mass-media—we propose to him a couple of excellent libertarian plans and are even ready to write the legislation and outline the campaign to arouse public opinion—we are treated to the popular wisdom that "people get what they want" and "what great art was ever produced by subsidy?" (Needless to say, however, when Cultural Freedom and the Encounter of ideas are instruments of the CIA, means have been readily found to subsidize intellectual groups, even though nothing could be more treasonable to cultural freedom and the encounter of ideas.) But the problem, it seems to me, is an existential one; how does the professor, as an intellectual individual, keep down his nausea in front of the TV screen and not *have* to change? Presumably it is a government of men, and not an automatic machine, or what is the professor doing there?

Finally, on December 10, 1961, we have the answer in the Washington *Post:* Scholars in government "are good for ungarbling what thinkers on the outside have written . . . and tabulating the points" (Prof. Schlesinger). I am breathless with the thought that Walt Rostow etc., or even Arthur Schlesinger, imagine they can write more clearly than thinkers on the outside; but I am indignant that such good talents should be misused for writing *précis;* it's like the waste of skills in the Army.

After a year, the conception of a government of active personalities and disorderly clash has crystallized into the doctrine of the "Web of Tensions," the use of internal conflict to generate ideas. This Hegelian notion is pyschologically correct. In the present ground-rules of the White House, however, it works out as follows: (1) There is a careful preselection of the combatants, so that no too obstreperous voice will disturb the proceedings, or laugh. (2) If anyone *in* the debate does disagree in a way awkward for the Cold War policy—and especially if his predictions prove correct—he is dropped. (3) At best in a megalopolis like the United States government, the Web of controversy is far removed from even its own staff-workers, who nevertheless have to provide relevant materials and know what they are doing when they execute orders. To these workers the effect of the Web of Tensions is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confusion, the feeling of purposelessness or divided purpose, of being out of contact and therefore absolutely frustrated when their earnest efforts are disregarded for reasons that cannot be explained to them. They then naturally withdraw into the usual bureaucratic apathy, now not even orderly. (4) Nor is this difficulty helped if the tense thinkers are by disposition in-turned, unfriendly, and unpragmatic. (5) Last but not least, the inventive out-going moment of the Tension, the reason for it altogether, is horribly inhibited by the fact that the thinkers don't have any power anyway. As one critic has observed, the Web of Tensions simply means that they are getting more tense.

I don't want to be unfair, though it is hard not to be sarcastic. In the centralized power-complex that these people are committed to, and with the baroque conception of national sovereignty that they represent in a world that has come to have a different nature, it is probably impossible to govern. Both vested interests and the social-psychology of the people (and the influence of the vested interests in the social-psychology of the people) are fixed on the Cold War. Even the coalition that put Kennedy in office is too variegated to be maintained, and I shall try to show that he is re-forming that coalition to be a better Cold War "leader." The kind of revolutionary attitudes and do-or-die attempts at education that would make for government and tend again toward democratic power, are beyond the talents of these people; nor, of course, do they want them. They did not run, they were not elected, to thwart the "industrial-military complex," as the departing President called it: to make peace and internationalize the world; to diversify and decentralize our economy; really to help backward peoples according to their needs and customs rather than for our own profits and war-aims in alliance with their ruling cliques; to revive civil liberties and try to improve the quality of American life. They did not campaign for these purposes, but I am puzzled why, except for the politicians, they did campaign.

II

To get a better view of Washington after a year, let us turn from these Top philosophers to those who are not in the Web of Tensions, though not a thousand miles away. Here is a collection of comments:

"Lot of activism: action for the sake of action." "The way they want to get something moving, you feel that they need to overcome something 'static' that is threatening to engulf them." "They don't know the difference between real power and the juvenile trappings of power." "You say that the Americans in general have a neurotic feeling of powerlessness, but you don't realize that those in power are equally frustrated." "As a matter of fact, there *is* a lot of loose power around, in Congress for instance, but he doesn't wield it." "If some Congressmen had monkey-glands—"

"This Administration is peculiarly humorless, like phony actors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At least Eisenhower was a genuine Rotarian." " 'Posture' is the favorite word. The preposterous syntax in the President's speeches: 'Ask not—' 'Let no one think, etc.,' especially when he occasionally mispronounces common words." "The worst was the speech to the Latin Americans, peppered with Spanish quotations but nobody taught him how to pronounce the words. It was embarrassing." "The Roman style is highly esteemed: tough, terse, we play for keeps." "I think they were badly stung by that remark last spring that they were great dribblers but never made a basket. I think that the need to produce at all costs was one reason for the Cuban goof." "Kennedy took full responsibility for it, like a Roman—and made full use of the scapegoat that he had poor Intelligence. But Bobby shut up the ones who apparently had more accurate information."

"They act on schematic preconceptions, with a crazy emphasis on Analysis and Facts; completely unpragmatic." "They have a justified contempt for the 'fuzzy liberals' who spout generalities that have nothing to do with the concrete situations, but they don't understand that to get anywhere, you have to have an ideal, a pragmatic-end-in-view."

"Naturally, being unpragmatic, they are continually projecting and finding scapegoats, rather than having real obstacles to overcome." "They talk about the dilemmas inherited from Eisenhower; but how is their own policy any different?" "They are apprehensive of obstacles that don't even exist, for example, opposition in the Appropriations Committee on issues where there is no opposition. In my opinion, they do the same with the Russians. They never think of clearing up an imbiguity by going and asking; they always figure it out by Analysis and guessing. This isn't helped by an Intelligence that feeds them false facts." "They try to circumvent the preconceived obstacles by tricks. You get a memorandum an hour before the meeting, so there's no time to research it and back up your opposition. Perpetuation of errors."

"He is astoundingly sensitive to criticism in the press. Unlike Roosevelt who got mad and told them off. But Kennedy says, 'Now Jimmy Reston shouldn't have said a thing like that.'" "He calls in *Life* to explain himself to *them!* So it becomes a symbiosis: since he takes them seriously, they are flattered and give him a good press, and he gets sucked in." "Is he still worrying about the close vote? Or maybe doubtful he should be there at all? By the way, why should he?" "Kennedy believes that there is a terrific force of reaction, that mustn't be confronted too fast, and one mustn't go too far."

"Of course, in an enterprise this big there's bound to be confusion and bad communications. But it doesn't help when they play it cool and by ear. Take the private-shelter story in *Life*: a press-officer gave it out and there was a howl afterwards." "In the Eisenhower chain-of-command routine, there was at some level a definite decision, also routine and usually lousy. But here one doesn't know *what* has been decided, if anything." "If he had a policy, why didn't he fire them all and put in his own people to pursue his policy? How much obstruction can you put up

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with? In 3 years Chile will be Communist even without Castro." "The difference under Roosevelt was that the Secretary would draw everybody together and inspire them with a pep talk; so that in *spite* of the bureaucracy they pulled together and got going." "Well, in my agency the chief complaint is that there isn't any contact with the bright young men who have access to the White House. You ask, what do they talk about in the White House? Oh, everything."

Finally, "There you are. All this talk around here finally tends to revolve around what He is like, and that's boring. Is it boring because we're sick of talking about personalities instead of issues, or is it boring because Kennedy is boring? It comes to the same thing. Kennedy seems to me to be simple." "Maybe the chief use of this Administration, especially after the last, is that it shows that livelier, better educated, and more likable people are even more boring in this situation, unless they stand for something."

III

This is not a happy spectacle. Let me point out, however, that it pretty accurately describes the behavior of a crew of hipsters, as Mailer called them in 1960, not foreseeing the consequences. It is the cool and activist role-playing of vitality in a situation of impotence. (The impotence is caused partly by obstacles and partly by their characters.) Like the artist and live person he is, Mailer responded accurately to the type during the campaign; he missed its meaning because he is (transiently, I hope) a chump. He is a great one for the style, the *nuance,* of life; he failed to remember that, as Kant said, a characteristic of art is to be *Zweck ohne Zweck,* purposive without a purpose. More serious has been the error of the liberals who were "realistic" and who, instead of going about their business of dissenting and building a movement that they believed in, supported Kennedy on the theory that, once elected, he would drop the morals and techniques that got him the nomination. But to no reasonable person's surprise, the Administration proves, after the election, to have the same basic character as when the candidate was wresting the nomination and waging an uphill campaign. Being in office, however, is less favorable than campaigning for the display of jumpy vitality well-heeled, morally uncommitted and intellectually shallow. Unfortunately, the end is not yet.

Of course I am judging by a high standard, but otherwise why bother? Why should these people seek office unless they had a useful idea and felt indispensable to execute it? Omit Kennedy and ask about the professors. They have given up citizenly independence and freedom of criticism in order to be servants of the public and friends of the cops. Presumably this is for the utility of power rather than the vanity of power. What? how? The answer is Analysis and Tabulation. In like manner, the scientists make bombs and missiles, but they do not make policy and they do not strike to enforce peace.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

The impotence of the administration is due, I have said, to the past down-slope of our history and its present irrelevance to world history-making. These causes are intrinsically related, for if the United States were not the kind of society it has become, its Administration could work toward a world order. Our emergency is not in Berlin, etc., as the newspapers keep proclaiming but in the economic, social, and psychological need for the Cold War. (Thus, if I were asked how to save us from Russian bombs, the first step would be to free the TV channels, for real controversy and true reporting on international affairs, for criticism and programming in our municipal and vocational lives, so that people would have to face the things that matter.)

With whatever hopes and purposes the Administration came in (and, as Oscar Gass has pointed out, these were already quite marginal and inoffensive to anybody), it has met the massiveness of the *status quo* and its established powers, venal, blimpish, police-ridden, prejudiced, and illiberal; officially existing in the Pentagon, the Treasury, the FBI, the Civil Service, the Scientific corporations, a large part of Congress. Eisenhower's Administration, in its personnel and motives and chain-of-command staff-work, rather simply expressed these underlying existing forces and inertias; it therefore had—especially in the retrospect of having survived it—a certain solid impressiveness. The picture on the box was the same as the contents. With the best will in the world, the *status quo* is a rocky mass to move; but of course the son of Joseph Kennedy had no such foolish idea. His first official act was to continue the existing FBI and CIA, and that was already the end of working toward a new America or a new world. The Wall Street stalwarts—Dillon, McCone, Foster, etc.—were brought back as they would have been if Nixon had won. The Pentagon could become only more so. Inevitably the subordinates of the agencies would be unchanged, but in a large number of cases the same types were returned to make policy, or obstruct "policy." (Foreign Aid is a sad example, as if the racketeering governments in the aid-countries were not intractable enough; and although, politically, even the Cold Warriors rightly fear that these countries will be "lost.") Must we not assume that "tragic" bureaucratic mishaps and failures-to-communicate are importantly due to the persistence of forces that want no change?

So we are presented with the embarrassingly *un*impressive spectacle of impotence among men who, by their personality, intelligence, and freer methods have promised to make America move; an irrelevant activism, a "tough" "hard" "posture" (it is necessary to put every word in quotation marks), and an astounding timidity that results from trying to be different from their own class-strength and class-needs, although they have neither a new idea to give courage nor a revolutionary will to make a change. That, on the domestic scene, there *is* no such new idea nor will to useful change, you can observe by looking out the window or thumbing through *Life;* the scene is, as might be feared, the same, only

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a year more so. More big money, more unashamed tax-dodgers, more cops, and more army. The war-budget is at least 25 per cent more than Mr. Eisenhower's last; but otherwise the "public sector," that Ken Galbraith was vocal about, is not further nourished. Some in Washington say that the Education bill was beaten by a "tragic" combination of perplexities—Negro-white, parochial-public, poor states-rich states; others, however, say that Dillon could afford it, that it was legislatively handled precisely in order to lose, and what evidence *is* there that Kennedy cares anything about Education? The New York *Times* has editorially described his interest as "tepid." That is, the program for a better quality of American life was fairly trivial to begin with (the liberals claimed that this moderation was necessary in order to win the election), but the will to achieve even this program has been lacking.

The field of action has been international affairs. It is estimated that three-quarters of the President's calendar is devoted to foreign and military matters, and certainly other matters are considered in this light, as fits the budget. The address to the Manufacturers strongly makes this point: when business is good, we look good in the world. Civil Rights for Negroes are never spoken of as social justice but always as enhancing our Image in Africa and Asia. (I asked a young Ethiopian what *was* the image of America in Ethiopia; he said that the vast majority of his people never heard of America.) The pressing problems of Youth are recognized by the Administration either as delinquency to be handled by the Justice Department or in terms of the few thousand, FBI screened, in the Peace Corps.

Yet here too, because of circumstances, action is impotent—except for the one grim potency of destroying everything. At present the administration of any sovereign State can make world-sense only by fitting into and furthering the inevitable development of the world community, and indeed by relaxing its own sovereignty. The interesting and long-range movement of the world has to do with increasing communications, exchange of people, the vanishing of colonialism and the rise of backward peoples from poverty, regional economic cooperation for mutual advantage. These secular movements occur, of course, according to their own laws, independent of Washington. A powerful national government can act in them only by contributing to them, perhaps leading. But an American administration is bedeviled in these things by business as usual and militarism, provincialism and jingoism. We cannot exchange goods with half the world; we cannot even talk to the Chinese. We cannot feed famine, though we have a surplus; we cannot give help to peoples except through our "friends," their rulers who rob them; and if a region is not a battleground, it is not considered useful to help at all. We put an ex-FBI man in charge of immigration. We cannot educate without propagandizing. We cannot engage in space-exploration without competing, nor develop modern technology without polluting the atmosphere. We cannot strengthen the parliament of nations lest it evade our grip. And of course the behavior of all the other sovereignties—including new-fledged

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cannibals and feudal lordlings as well as tall generals and ideologists even crazier than our own—confounds the frustration.

The sphere of free action diminishes. Even Latin America is increasingly frustrating. The chief current idea seems to be the perfecting of the arrangements, begun by Truman and continued by Eisenhower, with the big new power associated with the Common Market. As McGeorge Bundy put it on December 6, "It would be better if Western Europe were one great power . . . with the economic strength, the military self-confidence, the political unity of a true great power"; and on the same day the President plugged for trade arrangements with Europa. (By the way, what will prevent French rights and German skill and money from becoming a third nuclear giant?) Bundy warns that our rapprochement with Europa might amount to a Rich Man's Club against the rest of the world—yes, so it might; but in terms reminiscent of the White Man's burden, Walt Rostow mentions the responsibility of the "North" for developing the "South." In my opinion this allied policy is better than Barry Goldwater's isolated fortress of America, but it will not exactly kindle the enthusiasm of the nations toward the peace and unity of the world.

But the chief outlet for frustrated action is, of course, armaments and threatening postures. Oscar Gass deliciously reports the expression "posture of sacrifice" as a threat. Most often, the style is that of a frustrated juvenile delinquent who fears he might be judged inactive and probably powerless. This is younger than hipster, but it must be remembered that in international affairs statesmen always regress to more adolescent attitudes, whether friendly or hostile. We play the game of Chicken. There is gloating that our "tough" "hard" "policy" has "won" in Berlin. Soldiers are mobilized and will perhaps be demobilized. We will have Bomb Shelters and defy them. Walt Rostow is training guerrillas, since Castro did so well with them. (This is puzzling. Into what friendly countryside are the American guerrillas supposed to melt? Surely he means commandos?) The more hip age-level of the same frustration-syndrome is Game Theory applied to war. In Game Theory, the Web of Tensions is finally isolated completely from any contact with common reason, biological safety, or even any opponent except one's projections. All members of the Administration are experts in Game Theory.

A necessity for maintaining the Roman or cool posture is to have the situation always under control and not to be embarrassed by a goof or booboo. Unfortunately, this entails many contradictions. Since slant-eyed peasants are not really under one's control; since often one's best-considered efforts, as in Venezuela, work out opposite to what one planned; since from the beginning one is operating by a preconceived scheme, there are bound to be blunders and the threatening posture renders them more disastrous and more embarrassing. It is not possible to relent, atone, make amends, for these postures are "weak." On the other hand, to alibi, to be touchy to criticism, apprehensive of being misunderstood fearful of future criticism, timid of commitment, forced to be consistent

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—these postures are also glaringly "weak." (One had the impression that Cuba, etc., was intimidating in this way, as if a gang suddenly realized they were on a tougher block than they had been brought up on.) There is then nothing for it but to strengthen reprisals and enlarge the arsenal. This is called the Cold War, and of course this has become the greatest frustration of all, since the final and only proof of power, to fight and win, entails suicide and losing. That is, the outlet for frustrated activity is a scene where activity is frustrated.

Gordon Christiansen, the chemist, argues that the newer tactics of the Cold War are *solely* for home consumption. Since the bomb shelters are scientifically fraudulent, they will not deceive the Russians; so their purpose, he says, must be a calculated deception of the Americans, to prepare for our making a first strike. This is too shocking to believe; and also, I think, it is too ill-considered as a political policy for such astute politicians. Given the rising protest of so many respected scientists and students and even children, and many mothers, pushing the Civil Defense might result in riots on the streets. It is simpler to take it as the inevitable accumulation of frenzied expedients, as with the beast in *The Burrow*. But of course this comes to the same end result as Christiansen fears. The breakdown of common sense and morals in the continuing Cold War make it more and more indifferent who will be "guilty."

V

As apparent from all the foregoing, the demography of the Administration consists of the Status Quo, the Coalition on which it was elected, and its own characteristic groups, viz.:

(1) Wall Street Republicans, continuing.

(2) The Pentagon, continuing, in which we must include the aristocrats of military science in Rand and Aerospace. These latter, since more mentally busy, are more bellicose than professional generals whose aims, on retirement, seem to be intensely economic and therefore they have an incentive to retire alive.

(3) Bureaucracy and Civil Service in the other agencies, also mostly continuing.

(4) FBI and CIA, continuing. These are, again, activist-violent in disposition. The FBI is more lower-class, the CIA more middle-class. But the aristocrats of the violent-minded are the new-come professors from the old OSS, trained in the prudence of Strategic Bombing. About half a dozen members of this Club have access.

(5) The fuzzy liberals, part of the coalition who don't really belong. But even Harriman would be called a liberal. (Reuther, of the UAW, is said to be a useful friend.)

(6) The professors. These are characteristic and fall into various types: e. g., Schlesinger, Wofford, or Galbraith more for thought and speeches; Rostow more for power postures; Bundy more for administering.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(7) A number of genuine intellectuals, interested in prudent and ideal action. These are mostly younger men—like the young instructors or assistant-professors at universities, who suggest curriculum changes. This group is also characteristic of the Administration and gives it a livelier tone than its predecessor.

(8) The President's entourage for special assignments, with Irish names that roll on the tongue. We may here include Robert Kennedy. These are called, probably unfairly, the Irish Mafia.

(9) Besides, there is an unofficial night-life circle, generally upper-class and violent-minded. Important is Joseph Alsop who is said to leak hard-to-get data in order to push his activist policies and interests, e. g., the National Estimate of missiles. Alsop's tack is as follows: two years ago he said there was a missile gap, so we had to build fast; now he says that the gap was exaggerated, we are way ahead, so we can take risks. This gets you coming and going.

As might be expected, the glossary and style has strains of (1) Madison Avenue. E. g., "hard" and "soft" are applied to research, "hard" research contains numerals. "Shop," as 'over in Charley Hitch's shop." "Sanitize" is very good: it means to doctor a report, as to Congress, to take out the virulence. (2) Rand Corporation: "escalate," "hardware," "parameters"—"what are the parameters of the problem?" A horror is "wargasm," meaning all-out retaliation, which I recommend to Mailer for his hipster-theory. (3) Armed services: "tough" and other terms of panic about masculinity. (4) Lionel-Trilling-literary, especially "posture."

A curiosity that deserves special mention, however, is "exercise," as "A crude propaganda exercise," referring to a Soviet complaint about a Nazi in NATO. (British? I read in R. H. S. Crossman, "The aim of the exercise is clear," referring to a book he is reviewing.) The denotation is that the activity is only practice, it is not the real thing, it is not for keeps. Addressed to an inferior in a bureaucracy it can be crushingly one-up, for it means that there are grown-ups who do real things. But when used generally, as it is, it connotes that oneself is not *yet* altogether for real, one is waiting to graduate and get to work. (This is strictly the Cold War situation.) The next meaning—reinforced by the academic metaphor itself—is that *all* activity is merely academic, detached from any serious possibility of life. Since it is necessary to put up an appearance of being alive, one then adopts a posture or stance. *But such persons could commit suicide.*

Finally, I must call attention to words like "discipline" "sacrifice" "responsibility" and "challenge," which in Kennedy's mouth have a special stoical-Catholic tinkle. ("In this grave period, labor must discipline itself—" "The press must discipline itself and assume responsibility—") This is not the Catholicism that was touchy during the campaign, the prospect of Pope John in the White House (oh, to have had that fat man instead of Kennedy or Nixon!) It is the more moral Catholicism of the little boy who disciplines himself from masturbating and checks off his victorious days on the calendar. Masturbating proves you are weak

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and makes you weak. In this context, "challenge" is the kind of strenuous excitement possible to persons who, having given up their internal spontaneity, rally to an external demand; and then (as Murray Kempton judges) Kennedy is animated, genuine, physically courageous, and even unselfconsciously humorous.

(To my ear, in the rhetoric of Kennedy's big set speeches, there is an incompatibility between the two strains of the stoical-Catholic and the figure-of-history. The sense of duty does not seem to be himself, but his submissive—and evasive—obedience to some grown-ups; one is not convinced of his moral courage. The call-to-glory is warmer and more personal, but it is juvenile. How can a figure-of-history be spiritually inhibited? He cannot grow his myth but must finally manufacture it. With the best efforts of Madison Avenue and the History Department, such prose will not turn to poetry.)

VI

This brings me to the main theme of these reflections, the possible future of this character of Administration in our present democracy, the formation of what I shall call a New Consensus. We have now had the Cold War for fifteen years and it is about time that it became politically domesticated, with its own ethos and personnel. In the present Administration we have a remarkable and *organic* amalgam of the heirs and co-workers of America First and McCarthy and the heirs of Democratic Liberalism. This has an historical meaning. I cannot agree with otherwise excellent observers that we can write off the New Frontier as simply another sell for business as usual, for history does not simply repeat. Let me revert to my opening sentence, the failure of democracy by neglecting to improve the electorate. We then have, in scheme, the following devolution:

(1) For Jefferson, the chief use of democracy was *to* improve the electorate and so itself; people learn by deciding, including making mistakes. He championed decentralization, for people can reasonably decide only what they know about intimately. Madison hit on federalism as a revolutionary device for experimentation, for if the small group made a mistake, it did little harm to the whole; if it found something useful, it could be adopted by others and benefit the whole. One is struck by the pragmatism of such political thought, transforming the town-meeting into an experimental, self-improving unit with provision for expanding society. Any basic function could be the principle for the small political unit; e. g., to provide primary education, Jefferson suggested the militia-company or hundred. Applied to industry, the unit is the soviet. The political units select their federal delegates; this is democratic centralism from below.

(2) With the Jacksonian revolution, as de Tocqueville was quick to see, the democratic idea was already abandoned, for the power now resided in the majority of people *as they were,* with their passions and prejudices uneducated by the responsible give-and-take in a face-to-face

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

meeting that had to make practical decisions and use tax-money. Instead, the people would merely vote on issues and party-programs. This was an invitation for demogogues and party-leaders to get power, and for lobbying interests, that could deliver votes and cash, to influence the politicians for their own power.

(3) Through the 19th century, these non-public and non-governmental powers, bankers and industrialists, vastly increased their influence. Attempts to control them, e. g., by silver legislation and trust-busting, themselves centralized and increased the governmental power. But what was tragic was that grass-roots politics, like the agrarian and labor movements, also followed the centralized bureaucratic style. And of course the stresses and dislocations of war speeded up these processes. It is said that one reason that Woodrow Wilson hesitated to declare war was that he knew that the industries vastly expanded and empowered by war could never be displaced from power after the war.

(4) The imminent breakdown of the system in 1929 brought back a surge of popular participation in some respects not unlike the age of Jackson. But this was soon re-integrated into the bureaucratic central government by the paternalism of Roosevelt and his Agencies. Economic controls, social insurance, and other welfare began to break down altogether the formal division between government and the monopolies and other great powers of society. All this was regularized after the Second World War; by the 1950s there existed one massive Organized System, inert or expanding by its own law, immovable by any political public power, and administered, rather than governed, by the administration of Eisenhower.

(5) The election of 1960 was remarkable in that now there was not even the semblance of issues or programs for the voters to decide between. The election was importantly decided by the contrast of personalities on a TV screen. It was the end of the Jacksonian idea, since with mass-communications and national commodities, people's passions and prejudices were themselves nationalized. There had ceased to be a democracy even in form. The Administration would be, however, the necessary *symbol* of government. (For a rough analogy, consider the Roman "Republic" and its senators and consuls during the early Empire.) Now what are the characteristics of such a symbolic government, and what might be its future development?

VII

Eisenhower was unsatisfactory in many ways. With all his solid virtues and genuine Rotarian togetherness and Everyman's ignorance, he was often ludicrous as a Chief of State. Newsmen had to edit him, satire had to be suppressed, lest the image of government break down altogether. Culturally, he was out of place as the head of a Great Power. But most important, his regime was universally regarded as dangerously boring. For two reasons: first, the public will to politics, whether or not it was possible to exert power, had absolutely no object

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on which to exercise itself. Discussions of domestic "policy" fell to an all-time low; and instead, there sprang up a vast literature of criticism of the System en bloc, of the Cars, the Organization, the Suburbs, etc., etc. Most of this was a one-upping cynical product of the system itself, yet it did not express dissent and was disillusioning to the young. The later years of Eisenhower were marked by a resurgence of Youth, acting now in parapolitical movements, Birchite or Beatnik or Pacifist. But secondly, and most important, the adequate administrative inactivism of Eisenhower was symbolically quite inadequate for the affluent rigors of the Cold War. The old-fashioned diplomacy of J. F. Dulles, as brinkmanly as it was, still did not provide sufficient popular identification for so immense and continuing a deadlock. People began to join SANE.

It is essential to consider the social psychology of the Cold War. Robert Engler has recently written a fine study of the cultural effects of the Cold War; but we must ask also what are the moods and paralysis *in* the culture that demand such a sustained, pointless, menacing, and potentially catastrophic enterprise. I have gone into this subject frequently elsewhere—the exacerbation, in modern conditions, of masochistic violence, Enemy-projection, and paralysis—but let me here especially mention the public mood of powerlessness, powerlessness on the job, in the bureaucracy, before the TV screen, in politics, with the police; the sense that "nothing can be done." This powerlessness projects itself in the fantasy of the Big News on the Front Page, the terrific Drama of We and They mutually frowning for absolute stakes. But for this fantasy to thrive, there must be adequate Actors. Nixon plugged as hard as he could his *ad hominem* clash with Khrushchev, and indeed thereby almost won the election.

In all these respects Kennedy's Administration is a find. Kennedy can take care of himself in public and with his peers. His musicale has been praised by Paul Henry Lang who was so brutal to Ike. He is his own Secretary of State. His jaw is commensurate with General MacArthur's.* (Russian generals scowl; ours tend to jut the jaw.) He is vigorous and has physical courage. His lack of moral courage is no defect because, with Franco, Chiang Kai-shek, and tommygun-defended bomb-shelters, we are far beyond principle anyway; and on the contrary, a slippery idealism, in the style of Luce, makes a good hipster. We have seen that the Administration of active personalities *is* good; unlike with Eisenhower, the Game Theorists now seem at home. Yet the President himself is also a serious man, *sage* in the French sense, commensurate with the need for caution in the Emergency. He does his homework and learns the Facts. He is intelligent—not in the sense that we speak of our friends as intelligent, but in that he can read rapidly through a reasoned memorandum and catch the drift. Though he is high-toned himself, he has a nice family; his brother and sister-in-law have formed a study group

* In the East Wing of the White House hangs a picture of the Great Stone Face. Considering the theme of Hawthorne's tale, this is really carrying the profiles of history to the point of juvenile *hybris*. Like asking Frost to alter his poem at the Inaugural.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in Fairfax county across the Potomac, and Professors Walt and Arthur are going to give weekly lectures.

Most important of all, finally, with the Kennedy Administration there emerges for the first time the possibility of a National Unity to "wage" the Cold War. There is no other figure whose background encompasses McCarthy (and so guarantee that he is not soft on communism) and the Liberal Democrats (and so guarantees that there will be no wage-cuts during the war-economy). For the remainder of this essay, let us trace the lineaments of the New Consensus as a further devolution of American democracy.

VIII

A new Center is necessary. We saw that it is in the nature of the Cold War, where there is aggressive activism without pragmatic power, that there must be blunders, embarrassing at home and abroad, and even economically injurious and so leading to panic among American businessmen who are notoriously unable to take the long view. Such things jolt public identification. Also, the present Administration came in not only with a tenuous majority but also by a coalition—e. g., of urban Negro preachers and southern politicians, of leftists and financiers—quite impossible to maintain. Within three months of being in office, Kennedy had lost the more earnest liberals who had supported him anyway only because of their congenital obsession not to leave a blank space on a ballot. He has lost the professors, scientists, etc., who protest the nuclear insanity. Youth has held on a little longer—with the Peace Corps and all—but is pulling away fast in all directions. (A gentleman high in the Administration has said that "Youth is not a class"; he is in error.) On the other hand, stalwart party liberals like Gov. Lehman and Mrs. Roosevelt—and apparently even Bowles and Stevenson—*never* quit when there is the appearance of "influence" (they supported Wagner, and Mrs. Roosevelt is now for bomb-shelters if they are community bomb-shelters!) So the Center can go this far left. On the other hand, from the beginning Kennedy visited Nixon and Eisenhower and as far as General MacArthur. The plan for the New Consensus, therefore, emerges as follows:

(1) To drop the trouble-making liberals as quietly as possible.

(2) To exclude and ridicule the Extreme Right. The official stamp on this policy was the remarkable statement of J. Edgar Hoover condemning the rabid as unwitting fomenters of Communism. He sounded like the anti-anti-Communists of 1953.

(3) By a modest social legislation and a modest advance in Civil Rights, to hold the unions and organized Negro groups, while reassuring business and convincing the Southerners that, in our world position, a progress toward desegregation is inevitable. With the stepped-up production of military hardware, there ought to be no increase in unemployment, even a decrease. Given this much and the continued support of, for example, Senator Humphrey (the Senator is alleged to have said, "When I accepted the leadership, I gave up liberal principles"), the Administra-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion can rely on the ADA milieu of the N. Y. *Post,* without impeding further gains.

(4) The true grandeur and security of the New Consensus come from these further gains: it is beginning to captivate the mass of lower-brow readers of the N. Y. *Daily News* and the educated suburbanites who read Luce magazines and egg on their sons to get good grades and make the prestige colleges. These are the solid centers of Cold War fervor and Cold War mentality. The strengthening of the FBI suits both the righteousness of the stupider and the conformism of the brighter. For the *News* readers, there is an advantage in the friendly ambience of Catholic humanism-plus-discipline, quite oblivious of any notion of civil liberties or social change; for the college-bound, the professors are reassuring of tolerance, and their schools are among the most prestigious. The amalgam of Murrow and Luce in Information has been masterly. To the horror of John Birch, Inc., the TV attitude toward the Communists is often understanding and almost admiring—they are a powerful enemy, we shall have to confront them for "a generation and maybe two generations"—I quote from a TV documentary called *The Remarkable Comrades).* It is now only the young pacifists who are treated sharply as naive, misguided, and dangerous idealists. Persons like myself and my friends are gently encouraged as "utopians."

IX

What is the intellectual Idea of the New Consensus? Let us go back to the Professors, who are not now class-objectionable because, in principle, everybody who is not underprivileged goes to college. First, they are not eggheads. An egghead is one who, seduced by intellect and truth, might by chance say something inexpedient or something poetical that illumines the scene. Also, they are not brain-trusters, pragmatists who might come out with future-thinking like the TVA or the uncensored WPA. Rather, as we have seen, the Professors do Analysis and Tabulate Facts. As philosophers, they affirm a broad tolerance of ideas and an absolute pessimism about ideal or "utopian" action. Thus, via Dr. Niebuhr, the sage of *The New Leader,* we get the astoundingly un-Protestant rapprochement of Harvard and the neo-Jesuits!

Washington at present has a pleasantly free atmosphere of discussion. (Naturally I do not know the tone in the middle of the Web of Tensions.) Unlike the previous crew, the professors know from experience that propositions do not bite, and they do make the best conversation-pieces. I myself have been urged, by one who has access, to continue my indispensable "role of dissent." That is, we are the Jester. What is puzzling, however, is that the Administration is continually plaintively asking for ideas; the President asked even the NAM to send him ideas. The implication is, partly, that the carping critics really have no alternatives to suggest. The important fact is that, since the Administration neither can nor is willing to make structural changes, these people would not recognize an idea if they saw it. The openness to ideas, the hunger for ideas, in fact works out as follows:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

When a radical reform is proposed—e. g., a concrete plan to countervail the technologized FBI or the mass-media—at once one hears the most subtle niceties of definition and an amazing purity about constitutionality, possible corruption and abuse, the right of the public to "choose," etc., etc.; and anyway, as the clincher, Congress will never appropriate money for such a purpose. (As a critic has observed, "The wisdom of a policy is measured by the opinion of Mr. Oren Harris of Arkansas.") But if it is a matter of lending a much greater sum to a railroad that every banker has rejected as a bad risk, then there is no difficulty, there is a much looser interpretation of the public interest, and the Administration is willing to push. In the welfare state, there is a nice discrimination between expenditures that subsidize large enterprises and those that are worthless or peanuts. If the Public Sector means roads for General Motors or Urban Renewal for Webb and Knapp, it is attended to; if it means community experiments, work camps for youth, public defenders, or even primary education, it is nicely scrutinized. (But of course this double standard of scrutiny has long been familiar to us in the mysterious law of Economics whereby expenditures in 000,000,000, for armament, are never questioned with regard to nine or ten figures; expenditures for highways, in 00,000,000 are rarely questioned for eight or nine figures. But expenditures for useful domestic purposes, in 000,000 or even 0,000, are most strictly scrutinized; and, as poor people know, expenditures in 00 or even 0.00 require a means test and a quiz on morals.)

"Wagner is a hopeless boob!" exclaimed the Professor. "Then why did you support him?" "It was the chance of getting the Democratic machine away from De Sapio." "But it's *my* city!" I cried, "and you killed a strong reform movement." . . . Yet De Sapio *did* deliver New York City in the nominating convention, after oddly backing Symington, although any honest poll would have given most of the city to Stevenson. There's loyalty! To learn this kind of practical wisdom, you do not need to go to Harvard; you can get it in a pool-room.

Let me illustrate the Higher Science from Aerospace, a wholly government-supported corporation. Attacking Kefauver's anti-drug-monopoly bill, the spokesman of Aerospace explained that it would retard progress in space exploration, e. g., in developing medicines for victims of nuclear fallout. *(Washington Star,* Dec. 10, 1961). Aren't these people shameless?

Since I am nervous about the self-discipline entailed in the New Consensus, I ask about Civil Liberties. I am told, "Bobby Kennedy is not *against* civil liberties, he does not have any notion of what civil liberties *are.*" I did not have the chance to see Harris Wofford, the adviser on Civil Rights, since he was out of the country. (There is no adviser on Civil Liberties.) Wofford is an excellent and thoughtful man; he has even written for *Liberation* about civil disobedience. But he is a professor from Notre Dame and his view on civil disobedience is that we cannot take away a man's God-given right to rot in jail (he does not go on to Hobbes' dictum that the State breaks the social compact if it jails you,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and it's your natural duty to escape). But to my mind the most alarming clue of what the Administration promises on civil liberties was its bland, and entirely innocent, proposal to raise the news-rates in order to make the Post Office pay for itself! (This had to be dropped by Congress.) Yet one might have expected it: these people, professors of law and government and history, apparently do not have any notion of what the democratic idea *is*.

X

The New Consensus is an ignoble prospect. It would also be dangerous; for if such a national unity can fully form, we shall drift into a kind of fascism of the majority. If there were then a major reverse—supposing Brazil, Chile, Venezuela would follow Castro—the United States would be a police-state.

Robert Engler speaks of the society of the continuing Cold War as a "garrison state." I don't think so; it doesn't look like that. Rather, just the tightening of the existing suburban conformism, grade-seeking education, FBI protection, and mass-media, with a little addition of "discipline," "responsibility," and "sacrifice." This would be literally the despotism of the majority that Mill feared, manipulated by a popular Administration to meet a chronic Emergency.

In my opinion, the present Administration is committed to the Cold War (despite some evidence, I cannot believe it plans a first-strike nuclear war). It has no other economic plan than a war economy, no foreign policy outside the CIA, and no domestic idea at all.

If the Cold War is to be relaxed and catastrophe prevented, we must do it by action outside of their politics, by every means and on every relevant issue. There is already agitation for peace throughout the world, sporadically, with increasing frequency, and by increasing numbers.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COURAGE AND ECONOMICS IN WASHINGTON

Ben B. Seligman

When FDR came to Washington in 1933 he was accompanied by dashing young economists and social scientists ready to remake the government, if not the world. Many were fresh from Columbia University, and quite unlike the Harvard–MIT contingent that now graces the Capital landscape, they were naive enough to believe that America's ills could be solved forever by intelligent planning and good will. They had not heard of the realities tough-minded politicians were wont to talk about, and they exhibited just enough brashness to make one think they might really succeed.

Foremost was Rexford G. Tugwell, who liked to shock people with predictions that America would be remade in the image of the New Deal. Accompanying him was Adolph Berle, assuring everyone he knew more about high finance than the bankers. Berle's intellectual partner, Gardner Means, went to work with imagination and vigor at the National Resources Committee, a sort of precursor to the Council of Economic Advisers. The NRC was the only agency that provided a haven for economic planners and while an internal conflict between Frederic Delano, the President's uncle, and Charles Merriam, made it somewhat impotent, the very idea of central planning in the government was extraordinary.

There were numerous others, all young and intellectually alive and all anxious to rebuild an America seared by depression. Ideas flowed in abundance; Washington was a lively place to be.

A certain parallel to this experience occurred when John F. Kennedy brought his administration to Washington in January, 1961. It was thought that the Eisenhower *ennui* would be overcome by a vibrant new generation, just as the New Deal had displaced the confused placidity of the Hoover years. Among economists especially, there was the feeling that the newer theorists, having refurbished the Keynesian apparatus, would demonstrate how to make an economy move, not at a languid pace but with buoyancy.

Heading the parade was Paul A. Samuelson, perhaps the most brilliant contemporary virtuoso of mathematical economics. Although not now an official member of Kennedy's corps of economists, he has great influence. In his middle forties, Samuelson has been rocking his academic colleagues back on their heels with penetrating theoretical analyses ever since his student days under Alvin Hansen at Harvard.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He has continued to display his brilliance both at Cambridge and in Washington with self-consciously urbane lectures on a variety of economic problems delivered to such serious Congressional bodies as the Joint Economic Committee. Yet the Samuelson glow has had difficulty getting through to Washingtonians. The Task Force paper he wrote for Kennedy on economic policy could just as well have been prepared by a less sophisticated Keynesian. James Reston once expressed the town's reaction when he revealed that he had been quite bored by all the split infinitives in it.

Other well known Cambridge economists among the Kennedy advisors include Walt Rostow and Seymour Harris. Rostow advises on foreign policy, while Harris acts as consultant to the Treasury and more recently has come forth as chief expositor of the political difficulties faced by the Kennedy economic program. Harris' heart has always been with the angels, that is, on the liberal or slightly left side. Yet one can detect in his most recent popular writings a tone of resignation to the harsh requirements of Washington *realpolitik*. He evidently has tried hard to impress his perhaps old-fashioned New Dealish views on government officials, but they keep coming out as pure New Frontier. And New Frontier these days is comprised of one part thought, two parts hope, three parts rhetoric and four parts political buck-passing.

BEFORE GETTING DOWN TO ISSUES, as Washington jargon puts it, let us complete the roster. Major interest centers, naturally enough, on the Council of Economic Advisers. Established by the Employment Act of 1946, the Council has had a checkered career. Its first chairman, Edwin G. Nourse, who had come from the academically careful Brookings Institution, made it an agency for economic analysis only. Leon Keyserling, considered by some Washingtonians as the economists' version of the china-shop bull, took the Council right into the political arena where he fought vigorously for the policies espoused in his CEA reports. Eisenhower's chairman, Arthur F. Burns and Raymond Saulnier, virtually turned the Council into the Washington branch of the National Bureau of Economic Research, that is, a purely statistical body which had nothing to say on economic policy.

The present chairman of the Council is Walter W. Heller, a youngish scholar whose forté is tax policy. While Heller has expressed his Midwestern distaste for the excesses of contemporary affluence, he does not, like Galbraith, believe that we have achieved the ultimate in production. That much of the conventional economic wisdom remains with him. Nor is he willing to admit that there is a serious gap in public services, as Galbraith has done. Heller has urged rather that private enterprise needs to be given a chance to demonstrate what it really can do—a chance that war, depression and a defense economy have denied it.

Next door to the CEA is the Bureau of the Budget, headed by David Bell, also from Cambridge. The strength of the Budget Bureau comes not only from its statutory right to trim Departmental pocketbooks, but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the fact that it can and does see that Presidential orders are carried out. Moving along Pennsylvania Avenue, from the liberals through the moderate Bell, we come to the Administration conservatives at the Treasury, where Douglas Dillon rules. Dillon acquired his conservative label not only because he served Eisenhower and successfully talked Kennedy out of tax cuts during the last recession, but also because he can be found generally on the opposite side from the Cabinet's liberal wing headed by Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg. Yet often it is difficult to distinguish conservatives from liberals in the Kennedy entourage. Dillon, for example, has supported lower interest rates and budget deficits, the accepted way of moderating a recession. But most important, it is to Dillon that Kennedy is apt to turn for guidance, rather than Heller or Goldberg or Harris.

II

All of the Presidential economic advisers appear to be of one cut—sophisticated, non-utopian, even bland, and very quick to learn the ways of practical politics. None lacks a ready justification for his retreat from "text-book idealism." Such accommodation, we are repeatedly told, is what Washington needs these days. But part of Kennedy's appeal to intellectuals, at least between the summer of 1960 and Inauguration Day, was his apparent sense of history. He seemed able to trace the roots of our difficulties and called for fresh ways of dealing with them. Only a few observers noticed that rhetoric is a poor substitute for genuine proposals. The Task Force papers, because they said so little that was really new, left one with a feeling of controlled skepticism.

In economic policy, for example, virtually everyone recognized that the country had been fumbling under Ike. Only the continued impulses stemming from a defense program kept us upright. Yet each postwar recession was successively more intense, each recovery less ebullient, each residue of unemployment larger and tougher to dispel. There was a promise after the elections that vigorous action—a favorite Washington expression—would be taken. But somehow assessments of situations as preludes to judgments got in the way—so much so that even Samuelson had to admit that the adventures in New Frontier economics constituted a "placebo program for recovery." The cocktail party circuit and car-pool riders began to talk about the Third Eisenhower Administration.

A crescendo of criticism of the Kennedy economic program is now evident. Walter Lippmann calls it Eisenhower stuff thirty years younger; Leon Keyserling says more kindly that it falls short of even modest goals; and the trade unions are so restive they must be placated with middle and high echelon conferences.

Why this harsh reaction? Quite plainly, *the Kennedy Administration has been unable to break the bonds of its milieu.* We have now a society in which the ostensible end of ideology is welcomed and in which serious political debate is frowned upon. Existence under Kennedy is unchanged: it is what it was under Eisenhower, homogenized and apathetic. As Jacob Cohen remarked in his dissection of the mind of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arthur Schlesinger, a key Kennedy adviser (DISSENT, Autumn, 1961), movements become merely lobbies on the Hill and the imperatives of history are transmuted into the art of the poltically possible. And unlike the days of the New Deal, it is believed that there are not too many repairs to make. Whenever a high Administration functionary is asked, "When will something be done?" the reply is, "Give us some ideas." Now, who elected whom?

It is at this point that former Kennedy supporters are starting to drift. They see the economy's upward movement spending itself. And while economists outside the Administration are beginning to hesitate about continued expansion and growth, those in the CEA and elsewhere in government insist on telling us that the "slowdown is a reaction to the rapidity of the upturn from the previous recession's trough." Haven't we heard this before in the last ten years?

Recently, the CEA asked industry, labor and university people for comments on a "full employment" model projected for 1963. The model assumed—*note bene!*—4 per cent unemployment as a mark of full employment. Another assumption was a rate of growth in GNP of 3.5 per cent a year. On the basis of these and other premises which need not trouble us at the moment, the CEA suggested the possibility of a $600 billion GNP (in constant dollars), of which investment represented $97.5 billion, consumption $382.5 billion and government outlays $120 billion. As compared to 1961, this would mean a 34 per cent jump in real private investment, while consumer expenditure would rise 14 per cent and government spending 12 per cent. Of course, a 17 per cent rise each year in domestic investment is not inconceivable, particularly when we recall the 28 per cent increase in 1954–55, but that was by all accounts an extraordinary year.

At any rate, an investment level of this magnitude implies either a marked shift in income distribution in favor of the business community or greater participation by government. Current data suggest that the total of business net profit after taxes plus the salary, bonus and related take of upper income strata recipients is around $105 billion, and might reach $115 billion in 1963. If we assume that about 70 per cent of this is saved (Keynes' average propensity), then at best $80.5 billion would be available for investment. (This estimate seems consistent with a capital-output ratio of 3:1, actual productivity gains of 2.5 to 3 per cent a year and an annual population growth of around 2 per cent.) Consequently, the CEA's 1963 target would require an income flow to "capitalists" about 20 per cent greater than the $115 billion suggested above. Of course, if the "capitalists" decided to save more, say 80 per cent, then their required income flow could be less and the gap would drop to a manageable $7 billion. But it is unlikely that the "capitalists" would curtail their consumption by a third. What the CEA hasn't made clear is that growth depends not only on investment, but involves as well income distribution, propensities to consume and save and capital-output ratios. It's a complicated business.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOW WE ARE TOLD that the big problem is the balance of payments in international trade. Here the administration appears to be caught in a bind. Our merchandise balance, the excess of exports over imports, is more than satisfactory, but the over-all balance is awry because of capital outflow and foreign aid. Thus, in 1960, a merchandise gain of $3.8 billion was wiped out by $3.5 billion in capital exports and $2.7 billion in overseas grants. In this situation, an inflation can be really ugly, for increased domestic prices would depress sales of goods to other nations. The conservative solution, which is well received in some Washington quarters, is to place a damper on wage hikes, since this is presumably what causes inflation. Hence the Administration's recent cautionary word to industry and the unions. Yet at least 80 per cent of the manufactured goods exported by us comes from industries in which prices are administered rather than market-determined, in which automation and advanced technology have reduced the proportion of labor in total unit cost. In autos, for example, direct labor per car is between 16 and 18 per cent of unit cost, while material represents about half. The rest is overhead and profit. Moreover, internal inflation at the moment does not seem to be a pressing matter. It could be that other considerations, such as the international trade policies of some European nations (West Germany, perhaps), have contributed more to our balance of trade headaches than internal economics.

Protecting the dollar in international trade can conflict with policies for stimulating domestic growth. Caught between this Scylla and Charybdis, the Kennedyites evidently believe that a balanced budget and wage restraints will help them through the political narrows without much loss. The thought seems to be that a conservative fiscal policy will allay the panic supposedly aroused by an unfavorable balance of payments. The Administration's treatment of this question reveals the lack of imagination which characterizes its entire economic program.

It is conceivable that further domestic expansion would present its own cure, for prosperity might attract enough of a capital flow to the United States to help overcome the trade deficit. On the other hand, a stumbling economy would hardly prove attractive to foreign investors, especially in the short run. The only ideas that have come up in recent months are the not-so-original "export-more" campaign and a rather wistful plea to our Allies not to run away from the dollar. As the *Economist* remarked, the Administration's best weapon is speech-making.

In the domestic field, proposal after proposal for stimulating economic growth is whittled down on grounds of political expediency. More energy is spent by Kennedy's economists rationalizing each compromise than in explaining the urgencies of the case. The latter, in itself, as Keyserling bitterly remarked, would be an education for lawmakers. To blame a Democratically dominated Congress for the inability to advance a Manpower Act merely teaches us how to pass the buck. The fact is that a ready willingness to compromise and back down permeates official Washington. The rather weak Wage-Hour revision was an almost classic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

manisfestation of the habit. The art of the politically possible has been carried to wondrous extremes.

Meanwhile, the Council of Economic Advisers continues to urge the use of general monetary and fiscal policy as the best way to deal with unemployment. Growthmanship, it is hoped, will solve all problems. This evidently takes off from Samuelson's observation that only the warm sun of a rising national income can melt the deep freeze of a depressed area. A fine thought when an economy has been operating at low levels with accumulated excess capacity, it is hardly serviceable when hard-core unemployment continues year after year despite a GNP of over $500 billion. Obviously, the economy itself has been altered: unemployment of the kind we are now experiencing is plainly *structural.* Industries are shrinking, the labor force is being reshuffled, the economic mix has changed. These are specific ailments, requiring specific treatment, but the CEA prefers a generalized approach. One might well ask whether gangrene can be halted with fresh air.

Tragically, little genuine hard thought is expended in official Washington these days on the particular steps necessary to deal with unemployment in the coal, textile, auto and steel industry, or how jobs might be provided for those especially prone to loss of work—the young, the old, the Negro. Some of the labor economists have been shouting, and rather loudly, but who listens? Administration advocates point to the depressed areas bill, a new minimum wage, expanded social security, a new housing act, etc., etc. Yet each was diluted in the face of Congressional opposition: it was more important to get *any* law on the books; never mind a decent one. How else is one to run successfully and with courage for the history books?

Scholarly Prose

Divide Your Authorities

1) "Man, an animal after all, must, in Piaget's sense,[1] accommodate himself to the facts of brute existence."

2) "Work certainly does have, as Don Martindale notes,[3] instrumental value. . . ."

Scholarly Caution

1) ". . . the role of camping for men in reaffirming masculinity, or perhaps in escaping it."

2) "In view of Kinsey's findings that there is an average of only one pregnancy per 1000 copulations in the U. S., Nelson Foote's reference to this 'favorite form of play for millions of Americans[3] [21] probably applies, at least partially, to other countries too."

—All of the above from Edward Gross, "A Functional Approach to Leisure Analysis," *Social Problems* IX, 1 Summer 1961 pp. 2-8

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE MOOD AND THE STYLE

Michael Walzer

These days we don't ask of a new president "what will he do?" but "how will he appear?" The image of the leader at home, and now the "credibility" of his intentions abroad—these are the crucial elements of contemporary politics. Similarly, *he* does not ask us "how are we living?" but "what is our posture?" Domestically, the new questions suggest an end to significant political conflict; internationally, they are a part of the elaborate and frightening *mime* the cold war has engendered.

It is a little hard to adjust one's conventional ideas about politics and power to this new situation, to the idea, for example, that the crisis atmosphere of last summer and the policies adopted at that time did not have the purpose of increasing our strength but of making our use of that strength conceivable. Conceivable first of all to ourselves, so that the resulting mood (or appearance) of national determination might convince the Russians. President Kennedy played his part in this crisis with considerable skill. He is the first of our politicians whose style and rhetoric are perfectly adapted to the cold war. Nowhere more clearly than in his own person and administration are the limits and dangers of cold war politics revealed.

A president like Franklin Roosevelt depended at least as much upon the effects of his radically new policies as upon his personal style; Kennedy has hardly done the same. Truman was innocent of the higher art of public relations and depended for his effects upon actual participation in vulgar political struggles. Eisenhower was content to allow his lassitude to represent the weariness and confusion of the nation. Comfort was the effect he achieved and for that, art was unnecessary. Kennedy's style, on the contrary, is deliberate and willful. Hating and fearing the inertia, indeed, the comfortableness, of his public, he is constantly straining for effects of a new sort. Readiness, will, nerve, determination, endurance, sacrifice: these are the terms of his rhetoric. They do not constitute a political program or suggest a legislative effort comparable to that of the New Deal (the promise of another "hundred days" was designed to convey a sense of urgency but not a program). They do not require any involvement in social conflict. Kennedy's style reflects the official morality of the cold war. Its purpose is to create a cold warrior—frightening but high-minded—with a stern visage and an uplifted face. But it is at least as important that this new citizen be credible as that he be real; it is never possible to deduce from Kennedy's rhetoric his real intentions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE EFFECTS HE SEEKS are clear enough. He campaigned against the declining image of America. He campaigned against being second to the moon. "National purpose" was the gambit essentially of *his* supporters, despite its adoption by *Time-Life*; it reflected the mood of intellectual opposition to Eisenhower's complacency. Against that complacency, Kennedy has sought to generate a new nationalism, a sense of unity and determination. Hence the exhilarating grimness he has brought to American politics: it is the most direct reaction imaginable to Eisenhower's bland smile. His first State of the Union address was a dark (though incomplete) description of all that is wrong with the country. But Kennedy's grimness is more high-minded than zealous. It will not result in a renewal of political conflict at home or in a resumption of the social changes begun by the New Deal. A truly pragmatic liberal, I should think, would choose conflict and change as the best way out of the Eisenhower era. He would explore the stimulating effects of both upon the energy and idealism of Americans, seeking in political debate an alternative to conformity.

Kennedy is not in fact a pragmatic liberal; he is an adherent of the "crisis ideology" of the cold war. *He aspires to be a wartime president.* I don't mean to suggest that he is likely to launch a "pre-emptive strike" or that he yearns for the excitement and simplicity of conventional combat. But he seeks to represent the unified will and call forth the unselfish sacrifices of a nation totally committed to struggle and triumph. He seeks in unity an alternative to conformity; he hopes to generate activism and willfulness without uncovering disagreement.

Leadership of this sort obviously requires the end of internal conflict, the continuation of "bipartisanship" and even its extension to the sphere of domestic affairs. Thus the arguments for aid to education and civil rights tend increasingly to be put in cold war terms, that is, to be made unanswerable. Any more radical program has been laid aside. And when the President made his first political tour, after enduring repeated defeats at the hands of a congressional coalition of Southerners and Republicans, he spoke out against... the Birch Society and the pacifists. Kennedy thus disarmed his real enemies, without in any way rendering them harmless; they were simply included in the spurious unity which he proclaimed against Left and Right alike.

At the same time, it is characteristic of the approach of the new administration that terms like "will" and "sacrifice" have so little concrete meaning. To ask the American people to pay significantly higher taxes so that greater economic assistance might be given to the underdeveloped countries . . . would be a sacrifice indeed. But of that not a word; nor has anything been said of the "sacrifice" which American business must make if social reform is to be carried out in countries where it has massive investment.

In his effort to arouse the American people after the Eisenhower drowsiness, Kennedy has fallen back upon the rhetoric of the wartime Leader—Lincoln, Roosevelt (Mr. Win-theWar not Mr. New Deal),

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Churchill, De Gaulle. He has done this although he surely knows that the cold war cannot profitably or realistically be described in the old-fashioned imagery of warfare. One constantly catches echoes in his speeches of what has often in the past been the eloquent language of national unity and the will to victory. But the strained antitheses and parallelisms of Kennedy's prose are not eloquent. They are *kitsch,* because they do not describe our real condition. They aim at the easy and false fervor of schoolboy patriotism.

KENNEDY'S RHETORIC even misrepresents his own policies. Reread today the speech of April 20, 1961, delivered after the failure of the Cuban invasion. It was a hastily and loosely written speech, but not different in style from those which preceded and followed it. Kennedy's "crisis ideology" received its finest expression at this moment of national "defeat"—and sounded for a moment startlingly like certain other ideologies:

> The complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history. Only the strong, and the industrious, can possibly survive.

At no point in that speech—nor in his talk to American publishers a week later when he called for wartime discipline—did Kennedy suggest the policy we have since followed toward Cuba. Only once did he refer vaguely to a struggle "more difficult than war, where disappointments will often accompany us." His tone throughout was not one of disappointment but of nervous belligerency. He reasserted the integrity of our national will, our determination to triumph, our refusal to tolerate Communism in this hemisphere. Nor was any of this mere ritual, as it would have been with Eisenhower. Or rather, it was ritual of a new sort designed not to set our minds at ease, but to exercise us, to goad us forward to some (undetermined) effort, some assertion of strength. It reflected a mentality for which every crisis was a "test"—and a test of nerve (style) rather than of intelligence (policy). His nerve vindicated (his voice had been steady throughout the difficult speech; he assumed full responsibility for the "defeat"), Kennedy has never felt it necessary to defend rationally either the invasion or the hands-off policy which followed it.

The July 25 speech on Berlin was a more intelligent and careful example of the same sort of thing. The same rhetoric: "We do not want to fight—but we have fought before." The same ideology: Berlin, Kennedy declared, is "the great testing place of our courage and will." Perhaps it is; but it is also a testing place for our diplomatic craftiness and political imagination, and the President left little leeway for either in his address. It is significant that he chose this speech to elaborate the "new start on civil defense" which he had promised in May (only a few weeks after the Cuban affair). The choice had nothing intrinsic to do with the Berlin crisis, but it was intimately related to the style of Kennedy's approach to the cold war. Civil defense offers an ideal (and, in a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

certain sense, a safe) training ground for the national will. It requires discipline and mass participation. One of the things wrong with the cold war thus far, in Kennedy's view, is the ability of so many people to opt out, to take no active, or conscious, part. That is the substance of the complacency and self-indulgence of which he complains; he obviously intended to use the Berlin crisis to further his attack upon both.

Only nineteen days after Kennedy spoke, the East Germans raised the wall across Berlin—and we did not fight (as we have not fought before). Surely there is something dangerous about a presidential rhetoric which so inadequately describes the problems we face and our real intentions. It is dangerous because it conceals the fact—which Kennedy himself has recently admitted—that the trend of events in places like Laos, Cuba and Berlin is not dominated or controlled by our national will. A politics of willfulness and nerve continually falsifies our prospects and generates crises and "disappointments" out of what are in fact expected events and, by now, well-known dangers.

Kennedy's rhetoric is dangerous also because it increases the political risks of compromise and indecision. How else to maintain the "credibility" of American courage except to suggest that opportunities for heroism are always in the offing? But the opportunities (in any conventional sense) are unreal; we hardly encouraged heroic behavior when the Berlin wall was being raised. To talk of will, sacrifice and triumph, then, is to invite frustration. Since Kennedy realizes that frustration feeds the radical Right, he must occasionally play the realist. In recent weeks (November, 1961) he has been warning the American people to expect neither victory nor defeat in Berlin, but rather a long "twilight" struggle and a series of compromises. The warning is necessary in large part because of Kennedy himself; it is the inevitable outcome—excepting war—of the July speech. But Kennedy cannot yet couch his realism in matter-of-fact terms or give up the rhetoric of grim determination. He has made no significant start toward educating his public or arguing with his enemies of the Right.

THE TWILIGHT TONE, of course, has been present from the first; Kennedy introduced it into his Inaugural Address and it has been an undertone in many of his public statements since. In fact, the new administration may be analyzed in terms of a curious dialectic between its public style and its private intentions. On the one hand, Kennedy and his advisors surely realize the need to accept neutralism and democratic socialism—and to bargain for much worse—to assist in economic development even at the expense of American investors, to avoid the risks of brinksmanship. Such a policy is hard to come by; if pursued with any consistency it would undoubtedly lead to critical battles at home. More important, however, it would drastically interfere with the image of unity and strength which Kennedy also seeks to project. For this image, as I have argued, is not compatible with a realistic foreign policy. The outcome in practice of these contradictory impulses is the hypocrisy and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confusion which followed, for example, the Russian resumption of nuclear testing. Kennedy could hardly make this a convincing issue in the cold war without sacrificing something of the rhetorical immediacy of his campaign demand that America always be first—and without permitting someone else to take up the cry.

Kennedy's decision was for half-a-resumption of nuclear testing, and it invites comparison with the half-an-invasion he launched against Castro's Cuba. The two were manifestations of the same tension between the tough style and the "twilight" realism of the new administration. This tension produces a kind of oscillation in what Kennedy says and does which is similar to that of De Gaulle on the Algerian question. As De Gaulle's rhetoric of patriotism and glory is incompatible with the "defeat" he is going to accept, so the rhetoric of national will and wartime unity is incompatible with the long struggle (more difficult than war) which Kennedy more soberly promises us. And Kennedy's style similarly invites imitation and improvement from the Right, while he himself does little to encourage a realistic state of mind in the American public.

OPEN POEM TO JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY

fallout
is the hormone
of the small town mind

a fallout shelter
is sex

think how warm
at the thought
are all of Mr. U
and little Mrs. U S A
bonging the gong
below
while bigcity flesh
all that blond hair
and black hair
straight and long
short and highly curled
floating in through
the trees
a dew
of homogenized bone
and blood mist

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

atom bombs
are not so bad
says small-time
in the town mind
they disinfect
the big city
and jazz us to the toes
out here in God's Country

fingering is lovely
on the edge of the grave.

Mr. President
you realize of course
that your shelter program
for every home owner
is sexing up the countryside
and killing us in the
bigcity bar.
If this is good
for the vitality
of the nation
(I mean that countryside
could stand some sex)
then Mr. President
you are a genius
and corporation executives
living in the suburbs
with the five thousand
dollar
shelters
ought to salute you.
I do.

—NORMAN MAILER

(Reprinted with permission from the *Village Voice)*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KENNEDY AND THE UNIONS

David Carper

If anyone except a trade-union president—say a bank president, an old-line political boss, an insurance-company president, or a corporation lawyer—had ordered as much cash and manpower into an election campaign as Walter Reuther mobilized for Jack Kennedy, he would have gotten a ticket entitling him to this many places in the Cabinet, to that many ambassadorial posts, and perhaps not to a veto over any decision that bore on his interest but at least a nicely polished and highly useful gold-plated oar in the palaver leading to the final judgment.

But when you tote up what Walter Reuther got for the massive dispositions he commanded in patronage, in recognition, in favors, in acknowledgement of his contribution, and in special honors, the sum is less than nothing, because merely as Duke of Detroit, he would be entitled in the run of things to more than he has received so far and is likely to see in the next seven years.

What can be attributed in pay-off accounting to the Reuther side of the AFL-CIO are an appointment of his administrative assistant, Jack Conway, to a sub-Cabinet post in the housing agency, the naming of another Reuther staff person in the Industrial Union Department to a sub-Cabinet job in the Labor Department, and the designation of George Weaver as the Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge of the international labor program. No pipelines are necessary, however, to determine that each of these postings was made from happenstances that had nothing whatever to do with the discharge of political obligations, although it is generally credited in Washington that jobs the Reuther faction have actually sought and still wish for have never been granted and are not likely to be—but in all friendliness.

In appointments, the AFL has been treated even worse, and in one instance, an AFL personality of some importance, Joseph Keenan of the IBEW, was gratuitously humiliated. Quite callously the White House put out a story anonymously to the effect that Keenan was to be appointed as an assistant to Defense Secretary McNamara and then allowed it to become known that McNamara had rejected the idea because presumably by some sort of computer divining he had determined Keenan was not up to the intellectual standards he required.

With trifling exceptions this is the extent of the recognition by the Kennedy Administration of the expensive, strenuous and critical exertions on his behalf by the unions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Professional liberals, career Negroes, ADA operators and political academicians who have been associated with the unions, who court them, and who, with more or less success, have exploited them, have collected a substantial number of appointments that have been put down as union debts paid even though the swearing-in ceremony, without exception, was a bitter lump for the union people. Arthur Goldberg's champion performance in getting himself named Secretary of Labor as the union candidate despite the wry displeasure both Meany and Reuther have suffered from his efforts practically ever since he came out of Chicago, is a fair example of the kind of low-temperature humiliation labor leaders have endured until now under the Kennedy rule—a succession of snubs from essential snobs the occasions somehow prevent them from resenting, injuries packaged as favors, quiet insults labeled as gifts, and rebuffs offered ceremoniously as honors.

ALL THIS HAS HAPPENED not only to George Meany, in the view of many people something to be welcomed and to be expected because of the widely advertised sympathy that is supposed to bind Kennedy to Reuther (and does, curiously), but unhappily and unexpectedly Reuther is victimized by it too, in a particularly bewildering display, since the brush-off occurs in the midst of a great and convincing show of affection.

When Kennedy asked Reuther, for example, to try to run the Tractors for Freedom operation through to a final wrap-up of the Cuban mess, in a sense, he made a public show of the reliance and the trust he put in the UAW leader. It was noted then that Meany did not rush forward to put the AFL machinery at the disposal of the Tractors for Freedom effort. In fact, up until Tractors for Freedom came to its unhappy and unspectacular end, the headlines featuring Reuther elicited a perceptible wince on 16th Street at the park, particularly because the AFL interpreted the Tractors for Freedom assignment as a presage of a liberal labor administration with Walter P. Reuther ranging the country like Lanny Budd or Arthur Goldberg armed with the commission of a powerful minister with many portfolios.

Almost the first reward Reuther anticipated, according to a unanimous but perhaps apocryphal presumption, was a long-delayed appointment as U. S. delegate to the United Nations. Meany originally received such an appointment under Eisenhower for one year and in the ordinary course of public appointments everyone took it for granted that the designation which is the U. S. equivalent of a knighthood would next go to Walter Reuther. Meany, however, displaying a grim and determined pettiness, quite skillfully in fact, euchred Reuther out of the spot, three times, twice with the connivance of Nixon and Eisenhower, but the third time out with the sly assistance of Adlai Stevenson. Since the UAW leader's associates say Kennedy himself offered the post as the smallest acknowledgment of a large indebtedness, Reuther's ability to continue to be friendly with Kennedy, to compromise with Meany, and chaffer with Stevenson as one of the two trade-union advisors to the U. N. delegation —Meany is the other one—is a clue to his hardened telic discipline. While

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Meany's career does suggest that he is sly and vindictive enough to search out the most sensitive spot of an adversary to knee or to thrust, there is nothing to indicate that he is sensitive or intelligent enough to locate the less obvious vulnerable places. But when in his continuing secret war with Walter Reuther, while mechanically blocking anything headed in Reuther's direction, he did abort the U. N. appointment, he pinched a central nerve in the UAW president that blacked out the deepest and most cherished Reuther hope, that one day he would lay a Reuther plan before the world at the U.N. bringing peace, and prosperity and all the rest to men of good will everywhere.

IN HUMAN DIMENSIONS, on the scale of feet and inches, with a cast in which each person is known to every other person by his first name, George Meany, Walter Reuther, Arthur Goldberg, Arthur Schlesinger, Adlai Stevenson, George Harrison, Joe Keenan, and Jack Kennedy, this is a single drama out of a cycle whose totality is the presentation of a crisis in human history engaging three billion people across a stage that is measured in light years and is subject to megaton disturbances.

In the great cycle, Reuther's role is not petty, for he is in the United States the protagonist of an alternative solution to the world crisis, one based on the involvement of rank-and-file people in the historical process. Thus the repulse to Reuther reflects a more fundamental decision.

The speech writers at the White House, and Stevenson himself, who invented the phrase, speak glibly of the revolution of rising expectations in Africa, in Asia, and in Latin America but when they see it in the person of Walter Reuther they are suddenly blind. Among trade-union members at the present time, and especially among those wage earners in the CIO stream, there is a greater sense of world crisis, except for a handful of radicals and pacifists, than anywhere else in the nation. Reports from union meetings, for example, those held in connection with UAW and IUE negotiations, as well as accounts of Negro meetings in the country, and even the Administration Cabinet-level missions to the major American cities, all note a particular union-member tone, one of resignation before a destiny brought on by needless screw-up and betrayal which is part hopelessness before relentless erosions of automation, part despair over the prospects for peace, and part bewilderment that the election they won which was touted as so significant for them has meant so little.

Unquestionably, Reuther has personal ambitions, but whatever they are, they are con-substantial with the political and social hopes of wage earners and minorities. If the Democrats won, in effect union members and minorities were told by him, unions, the government and business were going to join in a common effort to bring about full employment. Wage earners were going to be represented in the high places where decisions are made. The rhetorical insinuation was that big business diplomats and cookie-pushing sissies in striped trousers were unable to deal with the leaders of countries where workers and peasants, very often colored people, had come to power. On the new frontier, there was going to be a different kind of approach based on designating union people

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG.
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Negroes and minorities to go out to work with their likes in Asia and Africa where actual horny-handed sympathies would produce a new international rule by the common man which would naturally result in peace and justice and prosperity and freedom and a guaranteed annual wage and the FEPC.

Nothing like this has happened either in the foreign or domestic sallies of the government. Kennedy's economic advisors have hardly changed the prescription the Eisenhower economic advisors wrote out. Making allowances for the more elevated rhetoric, AID, re-alphabetized from ICA, is unchanged in all but one respect from Kennedy to Eisenhower. The difference is a consequence of a surgical excision which has eliminated overt labor participation that prevailed under Eisenhower, in favor of a covert CIA labor program under Kennedy, to be jointly administered by Goldberg, a special labor agent in the OSS during the war, and Jay Lovestone who won his conspiratorial spurs as an apprentice Lovestonite at CCNY.

THE PHENOMENON someone has called the third Eisenhower Administration, the persistence of the old plot with an entire new cast of players was, of course, noted in 1953 and 1954 after Eisenhower succeeded Truman.

Yet there are differences between the Kennedy Administration and the Eisenhower Administration, obvious enough so that children in the eighth grade current events classes can list them unfailingly in a quiz. The beat is left of center instead of right of center. Poets, painters, composers, college professors, liberals and labor leaders now attend parties more or less regularly at the White House. Decisions to improve help to the unemployed under present rules, to raise relief standards within existing categories, to increase pensions modestly, to provide limited aid for education, to endorse unions at the NLRB, are reached enthusiastically instead of reluctantly.

You might ask what more anyone, even a labor leader can expect. First, labor skates still look forward to a day when union people represent wage earners in the administration just the way bankers represent bankers, oil men are on hand to speak up for the well diggers, farmers for the tillers of the soil, and cattlemen for the ranchers. For people who quite properly expect a big bite of patronage, Goldberg tastes like sawdust. Once this is understood, the point should be made that patronage is not really what the unions want. When they disclaim an interest in patronage, they mean it. No top union official wants a government job. Even when jobs are available they go chiefly to skates who are an embarrassment on their union jobs. What the union leaders want is a voice which must be located purely for the operating effect in people with top jobs. These jobs they never had before and don't have now.

Because union people are not passed into the Administration, what is undertaken where union officials believe they should have a voice very often is set going against union interests or is condescendingly done for them for their own good. The Area Redevelopment Program, for exam-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ple, which never would have been enacted except for continuous day-labor by union people who exhausted themselves in the effort, started its activities by making a cash contribution to the establishment of a plant running away from the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. As for the rest of the program, so loudly hailed as a foundation stone of a new world by union orators who very foolishly believed their own speeches, it has settled down into lubricant for tight Southern political situations.

On tax policy, on the question of interest and money, on full employment, on federal budgetary policy, the Kennedy appointees impatiently brush off union protests, including Reuther's, as simply uninformed or as economically illiterate.

THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, ruling the country, more like Catholic royalty, is kinder to the lower classes, including union members, other wage earners and minorities, but still it recognizes there are lower classes, less gifted people, less well educated people, people with fewer qualifications, and for this reason, people not really eligible for anything except the kind patronage of the properly powerful.

To Meany, to most of the old men in the AFL, people without intellectual pretensions, Catholic, and essentially Christian trade unionists, an administration which does acknowledge the Christian obligation of the ruler and the employer, which is moving toward the establishment of a secure place for workers in an ordered, hierarchical society, the cynicism about democratic processes, the skepticism about wage-earner participation in government, are reassuring in spite of their irritation because the attitudes correspond to their own mood and inclination.

Even Reuther and his associates, who are there but not with it, are up until now baffled rather than frustrated, still hopeful.

Among the hyper-actives in the industrial unions, the Kennedy Administration at the moment is a not unpleasant trap. When they make telephone calls their wires go straight through to the top Administration people. The hackneyed but basically meaningless programs adopted at union conventions year after year, with some legislative tinkering and tailoring, are being enacted into law. Actually, the Kennedy Administration very often proposes measures legislatively in advance of anything the unions, which are steeped in 19th-century rhetoric, have conceived. And when dignified pot latches are scheduled there are engraved R. S. V. P. invitations and places for union leaders. If they cannot claim recognition and a role in the government with a voice in the decision-making at least it is pleasant for them to testify personally that they have received tickets entitling them to places at an elegantly served table.

Especially for labor leaders it is difficult even to think of walking out on a pleasant host who happens to be President of the United States who calls you by your first name. And even if the president of the IUD-AFL-CIO should choose to walk out, where would he go?

The result is what could be described as the Goldberg quandary. Whatever the inner judgment, officially everyone must smile politely and approvingly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OFFICIAL LIBERALISM— AND NATIONAL NERVOUSNESS

William J. Newman

Facing a severe challenge from without and trouble from within, American opinion leaders feel the need to assure themselves that the ship of state is under firm control. The debate on national goals with which we are deluged today is interesting for many reasons, but not least for the light it throws on the need for some kind of directive about what America should do in the face of its multiple crises. Since there obviously can be nothing wrong with our present social system in and of itself, what is required therefore is a re-thinking, a re-orientation of the system as it stands—if "stands" is the word.

In order to help solve the problem two recent works have attempted to scrutinize America and decide on its goals. One was produced by an outgoing administration—a fine time, one might think for an administration to think about goals, but typical of *that* administration. It was written by The President's Commission on National Goals and is called *Goals for Americans*. The other, produced for the incoming administration, is composed of "task force" reports prepared under the title *New Frontiers for the Kennedy Administration*. In preparing *Goals for Americans* over 100 experts were used as consultants; fourteen experts were asked to write essays for the Commission—which evidently could not write its own essays—and the Commission itself numbered eleven. There was a staff of five and the job was administered by the American Assembly of Columbia University. Taken as a whole it was a Big Operation, and one may assume that it was intended to produce something rather definitive. The Kennedy reports, on the other hand, have the flurried appearance which the Kennedy administration is adopting from its master. Some, as published, are sketchy to the point of uselessness; others are of some limited importance and one is a minor masterpiece —Dean Landis' report on the administrative agencies. There is also one minor masterpiece in the *Goals for Americans* publication, too, the essay by Mrs. Catherine Bauer Wurster on urban living.

As revelations of the nature of Official Liberalism today, they are a useful insight into the mind of the Planner at work. And both volumes enable us to ask two pertinent questions about the Kennedy administration. What is the nature of the Official Liberalism which is the dominant intellectual note of that administration? What does Official Liberalism signify for the problems of power and democracy in our society?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

The Official Liberal approach to the problems of our society can be described as a point of view which looks to planning as the solvent of our discontents without any fundamental concern for the political or ideological source of those discontents.

Planning would provide the solutions to the specific malfunctioning from which America suffers today, for once our diseases are identified the planner would get to work and eradicate them through human action and intelligence. Man should use whatever means are at hand to solve his problems—the idea of problem-solving is basic to this neo-New Dealism—and in practice the means at hand usually end up as the federal government. It also ends up in the hands of the expert who accepts the existing framework of pluralism and ignores all those doubts about democracy, equality, reason, science, pragmatism and mass persuasion which have bedevilled so many intellectuals today. For if the expert did not ignore such questions there would be little basis for his survival as an expert. It is on such unexamined concepts that he literally depends for his professional life. And it is necessary to understand that such dependence is not a question of financial self-interest but of his fundamental project to be an expert—to *do*.

The hopes and assumptions of the experts revolve around various areas of American life which present unresolved questions and which seem to the Official Liberal to demand concrete, practical answers. Is the problem one of urban disorganization? Catherine Bauer Wurster's excellent study on a "Framework for an Urban Society" in *Goals for Americans* proposes to seize the crisis of Urban disorganization in order to plan the kind of urban area in which we wish to live. She is the most radical of the experts, for she points out that it will be necessary to take some basic decisions about the way we really want to live and that it will be necessary to use big government and not the broken-down units we now have if we are to rebuild our cities. Is the problem education? Then John Gardner (President of Carnegie Corporation), who shows few other signs of being radical, believes we should innovate in education, and the innovation will not come about unless governments on all levels plan what to do. Is the problem one of economics? Professor Samuelson for President Kennedy and two experts from the Committee for Economic Development for the Goals Commission are in fundamental agreement that government planning for growth is both necessary and feasible; indeed, economics in their hands becomes simply a technical matter and ceases to be one of controversy over ends. Culture too will come under the aegis of planning, for August Hecksher in *Goals for Americans,* who quite correctly has no truck with the idea that art is a matter for amateurs, would see the government create a home for art and would have both private and public funds used to establish repertory theatres, etc. In the Kennedy task force reports, area redevelopment, social welfare, education, and cultural affairs are all conceived as involving not just government but government planning on a continuing basis. The Landis report on administrative agencies, the only one really to rise

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

above minutiae, is concerned not only to clean up the agencies in the sense of de-corrupting them and making it possible for them to get through their work, but also to make them into effective policy planning instruments. He would do more, for not only must the agencies take on responsibilities for planning, but various agencies must be grouped into integrated wholes to meet the demands of more general planning than any one agency can cope with. He mentions transportation, communications and energy as areas in which coordination is essential. We are not ready yet, he thinks, for a Ministry of Transportation with cabinet rank but that should not and need not prevent the evolution of a "national transportation policy." And, of course, his famous recommendation on strengthening the chairman of the agencies is part of his hope for making them effective policy-making bodies instead of Dickensian circumlocution offices.

The New Deal has returned. It is, however, a tamed and house-broken New Deal; no Official Liberal now speaks about "Economic Royalists"—though we have, in fact, more economic royalists than ever before. House-broken, the Official Liberal is all the more likely to enter into the drawing rooms of the Mighty.

III

Yet questions must be put to Official Liberalism. To what extent will such an approach—it can hardly be called a philosophy—deal with the need to re-distribute power as it is found within the present pluralistic system? Are we to allow the television networks to continue their daily insults to the American people? Are we to allow General Motors and all that crew of maniac materialists to decide what better things we need for better living? More generally and exactly, will we *change* America into a *democracy* or will we allow it to remain the *quasi-democracy* it now is? Does Official Liberalism have any solutions to the problems of wealth and power our society poses today? Maybe what is "wrong with America" today is the system of exploitation which has fastened itself on us as the leech it is. Will Official Liberalism be able to face up to that possibility? In short, what kind of society will it create for us and how adequate will it be in facing the real problem of today?

Above all else, a society under the stimulus of Official Liberalism will be a *Clean, Well-lighted Place.** It will be as neat and orderly as American life will allow. It will be the welfare state plus. Plus what? Plus all the awful joys of American free enterprise capitalism, which however, will be allowed to go so far and no further. Education will be widespread and get better in quality. The executive branch of the government will become a super-planning agency having to do battle with Congress no doubt, but still getting its way on all the big decisions. The mass entertainment industry will continue to ruin

* With apologies to Kathleen Nott, who has recently used that phrase as the title of her new book on Sweden.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

our dispositions, but there will be increasing opportunities for what are euphemistically called "minority interests." Health, it need hardly be said, will be as perfect as our climate permits. Farm surpluses will pile up but better uses will be made of them and eventually—sometime in the next century—they may even begin to shrink slightly through strict government control over the half-dozen farmers who will remain to feed the rest of us. They will also shrink because we will be eating more; the "Report" of the Goals Commission contains this odd sentence: "improvement of nutritional levels for many Americans would not only increase the work efficiency of our population but also reduce the farm surpluses." Finally, the economy, needless to say, will provide abundant leisure and affluence for the most wayward of individuals. No one, except perhaps some millions of Negroes, Puerto Ricans and other miscellaneous types, will be allowed to escape affluence. And with all this we will still be able to look back and say that these things were set forth in the Declaration of Independence.

Such extrapolations, though accurate in fact, are unfair in tone for it must be remembered that a clean, well-lighted place is far better than a dirty, ugly, and violent place. Faced as we are with the possibility of what might be called a partial-utopia or pseudo-utopia under the direction of the planners of Official Liberalism, it must be stressed that this is no time for the easy romanticism which says that planning crushes the human spirit, etc. It does nothing of the kind; it can help liberate the human spirit and the society described above is far better than that we have now, by any liberal/radical criteria. The only people who would not find it better are the conservatives—for the Declaration of Independence notwithstanding, the conservative ethos is going to take some hard knocks in such a society—or those eccentric radicals who would join hands with the conservatives in praise of dirt and individualism. Indeed, just to get our cities painted and the streets washed would be a major achievement. No, romanticism will not help us now. The partial-utopia of the Official Liberal may have some amusing features, but they will be more tolerable than the not-very-amusing aspects of our present society.

One of the virtues of such a society and of Official Liberalism itself can be seen in the emphasis it places on science not as an operational technique to achieve "Better Things for Better Living" but as a value in and of itself. Both the essay by Warren Weaver on science in *Goals for Americans* and the task force report (Jerome Wiesner, chairman) on space investigation in *New Frontiers of the Kennedy Administration* stress that science is a value in itself. The degradation of science into a means to a better gadget or to prove the superiority of our leadership over that of the Russians is one of the great weaknesses of our present society; some Official Liberals at least see that the importance of science is to be found in the excitement of investigation. Mr. Weaver's essay especially stresses the importance of investigation as such and also points out that for all the money the United States is supposed to spend for science it actually spends very little. His figures show that only one-fifth of the total expenditure for research and development is spent on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both basic and applied research, and only 7–8% of the total spent in 1957 was for basic research, i.e., only $700 to $800 million.

If the values of Official Liberalism—within their limits—are sound, they nevertheless contain some important lacunae. For one cannot help wonder how different a clean, well-lighted-place would be in terms of power, or more precisely, in terms of democracy, than our present dirty, slovenly and exploitative place. It is, after all, possible to consider that bourgeois democracy has certain virtues without succumbing to its fundamental assumptions concerning class and power.

Who would really run this new society? Granted that things—literally, things—would be better and better organized under the Official Liberals, would the same power structure, the same class structure, which we now possess remain in the new world?

Would the present distribution of power and reward become more stabilized, more stratified and more dominant than it now is? Are there any forces at work in the visions of the Official Liberal to affect and counteract the present power facts of life? It is undoubtedly better to be pushed around in a clean city than a dirty city, but one is still being pushed around and after a while it becomes exasperating. In one sense, these problems are those raised by Mills' *Power Elite,* and whatever the virtues and faults of his particular analysis it is nevertheless true that the question we face today is how the present structure of power can preferably be destroyed and if not destroyed then at least modified. It is the recognition that this is our problem today which has already given the New Deal a dusty place on the history shelves. No doubt the New Deal helped us to get to a cleaner and better-lighted place than we were in during the 1930's. But its refusal to tamper with the basic facts of power in its time helped to confirm the past and present distribution of power, and raises questions as to how meaningful democracy can be in clean, well-lighted places.

Thus it is necessary to ask whether the commitment of the Official Liberal to planning necessarily assumes, in the America of today and the future, not a technocracy or even a managerial elite—bad enough though they are—but the present bourgeois society with its exploitation or whether it will lead to fundamental changes in the nature of our society. One of the gravest weaknesses of Official Liberalism, for all its considerable virtues, is its failure to face the question posed by planning: does the planning in question affect in any significant way the power of some men over other men? It may well be that it does; there are certain important possibilities in planning, for example, as far as equality is concerned. But the case is seldom examined by the Official Liberal. And since it is not, his planned society in and of itself and without some kind of value-ideological concept in support of it will not bring about the fundamental changes that are necessary. Hence, too, the peculiar fact that his planning instead of having that dynamic quality usually ascribed to it, is static in its approach to the basic realities of a society.

All of which is to mount the accusation against Official Liberalism

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that its commitment to democracy, which is indeed fundamental to its being, is nevertheless more abstract than real. Democratic beliefs today are widespread and the Official Liberal is their prime carrier. But democratic concepts are in disarray, they are more disheveled, more disorganized than they have ever been. In this case we are far removed indeed from the neatness and organization of a clean, well-lighted society. The very virtue of Official Liberalism—its ability to cut through the haverings of intellectual self-doubt—plays it false when it is faced with the problem of democracy. For the question of democracy, like that of freedom and because it is basic to freedom, has to be re-opened again and examined all over again. The word "planning" must have a modifier; it must be democratic planning or it is of small interest, neat and tidy though it may be.

But what is democratic planning? Are the two ideas compatible? Are the two ideas feasible in this particular huge society? Certainly one would expect a few words on this subject in the two works discussed above; but other than some brief remarks of Dean Landis about the difficulty of those appointed to administrative agencies in keeping the public interest to the forefront of their consciousness, there is no consideration of the question. Nor is there much consideration of these questions elsewhere in Official Liberalism. The Official Liberal is marvelously adept at making blueprints for all of us, but when it comes to questions of the nature of parties, the power of private groups, the problems of participation, the role of government, and other such questions, he mainly falls back on a simple pluralism which, with luck he hopes will solve all of those questions. Now pluralism is a grand old doctrine and one would not give it up for the world, but unless it is defined with some precision as it would operate in this particular society of today and that particular society to come it is a way of avoiding problems.

Because Official Liberalism has not examined the power realities of American society it cannot give adequate guidance to the problems and possibilities of freedom in today's American society. For, as a result of that failure, it has been unable to develop any concepts of change or political reality, to develop any image, theory or vision of an on-going, developing society in which new forms of freedom grow out of old.

What sense of future freedom does Official Liberalism offer those who look to it? Are we offered any ground for believing that future configurations of freedom will be different from what they are now? No, it may be possible, it may be true, that the clean, well-lighted place will offer us more freedom, but it is hardly possible to be assured by the ideas of Official Liberalism. For in fact, the future as postulated by Official Liberalism, for all its sanitary comforts, is exactly the present-day American society re-housed, re-distributed, re-organized, and re-administered, but with all the activity taking place within the same social framework, the same power structure, the same value system and all of it leaving freedom in its present position. The idea of a different society which will *expand* freedom, make it more available to more people—this Official Liberalism cannot offer to us.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CIVIL DEFENSE ON THE NEW FRONTIER

Stephan Thernstrom

There can be no doubt that there is a civil defense race, just as surely as there is an armaments race. Through efficient implementation of the National Plan we hope to prepare this Nation to withstand an all-out attack, and to recover and win. —FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE AUTHORITY.

Civil defense is the key to avoiding nuclear blackmail and the only way for us to stop being a gutless nation.—WILLIAM NOYES, CIVIL DEFENSE DIRECTOR, OMAHA, NEBRASKA.

The best first aid for radiation sickness . . . is to take hot tea. . . . You can recover from a mild case of radiation sickness just as you can recover from a cold. It is not contagious.—LIFE MAGAZINE.

In the age of Eisenhower, America's civil defense "program" was an amusing fraud. Presidential, Congressional and public apathy inspired bumbling CD officials to actions that were sublimely ridiculous. Back in 1952, when no constructive use could be found for the abandoned Percy Jones Army Hospital in Battle Creek, Michigan, the huge building was turned over to civil defense bureaucrats as a national headquarters. The state of emergency preparations in Battle Creek were charmingly revealed in May 1960, when a national emergency civil defense drill was held. A shiny and expensive system of sirens had been installed in the city, and cameras clicked as the national director of the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization stepped forward to sound the alert. Nothing happened. . . . At this vibrant "nerve center" of America's civil defense operation, someone had forgotten to wire the sirens to the central control button.

But now, since Berlin and the Soviet tests, civil defense has become a national obsession. If the expenditure of newsprint be a gauge of anything, civil defense is the hottest subject of the year. Battle Creek's postmen are facing a challenge more awesome than rain, hail, or dark of night; the flow of inquiries at OCDM, we are informed, has reached "tidal wave proportions." Entrepreneurs with vision (and a scent for the fast buck) are following the lead of such pioneers as the Fox Hole Shelter, Inc., of Southern California and the Los Angeles Nuclear Survival Cor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

poration. The President wants civil defense, Nelson Rockefeller wants civil defense, Barry Goldwater wants civil defense, and if any important politicos don't, they are keeping their reservations to themselves. Clearly it is time to ask some basic questions about civil defense. What kind of "protection" against nuclear war has been attained thus far? What might be achieved from more far-reaching programs in the future? What are the likely domestic and international repercussions of a massive program to move American society underground?

I

The main guidelines of the present civil defense program were laid down in 1958, with the promulgation of the National Plan. This grand scheme supposedly projected "the non-military defense of the Nation ten years into the future," taking into account "progressive changes in weapons and in defenses against them." Early planning for nuclear survival had oscillated between evacuation and shelter measures. Sometimes *both* were urged in the same breath. Witness the response to a simulated attack on Chicago a few years back: After the CD Director ordered the radio audience to head for the prairies, the Mayor seized the microphone and told Chicagoans to stay where they were and take cover! While the 1958 plan was somewhat ambiguous, it was essentially a triumph for the shelter option. With warning time cut to minutes by the development of long-range ballistic missiles, mass evacuation became patently impossible. As California's CD Director confessed, "we can't even get people out of San Francisco after a football game."

If shelters had become public policy, they remained emphatically an *individual* responsibility. No creeping socialism here. The ghost of WilliamMcKinley might rest easily as long as the government's role was merely that of providing "the stimulation necessary for the American people to make preparations" for protection. And when the government was forced to do something more than "stimulate," America would still be secure against Leviathan: "The action to be taken is for the local government executive to decide."

It seemed at first that a really dramatic departure was to be made by the Kennedy Administration in the area of civil defense. Frank Ellis (a man with an unerring instinct for *le mot juste)* proclaimed a great national "revival for survival." Kennedy's "second State of the Union" address revealed his determination to push CD hard, and Congress was unusually accommodating. For the first time in a decade, an Administration request for a civil defense appropriation was approved without a cut: a total allotment of a third of a billion dollars.

What will this money buy? First, expanded propaganda efforts to "educate" the public about nuclear warfare, producing "the stimulation and strengthening of the National Will" (Frank Ellis again). Second, a program to discover and mark "available community shelter space in existing buildings throughout the United States." In perhaps a year, this measure could save ten to fifteen million lives (McNamara) or three to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eighteen million (OCDM).* Third, 126 million bushels of surplus wheat and tons of medical supplies can be buried in the vicinity of 191 fortunate cities. That, for all the hullabaloo, is about it. . . .

The Kennedy prescription for national survival in nuclear war, after ten months in office, was more of the same—and not very much more, at that! If it is significant that the President is committed to civil defense in a way Eisenhower never was, it is equally significant that his first ringing endorsement reached its climax with these words: "Every American citizen and his community must decide for themselves whether this form of survival insurance justifies the expenditure of effort, time, and money. For myself, I am convinced that it does." It's really up to *you,* brother. . . . Nothing Kennedy said during these ten months represented a fundamental departure from this attitude. Through at least November, 1961—more about the future below—we can say that the "new" civil defense program did remarkably little more than "encourage" the construction of privately owned fallout shelters.

II

The official literature on fallout shelters has to be read to be believed. The typical specimen hastily points out that nuclear war threatens the life of every American. The threat is then portrayed *exclusively* as the problem of radioactive fallout. That *blast* effects might instantly incinerate fifty million Americans, fallout shelters or no, goes unmentioned. And fallout itself, in these pages, is conquered by abstraction. True, it isn't exactly *good for you.* Fallout is definitely "unsanitary," something of a health hazard to the careless; but, in the words of an AEC official, "few knowledgeable, intelligent people need to be hurt seriously" by it.

There is never a hint of blood on these slick pages. Indeed, fallout appears chiefly as an excuse to do something which is rather *fun*—to climb into a cozy nest and attain some real togetherness. Here is one sure refuge against the pressures which have disintegrated the modern family and sent Mom to the bridge club and the kids to the "peer group." World War III may even restore some of Dad's patriarchal prerogatives; in the sketches he is shown in firm command of the symbol of the highest authority, the battery radio which brings in the mellow voice of CONELRAD. In the world of the CD ad-men, nuclear attack comes invariably at supper time or between midnight and morning, enabling the family to repair to the basement as a unit. Practicing for such an eventuality is a delightful game; a stirring pamphlet titled *How It Was Done* quotes a Michigan housewife who reports "our training is fun for the children."

Remembering that "the family that prays together stays together," the bureaucrats have relentlessly exploited the religious argument for fallout shelters. OCDM has a Religious Affairs Office which issues peri-

* On November 24, it was announced that the survey was running six months ahead of schedule. This inspired the Boston press to headlines like the following: "SUPER SHELTERS FOR 50 MILLION WILL BE READY BY NEXT JUNE." *Globe* November 25.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

odic manifestoes based on the insight that "the religious faith of church women provides a strong, normal motivation for home preparedness." These documents bristle with striking scriptural citations. After all, as Frank Ellis puts it with exquisite logic, civil defense is "the Christian thing to do. It's just the same as not committing suicide." The official checklist of equipment for The Compleat Shelter always includes a Bible and "other appropriate religious articles."

A deliberate attempt is made to link the shelter program with the pioneering tradition and the rural virtues. Hydrogen bombs might almost have been created to give Mom an excuse to do some home-canning. Not only an excuse, but also "storage space" in which to put the stuff. (Occasional items directed at urban sophisticates stress that the shelter could do double duty as a wine cellar; those who follow this felicitous suggestion will at least attain surcease without resorting to the drugs prescribed by the Rand Corporation experts.) One brochure opens brightly: "Remember grandma's pantry, its shelves loaded with food, ready for any emergency . . .?"

Dad's primary duty as a pioneer is apparently to *build* the thing, no mean achievement for anyone who hasn't served an apprenticeship as a mason, carpenter and electrician. The official handbook on construction, *The Family Fallout Shelter,* declares glibly that "a basement shelter can be built with solid concrete blocks as a do-it-yourself project." Perhaps, but a close reading of the plans and a few fugitive press reports of people who actually *tried* it and ended up with "fall-in" shelters makes one wonder.

Perhaps impatient at a certain greyness which pervades even the most seductive OCDM appeals for fallout shelters, *Life* stepped into the campaign with a special issue in September. Aided by the President, who supplied a letter urging every citizen to do his duty and dig, *Life* managed to compress into a few pages the very quintessence of the current civil defense program at its most absurd. "YOU COULD BE AMONG THE 97% TO SURVIVE IF YOU FOLLOW ADVICE ON THESE PAGES. . . ." The source of this reassuring estimate is never divulged. Upon a careful reading, it appears that the following assumptions have been made: 1) The attack is solely on "military objectives"; 2) the public has "good protection"; 3) "some warning" has been given. No mention at all is made of the *size* of the projected attack.

This must surely rank as the most viciously mendacious moment in the long history of the Luce publications. Scientists do differ in their predictions as to the extent of possible damage from war of varying sizes. One of the most convincing projections, done for the Institute for Defense Analysis, judges that *given six months to build fallout shelters and get in them,* the explosion of 1000 megatons would kill 22% of the American population. Five thousand megatons would raise the total to 58%, and 20,000 megatons . . . 89%. (Russia currently has an arsenal valued at 50,000 MT, and the U. S. 100,000 MT). But even if one takes the more optimistic figures of the Holifield Committee or OCDM *Life*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remains guilty of a statement so dubious as to impugn the position of the President of the United States—who knows better but lent his name to these sorry proceedings: "I urge you to read and consider seriously the contents of this issue of *Life.*"

From foolishness and fraud it is but a short step to ugliness, and the shelter panic has revealed a sub-stratum of brutality in contemporary America which is terrifying. The "great debate" over the propriety of shooting your neighbors to keep them out of your shelter began in July, when a Las Vegas CD official warned that Californians would swarm into Nevada "like locusts" in the event of nuclear war and asked that the state militia be prepared to repel the invaders. Shortly after, the CD Co-ordinator for Riverside County, California told a meeting of police reservists that refugees from Los Angeles might pour into the county through San Gorgonio Pass, seizing local water and food supplies. Then, according to the AP dispatch, "he pulled a pistol from a large can of dehydrated food and said: 'Get one of these and learn to use it.'" A series of further incidents compelled Governor Brown to assign wartime CD responsibility to the National Guard "to end talk of guerrilla bands threatening to shoot down people fleeing from cities under attack."

From the city of Al Capone came word that a civil defense official was mounting a machine gun on his personal shelter; a Roman Catholic priest affirmed (in the magazine *America)* that God might not look with disfavor on the use of a revolver to protect one's family from an unwanted and possibly radioactive guest; a columnist in Maryland even found certain "Darwinian" consolation in the prospect of nuclear war: "From a purely Darwinian point of view, it probably will not be calamitous... if ten million or so of our sloppier citizens disappear as a result of their lack of ability or will to survive." That this humanitarian was not thinking exclusively of criminals, prostitutes, and men without white skin is apparent from his observation that "many of these second-class human beings are the ones who are right now asking what the fuss is all about in Berlin. They haven't the wit to understand that Western Civilization, human freedom and the dignity of man are on trial at the Brandenburg Gate."

III

These outbursts of viciousness, thus far, have been isolated instances. Has the massive fallout shelter campaign had no other measurable impact on the country? The volume of propaganda has been immense, and as early as July 71% of the public was reported "in favor of fallout shelters." How many Americans have *actually built them?*

Nobody knows with any certainty. Either from fear of ridicule or fear of uninvited guests, some shelter owners keep the fact to themselves. But there are some reasonable indices—most cities require building permits. When one pieces together scattered figures buried in the back pages, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, after an intensive selling campaign extending over many months, only a *tiny fraction* of the American population has chosen to invest in individual shelters.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Take Battle Creek, which is supposed to be some kind of "showcase" for the federal program. OCDM officials were proud to announce this Fall that *two* building permits for local shelters had been applied for within *one week* for the first time. This model city of 50,000 will be ready for the Russians in just 150 years, by my calculations. One thousand shelters are estimated for the entire state of California. A survey of 40 states guesses that about 60,000 family shelters exist "or are under construction." Chicago and Cook County received many plaudits when they speedily passed new building laws to encourage shelter construction. After 45 days, precisely *five* permits had been taken out by city residents, with *two* more in the entire county. The most up-to-date item on the question comes from the November 11, 1961 New York *Times*. According to New York law, fallout shelters must be approved by the Building Department. As of that date, there was one and only one "approved and completed private fallout shelter" in New York City. The address . . . 810 Fifth Avenue . . . the proud owner . . . Nelson Rockefeller.

One might suspect Americans of not believing what they're told. Perhaps some have become unduly skeptical because the government so clearly fails to practise what it preaches. It is an illuminating experience to wander through the great halls of the OCDM building looking for possible hiding places. I was nervously assured by an underling that the basement of such a huge structure had a high "protection factor." But what about food and water, I ventured to ask. Silence. "We're *planning* to do something about that." (I had already read the December, 1958 anouncement that "planning is underway to provide additional fallout protection at OCDM Operational Headquarters in Battle Creek." My visit took place in September, 1961.) In August a reporter made bold to poll every Washington CD employee he could find. Frank Ellis had no shelter, nor Deputy Director Edward DcDermott. George McCarthy, the "Deputy Assistant Director for Shelters and Reduction of Vulnerability" has done nothing at all to reduce his own vulnerability. One embarrassed official, after trying the gambit "the fact that your doctor doesn't take good care of his body doesn't make you distrust his advice," confessed that Washington would be too hard hit for shelters to make any difference. Another said simply, "I'll head for the country, I guess." No emergency supplies were to be found in the buildings which housed CD employees in Washington. Employees said that their only attack instructions were to gather in the hallways and await orders from wardens; most didn't know who their wardens were.

If America is to have a civil defense program of any consequence, it is evident that Washington must do a good deal more than exhort the individual to take care of himself. The Administration's major contribution to the campaign, a "definitive" hundred-page booklet packed with shelter lore, will be off the press by the time this article is published. This document has been endlessly revised, we are told; some of the birth pangs were eased "with the help of Time, Inc." However seductive the final product may turn out to be, who can believe that the sixty million

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

copies of it which will be printed will spawn sixty million private fallout shelters? The public, whether out of apathy or skepticism, seems already to have voted a resounding "NO" on the do-it-yourself program. How then was it possible for Herman Kahn, who urges annual CD expenditures of $5 *billion*, to testify that Kennedy's plan is "the right way to get the business done"?

IV

Perhaps Kahn, Holifield, Teller and Co., have withheld criticism of the present feeble gestures because they have been privately assured that the Administration feels a massive federal CD program is essential, but considers it expedient to approach its objective with muffled oars. Kennedy is not exactly audacious in treating potentially explosive issues, and we cannot yet be sure what his private views are. But there are grounds for believing that he strongly inclines towards a Kahn-type "solution," and will eventually espouse it in the absence of significant political protest. James Reston and other inside-dopesters have reported this; *Look* (December 5) goes so far as to claim that a definite decision to launch such a program "was made in the White House one day last summer." A figure of $20 billion was mentioned as "the probable eventual cost." Seeing Dillon's scowl, Kennedy is supposed to have remarked, "Fort Knox full of molten gold wouldn't do us much good after an attack, would it?" This may all be fantasy, since there is as yet no *Look* correspondent with cabinet rank, but there are many signs that the drift of things is in this direction.

The transfer of CD to the Pentagon is undoubtedly the most important step yet taken. Imagine the Congressional reaction to a request of a few billion for the boys in Battle Creek! It would appear a *sine qua non* of a serious civil defense program that it be the immediate responsibility of the high military, and that it have the same unimpeachable status as the Polaris or Minuteman programs: this condition has already been partially fulfilled. Add to this the highly cooperative behavior of the devotees of a massive shelter effort, and the curious failure to give tax exemptions for private shelter construction, and it becomes likely that a radical departure from the present program is in the offing.

Secretary of Defense McNamara's national survey of "existing" shelter space in public buildings appears trivial in its immediate objectives, but suppose that its actual purpose is to gather information needed to plan an enormous public shelter *construction* program. . . . After confiding that the Administration really believes in a far more ambitious civil defense effort, one CD bureaucrat pointed out to me that "right now, we wouldn't know what to *do* with any more money than we have." Soon they will know. And if the public is told that "existing" shelter space will protect only one-quarter of the population, it shouldn't be hard to "discover" a mandate to use this knowledge to build shelters for the rest.

The school is a particularly inviting target for the advocates of a multi-billion-dollar program to put America underground. Governor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rockefeller has already picked up an appropriation which amounts to one-third of the current federal CD budget for his plan to "protect the young" of New York State, and it is not difficult to imagine other legislatures following suit. Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Brown, MIT, Penn and others have appointed committees to appraise schemes for carrying on the higher learning beneath protective sod. The following item may be a grim portent of the future: "The 'Little Red Schoolhouse' of sentimental memory is all but gone from the contemporary scene, and the 'Fallout School,' with multi-purpose construction, protective features, and full usefulness as a community center, is here." The model "fallout school" already exists at Moraga, California, near the GE Atomic Reactor. True, the Donald L. Rheem School is buried in the earth. But, as its designer points out to old-fashioned critics, "to prevent any shut-in feeling, large Kodachrome murals of mountain or seacoast views decorate classroom walls in place of the usual wall windows."

The official CD publication, *School Shelters,* confesses that "the attempt to combine the ideal school and the ideal shelter creates a number of problems," but certainly the major hurdle will have been cleared once our children have learned that they can do quite nicely with sunlamps and a few murals from *National Geographic.*

This will be only one of the "little "adjustments" which will have to be made if a colossal investment in civil defense installations is actually to save many lives. The official literature slides blithely over the problem, but in fact the training and disciplinng of the population to utilize facilities "rationally" will be an immensely difficult task. Psychologists who have pondered natural disasters and World War II experience tell us that an attack warning—if it is *believed* at all, another grave problem —will produce a calamitous national stampede. An iron framework of control, with obedience made habitual by constant drill, must extend to every school, factory, office, church, and home in the United States. Such a system obviously could not depend on the volunteer "air-raid warden" or the local cop for enforcement. The discipline required would be the discipline of combat, and disobedience would have to be treated as summarily as desertion in the face of the enemy.

V

Suppose that these conditions were met. A massive federal program of blast and fallout shelter construction has been carried out, and Americans are habituated to march into the shelters in an orderly fashion. The twenty-billion-dollar figure is certainly a minimum for such a program—one expert on these matter sadvocates a long-term CD investment in the hundred-billion-dollar range. Could a civil defense effort of this magnitude protect a segment of the population from the most likely forms of nuclear attack?

Probably. Vast areas of the country will be completely devastated, their inhabitants incinerated or suffocated almost to a man. Even the fortunate soul whose shelter has a built-in oxygen supply may starve be-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fore it is safe to come out. But, at least in the sixties, the enemy will not have the means to set the *entire country* afire or to make every inch of it fatally radioactive for more than a short period. Far from the blast the well-sheltered may "survive," though many will certainly fall victim to the hostile environment which will await them. As long as the destructive power of the U.S.S.R. remains finite, the most "rational" use of that power in attack is to concentrate on knocking out our nuclear bases, and this will leave *some* locales with no more than fallout to contend with. *If* the Russians abide by our canons of rationality, a gigantic shelter program might save millions of lives.

To those "hard-headed" enough to pay any price for physical survival, making an enormous investment in civil defense on the basis of these assumptions might make sense—*if* civil defense had no demonstrable bearing on the likelihood that a nuclear catastrophe will occur. But this is not the case. The President has repeatedly insisted that CD is nothing more than "insurance for the civilian population," but in fact a massive civil defense effort will have a crucial and dangerous effect on America's over-all nuclear "deterrent" strategy.

A program to protect one's population, Herman Kahn and other theorists of the cold war have long realized, is the prime requisite for pursuing an aggressive nuclear strategy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testifies that "civil defense is an essential element of our over-all deterrent," while another general observes that "any nation that is serious about a nuclear war" must shelter its citizens. "Nothing," according to the military, "could do more to convince Khrushchev that we mean business." The argument, in official lingo, goes like this: We prove that we are "serious" about nuclear war and are ready to "resist nuclear blackmail" by protecting enough of our population to risk going to "the brink of war" in defense of "our rights." We possess a "credible deterrent" when the enemy understands that we would prefer to sacrifice the unsheltered proportion of our population in a total war rather than acquiesce to his political demands. Enter John Foster Dulles.

This is not to suggest that America will joyfully embrace a total war because civil defense will render hydrogen bombs harmless. A few crackpots may believe this, but no responsible decision-maker could think that civil defense was foolproof. The point is more subtle. By altering the calculus of risks, a civil defense program which *we believe* makes a difference (even if this is a mistaken belief) allows us to take greater chances, and to extend our nuclear umbrella to Berlin, Laos, the offshore islands, etc. It gives us a "credible first strike" capacity, and permits us to abide by the beguiling doctrine of "massive retaliation."

A civil defense program which gives us a "credible first strike" capacity not only *allows* us to opt for a strategy of massive retaliation; in a sense it *requires* such a strategy. Civil defense which is thought to be effective cancels the necessary condition for a "pure deterrent" balance between powers. According to the "pure deterrent" theory, the enemy's population stands as a "hostage" to guarantee that he will not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

launch a nuclear assault; if he does, your hardened or mobile retaliatory force destroys his urban population, inflicting losses so heavy as to be "unacceptable." Once it appears that your opponent has drastically cut his possible losses via civil defense, his threat to attack you becomes *believable*. Here is a position of genuine nuclear superiority, and it is not surprising that the military metaphysicians have found it so tempting. No wonder that the original hostility of key Pentagon officials to civil defense has evaporated so quickly.

VI

The quest for superiority through credibility has, however, certain drawbacks. One is that the enemy will find your plan to protect your population so thoroughly credible that he will launch a pre-emptive attack before the shelters are completed. Kahn concedes this eventuality, but assures us that if we go underground without undue haste and keep our fingers close to the trigger, it shouldn't happen.

The other, more likely, possibility is that the enemy will start digging just as energetically, so that a "civil defense race" heightens the dangers of the arms race. We have already been besieged by propaganda which claims that the civil defense race has begun, and that the Russians are running far ahead. My argument that civil defense cannot be viewed sheerly as "insurance" finds interesting support in the universal American assumption that if *they* build shelters it could only be because they're about to attack. We must know "whether the Soviet Union is building civilian shelters for its people," declares a retired Air Force Chief of Staff. Why? "This can be one of the most significant indicators of its intentions, if and when it gets ready to launch a surprise attack." If you have good shelters, it is only prudent to tell people to get into them during a crisis. And, as General Spaatz perceives, what better proof can a country give that it's so "serious" about nuclear war that it's about to start one? A "civil defense race," for all the rhetoric about "protection" and "insurance," is nothing less than a particularly "destabilizing"—hence a particularly deadly—form of the arms race. We have narrowly escaped nuclear catastrophe triggered by accident more than once in the past decade. To survive a decade in which one or both of the major powers possess a credible first strike capacity is difficult to conceive.

Fortunately, however, a serious civil defense race has not yet begun. Current American CD measures are certainly not of a magnitude to alter the calculus of risks in favor of greater bellicosity; the Soviet Union, contrary to popular belief, is no better prepared. The myth that Russia already has an enormous civil defense program in operation has been assiduously cultivated by those interested in selling shelters to America. I. F. Stone notes that "when the Air Force wanted more money for bombers, it leaked stories about a 'bomber gap.' When it wanted more money for missiles, it leaked stories about a 'missile gap,' which seem to have been equally exaggerated. Now the Air Force wants to sell the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

idea that there is a 'shelter gap.'" All of the lurid press reports about Soviet CD depend on the testimony of one "authority," a man named Leon Gouré (who happens to work for the RAND Corporation). Mr. Gouré's fertile imagination finds evil potentially in the fact that the Moscow subways could provide shelter for two million people. When one actually divides the total area of the Moscow subway system (7,500,000 square feet) by the U. S. OCDM minimum long-stay space requirements (20 square feet per person), the resultant figure is approximately one-sixth of Gouré's estimate. Furthermore, this "expert" does not find that the subway tunnels are stocked with food and water, usually thought helpful adjuncts to prolonged existence. A hardy breed, those Muscovites. . . . Nor do the subways offer satisfactory protection against blast and fire-storm effects.

Gouré also believes that nationwide compulsory training courses in first aid, fire fighting, and rescue techniques speak volumes about Soviet intentions. Perhaps, but how will the two hundred million-odd citizens not situated conveniently near a subway entrance survive to use these techniques? The chief of the AP Moscow bureau writes that he has made "a sustained but unsuccessful hunt to find either a bomb shelter or anybody who has seen one in the Soviet Union," and correspondents from the New York *Times* and other papers confirm this. Mr. Gouré's ingenuity, however, is inexhaustible. The Russians are going to build "simple earthen shelters" just before they attack us—until then they really don't *need* them!

There is no assurance, of course, that Russia will not opt for a serious civil defense program in the near future. Khrushchev, recent events suggest, may well have abandoned all interest in disarmament or even relative nuclear stability, and sees benefits in a murderous intensification of the arms race. If Russia does make a massive civil defense effort, the United States will either follow suit or resign itself to a substantially weakened strategic position: our likely choice is not difficult to predict. The same grim logic will apply if America is the country which begins the civil defense race. That one or the other giant will take the step is a strong probability at the present writing. Whichever does, another restraining thread will have snapped, and civilization will have moved still closer to the abyss.

Even if fireballs never again sear the face of the earth, how much cultural and political freedom will remain in any country totally mobilized for nuclear war? Dr. Teller advises us that after two weeks of hibernation, we can emerge from our shelters to "clean up and rebuild our nation," and that "democratic institutions would function again." It seems unlikely, however, that a free society can even survive the *preparations* for nuclear war, much less the war itself. The neatly designed fallout school and fallout university, fallout church and fallout factory will be to no avail without a rigid system of central coordination and control. Power will inevitably gravitate to the military. The AEC's director of weapons development, Brig. Gen. Austin Betts has already complained

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that "somehow a vociferous group . . . has managed to associate nuclear explosives with evil, great hazard to health and insecurity to world peace." Such erratic associations will not be long tolerated. If the United States is to "stop being a gutless nation," gutless individuals must be silenced. Men who believe with the Minutemen that "a lot of people in this country are Communists without knowing it themselves" will surely find this a hospitable climate. A pamphlet recently published by the Nutley, New Jersey, Civilian Defense Organization may indicate the quality of life in the Fortress America of the future:

> There can no longer be any doubt in anyone's mind that Russian and Chinese Communist aggression is both virulent and brutally planned. This disease must be wiped from the face of the earth. . . . A showdown must eventually come, or freedom shall be no man's privilege.
>
> Where does the United States stand in this situation? It stands where you, the individual citizen stand—and "stand" each citizen MUST. Now is the time for commitment. There can be no further delay.
>
> At present, the Civil Defense Organization is the most obvious and most opportune instrument for recording each individual's committed stand on the question of appeasement or resistance to active, Party-Line Communism. It is highly important that each citizen participate actively in the Civil Defense Organization, now. Every loyal American should stand at the side of his neighbor, wearing an arm band of the Civilian Defense Corps, pledged to support and uphold the Constitution and the principles upon which our defense rests. There can be no equivocation. Either you belong now—committed to your nation's defense—or you do not belong, and so stand 'uncommitted.' Today, no commitment in this matter is an open invitation to party-line Communist penetration.
>
> In Nutley, during Civilian Defense Week, opportunity will be given to each person as a citizen to join the Nutley Civilian Defense Organization and thereby to commit himself or herself to defense of the American Way of Life—the way of freedom and liberty.

[*Reprints of the above article may be had by ordering from* DISSENT, *in minimum quantities of five or more, at ten cents a copy, prepaid. Large quantities by special arrangement.*]

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HOW GEORGE MEANY IS HELPING TO ELECT A NEGRO PRESIDENT OF THE AFL-CIO

David Carper

Columbus Day 1961, the AFL–CIO Executive Council inadvertently brought on the birth pangs of a new American union movement. When the travail is over very few of the old-crony midwives who now run the AFL–CIO will be around, and almost nobody will care, because there are indications that the successors to the men who lead labor today will be Negroes, and that the resistance to them, led by George Meany, will precipitate a factional struggle that the Negroes will win along with the AFL-CIO, the emoluments, the perquisites, and the real estate, that is, the neo-Mogul Taj Mahal which houses the AFL in Washington.

Demographic and economic forces, not the strange document adopted by the AFL–CIO Executive Council, and not A. Philip Randolph either, will one day put Negro officers at the desks in the AFL–CIO Building from which George Meany and William Schnitzler today look down on the White House grounds, and when the air is clear, even see the George Washington Memorial steeple in Alexandria, Virginia. A lovely view from one of the finest pieces of real estate in the national capital.

The day before the AFL-CIO Executive Council decided to speak their own odd version of the truth to the Negro people, an opinion-sounding in the center of the lobby at the New York City Commodore Hotel during the council meeting indicated the two major issues it faced were Hoffa and who's winning the ball game.

In the bar at the Commodore Hotel, staff people, who had no vote in the Executive Council on the Teamster issue, said that Hoffa should be readmitted to the AFL–CIO on probation and given six months to clean up the Meany mess on pain of being expelled finally forever. Once this was said, no other anticipated event seemed important enough to keep anyone hanging around to pick up the gossip. One by one, the usual kibitzers, commission merchants, and opinion brothers in the labor business went home to leave the aging, overweight leaders of the American unions gumming their lines on a stage without an audience. Toward the middle of the week, the bearded, slightly seedy Potofsky stood at the head of the carpeted stairs that mounts into the smudged glitter of the Commodore lobby for hours at a time constantly jostled by the come-and-go of tourists, neither recognized nor spoken to.

The occasion was dull and distractingly quiet before the Council

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adopted the three-man report accusing the Negroes and Philip Randolph of segregating themselves against the best efforts of building trades leaders to integrate them into a totally tolerant union movement, and of discriminating against whites seeking jobs as Pullman porters. Meany himself trundled his stomach the hundred-yard length of the lobby, his eyes characteristically bugged, and not even Murray Kempton, who so deeply respects the ex-plumber's fierce and guileless honesty, was on hand to say "sir" before a thoughtful question. Walter Reuther stayed away presumably on account of the Ford negotiations, but he was not at the preceding Council meeting either, which was cited by the attendant administrative aides as another evidence of Reuther's political genius.

WHEN THE SCANDAL FINALLY HAPPENED, it came with the crack of a triangular sex scandal in an upper middle-class suburb. The standard reaction was that it was incredible Meany could be so stupid, but said as if he were being accused of a far-out perversion, and as for Potofsky—if the president of the sisterhood at the Temple, in whatever community any one lives in, should turn out to be Nasser's mistress, no one would be more bowled over than the AFL–CIO types were to see Potofsky's name on the memorandum attacking Randolph. Insiders chiefly were bemused over this mindless contribution by the president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers to a mounting anti-Semitism among Negroes, especially because it was aimed at the Negroes in the unions who since the organization of the CIO, at least, have always been allied with Jews against anti-Semitism and racial and religious prejudice in general.

In the newspapers Meany's Hoffa-baiting won a unanimous editorial accolade, with clusters from the ultra-commercial part of it which professes to see a threat to civil liberties in the union shop. (Personally, the editorials and Meany reminded me of a line in *Time of Hope* by C. P. Snow. "Were they so utterly cut off from their own experience that they could utter these loud resounding moral brays and not be forced to look within? If baboons learned to talk, the first words they spoke would be stiff with moral indignation.")

Besides winning a medal as the world's champion Hoffa-kicker from a hypocritical position, the president of the AFL–CIO, also ran off with first place for himself and the AFL–CIO, that week anyhow, at the top of the list the Negro people, like every other minority group, keep of the public figures and agencies they would like to see flushed away; Meany, AFL–CIO, Faubus, Eastland, Sir Roy Welensky, the Union of South Africa and Verwoerd, and the Belgian colonists in the Congo.

ANIMOSITY TOWARD THE AFL by Negroes is not new, but in this historical context, the nakedness of the prejudice and the hostility in the AFL–CIO Executive Council to the political ambitions of Negroes counter-pointed by the quick precision with which Roy Wilkins and Martin Luther King personally replied to the AFL-CIO attack, brought on a climax in the American labor movement which is as total, as organic, and as intimate as childbirth.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With the lamentable assistance of the Jewish anti-discrimination organizations which can't help themselves because they are captives of the unions, the AFL–CIO has recently been trying to put the history of bigotry among worker organizations into newspeak or Aesopian in an effort to deny what everyone knows, that Negroes are discriminated against even in the industries where the most advanced unions are organized, in Steel, Rubber, and the UAW, for example, and they are practically barred from employment by union practices in the least advanced unions, the building trades. While the AFL–CIO, ironically enough, was mimeographing its polemic against Randolph, the *Washington Post* published a feature on discrimination in the District of Columbia written by the Education Director of the AFL–CIO International Electrical Workers, which, acknowledging very substantial advances in the Operating Engineers, reported that more camels are going through needles' eyes these days than Negroes are getting into the AFL–CIO skilled trades in the national capital, with George Meany's own union, the plumbers, among the worst.

THE NEGRO COMMUNITY IN WASHINGTON is getting rather more attention today than it has since Major L'Enfant laid the city out, first because the city's adults acquired the vote during the last session of Congress, and second, because when the people do stand in line at the polls, more than half of them will be Negroes. Among the aspirant politicians scrambling for places in the emerging political machine are AFL–CIO staff people, who find they are better received when in white professional neighborhoods than in the Negro areas where it is to the advantage of a canvasser not to mention his connection with the union movement. Publicity about the situation of Negroes within the AFL, given this circumstance, is not welcomed.

Other political and economic adjustments are also eroding the AFL situation. Inside the Democratic Party and within the government there is no sympathy for the segregated fraternalism of the AFL–CIO and its affiliated unions. Civil rights and anti-discrimination efforts by the government agencies have broken through the tangle of red tape and are now getting loose into the country. For months, unions have been receiving warnings from the agency which enforces the Presidential Fair Employment Practices Order, urging them to get things straight before the government descends on them. Under this pressure, and never for one moment desisting in their denial of *any* guilt in the matter, unions will soon be forced to stop conniving at keeping Negroes out of their jurisdictions.

At this moment, while unions still claim that they are the champions of minorities, and the super-jets of civil rights, George Meany is known as old Mister White Supremacy himself among Negroes, and more and more Negro workers charge bitterly that the union movement itself is just another white man's device to keep the man down. Once, in a time now past, union spokesmen, especially the staff people assigned to the so-called civil rights or fair practices activities, could enter a skillful and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

convincing defense by claiming the employer, not the unions, did the hiring, and that it was the employer's prejudice that barred the way. But the Negroes around A. Philip Randolph who are talking union today, but in cynical accents, are not country boys; they are urban, they are literate, they are politically sophisticated, the Negro leadership council they have organized is evidence of that, and they speak Aesopian themselves. Chief among the reasons Randolph and his associates put the AFL–CIO Executive Council in such jeopardy of choleric angina is that the Negroes have stopped talking about jobs the companies control and have started to demand equal opportunities in the jobs (as officers and staff members) the unions control. If a bald-headed, pot-bellied genie should exert itself and relocate the AFL–CIO Taj Mahal which is now across Lafayette Square from the White House, and set it down in Charleston, South Carolina, there would be very little that the Governor of South Carolina would object to, and as for the Governor of North Carolina, the chances are he would suggest that decent respect for the pieties at least required a show of token integration in the AFL–CIO.

EXCEPT FOR RANDOLPH, the Executive Council of the AFL–CIO is like the driven snow, as are most executive boards of most unions. Beyond the prevailing apartheid among elected union officials, Randolph also charged, by implication, that AFL–CIO hiring policy itself within the sacred mausoleum is anti-Negro. "This is false," the AFL-CIO replied, and as evidence cited four staff positions held by Negroes. But the AFL is contending with a militant political appetite, not with syllogisms. Underneath the bureaucratic super-structure, throughout the economy that encapsulates the unions, especially in the needle trades and in the metal factories, and in every urban center, the proportion of Negro workers has increased steadily over recent years until, at this moment, the Negroes who follow Randolph are quite right when they compare the union job machinery itself with the colonialist regime of Kenya, or the Rhodesias, or Angola, as an unrepresentative white officer class which, in a vulgar effort to survive, is increasingly concerned to frustrate a growing body of colored privates.

Among the trades that are organized today, noticeably in the government services, the Post Office, for example, but in most industries, except aircraft, the unskilled and semi-skilled vocations, both blue and white collar, are very rapidly filling up with Negroes, so that it is virtually certain, either with or without a fight, that the 99.44 per cent white council of old men that Meany presides over will disappear in a colonial uprising which will bring a cabinet of local, regional, and international Lumumbas, Mboyas and Gizengas to union power. Certainly, the most plausible explanation of the AFL–CIO hysteria that attends anything touching Randolph is that these phrenetics are the anxiety symptoms of insecure and frightened politicians whose time has run out.

Hysteria is not inappropriate if you consider another development which has brought the defense of white privilege in the union movement within only a few moves of mate, that is the rapidly altering relationship

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between unions and Negroes politically. In most of the communities where unions have had substantial successes in elections, the winning returns have been based on the confidence Negroes have almost gratefully given to the labor movement. In Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Youngstown, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Los Angeles, the cities where unions seemed to have found the formula for effective political action, an examination of the vote shows that the election victories have not been based on brilliant leadership or even on the marriage of COPE to motivational research and the use of depth interviews in opinion polling. Actually, labor political claims of prowess are based almost entirely on the fact that Negro wards, under the urging of industrial unions, to a far greater degree than has been true in white working-class wards, have voted Democratic by majorities of 80 to 95 per cent year after year since 1944. Since this vote was organized, mobilized and enrolled by the industrial unions, the UAW, the Rubber Workers, and the Steelworkers, it has not been unnatural that these successes were capitalized by union leaders. At this time, the Negro vote in the large cities which has accepted COPE recommendations far more consistently and unquestionably than white union members, even against racial appeals, these ballots are the money in the Democratic bank on which Walter Reuther, David McDonald, and George Meany draw their interest in the form of influence, appointments to advisory committees, and black tie dinners at the White House. The next time they look at their books, they may find their balances have walked away.

UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE UNIONS, the precinct committeemen and the district delegates who are the critical personalities in getting the Negro vote out, also are very often the key people in the Randolph revolt. Their tactics obviously are designed to flank the white positions in the unions by a demand for representation in regional and national offices (the fight has almost been won in the locals). Simultaneously, however, and with less trumpeting, the Negro advance is moving around the other flank through the Democratic Party where the leaders who are not union staff are eager to accommodate themselves to the reality of black metropolises and are delighted to cooperate with new political organizations whose spokesmen are directly representative of the ranks and not non-resident commission merchants. In the recent election of delegates to the Michigan Constitutional Convention there was evidence that the Negro rank-and-file of Detroit are already re-forming to march under Negro banners, still Democratic, but Negro Democratic, not COPE Democratic, with Negro caucuses selecting candidates and making decisions and asking for recognition intead of AFL-CIO or UAW, or Steelworkers' caucuses. (Since this was written the Negro Trade Union leadership Leadership Council in Detroit was instrumentally crucial in the election of a Mayor in opposition to the candidate endorsed by the UAW and the AFL-CIO.)

What evidence there is around also suggests that the national Democratic Party, like the city and state organizations, would rather

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deal directly with Negroes and other minority groups than through a union broker. To support this, there is the truth so galling to AFL candidates for Presidential appointments, the far greater number of jobs given Negroes as compared with AFL hopefuls.

UNLESS ALL THE PORTENTS ARE MISLEADING, the future of the AFL-CIO, as Tom Mboya once said of South Africa, is black. The AFL-CIO mimeograph machines will run dry blank pages before any volume of press releases will persuade Negroes that George Meany *et al* are treating them fairly on jobs and representation. The showdown fracas might have been postponed except the AFL almost comically conked itself by a roorback fizzle that boomeranged. The persistant attack on Randolph and the insistent assertion of false claims about the AFL policy to people who know better because they were there when the doors were slammed in their faces have lost the AFL the confidence of Negroes apparently irretrievably. Randolph has emerged as the embattled champion of his race against Meany the villainous racial antagonist, Pharoah, Hitler, and Potofsky all rolled into one.

Within this or the next administration, the white leaders of the American unions must submit themselves to a vote of confidence, reluctantly where the Meany strategy is followed and almost inevitably after bitter, racial and factional struggles within some unions. But there is evidence in the UAW, in Steel, and certainly in unions like the Packinghouse Workers that there will be accommodations and disengagements from last ditches which suggest that some non-glandular transitions will be made. Whether it comes by land or sea, by peace or by war, for demographic reasons, or for reasons that relate to the movement of people through the labor force, a new union movement is coming, predominantly Negro. And it will arrive earlier rather than later, for a political reason, that is, that Negroes, now in a pivotal electoral position, are poised so they can act independently within the Democratic Party and with this leverage can command a mobilization of the Democratic Party and government anti-discrimination agencies as their allies.

Leaders with Bourbon whisky in their bellies are not very different from those with Bourbon blood in their veins, yet it is surprsing that the Meanys, Potofskys, and Dubinskys, and the other latter-day hysteron-proterons who speak so knowingly and glowingly about the revolution of rising expectations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, when it appears in their own colonial kitchens (even as a staff union) are unable to recognize it much less compromise with it to the extent of a couple of pounds of pork chops they would never miss. Just because they are so tight and nepotious and all white meat about their pork chops, they and their relatives are going to lose their fine and private places high up on the hog, sooner than need be, and with a loss of dignity, that could also be avoided, which might turn out like Mussolini's upside-down end, to be so degrading that it will be an historical embarrassment, to victors and vanquished alike.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

YOUTH WORK CAMPS

Paul Goodman

The idea of work camps for unemployed teen-agers has always been attractive, it has somehow seemed "right." So it recurs whenever, as now, the competitive labor market begins to fail these youth. The camps are first set up as a facility for delinquent youth—the first such camps in California antedated by a few years the Civilian Conservation Corps of the Depression, and in recent years in New York we have set up similar delinquent camps. Then camps are proposed for "pre-delinquent" youth; and then for all who are not easily employed though otherwise unproblematic. Various reasons are given. The camp situation is therapeutic for the emotionally disturbed; it gets them out of their (and our) environment. Work is therapeutic. Youth are taught work habits and even particular skills that serve them on their "return to the community." And public projects like conservation are carried through. (Indeed, the actual productive work done proves—surprisingly, as in the case of the CCC—immensely valuable; it was an economic use of human resources otherwise wasted.)

These arguments are sound, but I do not think they hit the essential "rightness" of the idea of work camps, which is simply: that *there is an intrinsic relationship among middle adolescence, living in camps, and the need for work and a certain kind of work.* Camps and the right work are not, for that age, a device for an emergency but are a natural institution of society. One does not "return" from them to the community, they are part of the community, akin to the Youth House of primitive cultures. Under certain conditions, parts of the complex are informally provided in the on-going community itself, for instance, when the city itself has real vocations and there is a general institution of apprenticeships. But at present it is worthwhile to explore this philosophical idea of the youth work camp, because it is a standard to judge what is wrong with our own community and its work.

I

To BEGIN WITH, a residential camp is a sub-community away from the parental home. In America we are so committed to the psychological value, if not sanctity, of the family that we have insensibly

NOTE: This essay is taken from Paul Goodman's forthcoming book, *Utopian Essays and Political Proposals,* published this month, by permission of author and the publisher, Random House.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

slipped, in modern urban and technological conditions, into the error of a later and later "maturity." The mayoral prescription to curb youth by stricter home supervision is not only unrealistic but disastrously unhealthy. Consider the trap that American youth is maneuvered into: they are put off to a later and later sexual maturity and independence, and forced into an earlier and earlier career choice. There is no period for adolescence.

The community of youth must exist in a certain sociological isolation from the massive adult world, it must have its own rules. In principle this does not require the country or forest setting that is the usual image, though that has obvious attractions; a street-gang isolates itself very well. We shall see that many youth-valuable and socially-valuable work projects require being in or near town, and therefore every effort should be made to devise an urban residential camp. A difficulty is the wildness and in-groupness intrinsic in any transitional stage. Hell-raising and the need for space are good things, but how to institutionalize them? (In Scheme I of *Communitas* my brother and I therefore locate all the high schools and junir colleges in the forest belt.)

A second interesting property is the mean size of the camps. One is struck by the unanimity of the writers. "A delinquent camp," says the latest manual (George Weber), "should be limited to a maximum of 60 boys, and fewer are desirable." By law, California delinquent camps "must not exceed 100 in population, including staff" (Lee Cary). The two delinquent camps in New York number 50 and 60. The CCC non-delinquent camps averaged 110, but the discipline was admittedly too military. Senator Humphrey's proposed camps * will therefore average 40 to 50. One is reminded of the kind of figure mentioned for a residential progressive school, 50 to 100. Clearly in this median figure, not too few and not too many, there is implied a face-to-face community where everybody knows everybody; and yet there is a complexity of social relations beyond cliques or even gangs, so that a youth must learn to take himself also as a public person. Living together in such a community provides a continuum between intimate acquaintance and the public self, the citizen. In modern mass society, this is the school of democracy, and possibly there is no other school.

It is relevant to leave home during *middle* adolescence. The youth is now past the anxieties of the onset of adolescence (age 11-14), which might still require, as Mayor Wagner says, "the love and warmth of family affection." Now there is sexual and self-affirmation, and therefore fights at home. Contrast this period with the much earlier "separation from mother" (age 6). The earlier break consisted in finding oneself in friends like oneself, ultimately in one's gang and uniform. But the break during 14 to 18 consists in finding oneself in the public real world.

The crucial question is this: *What can give structure to this new identity, to replace the parental identity?* And the answer I want to sug-

* The reference here is to a bill introduced by Senator Hubert Humphrey for setting up youth camps, mainly in conservation work.—ED.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gest is: *Objective productive work, leading to the discovery of unique vocation and career.* On such a view, a person's work and kind of work are as important to him as in Luther's religious view that "a man is justified by his calling." Yet our society does not think about it!

II

GO BACK A MOMENT to the comparison with the primitive Youth House. This is a community of peers, but there is no need to provide for it an objective work, for *all* the work in such a community is cultural and useful and performed cooperatively or with a simply understood division of labor. From early childhood the youth has already been involved in it, trying out various skills.

Our nearest equivalent to such normal growing-up is, perhaps, middle-class youth going off to school and colleges, continuing the academic work they have done since childhood, and learning the verbal and symbolic skills of a bookish and technological adult world. They do not have a very communal Youth House in their schools; and their careers, and academic preparation, do not, for the most part, have much flesh and blood. Yet they are our model for the unproblematic in the "automated society."

For non-college youth, however, merely "getting a job" is *not* unproblematic, it does not provide objective productive work. Very often, it does not provide a normal next adjustment. For the wrong job, just to get a job, *prevents* growth. The job gives economic independence, but the employer turns into a substitute father, and the youth (and man) repeats the pattern of resentful dependency. Further, the job-market being what it is, the job rarely has any relation to aptitude. If there is "guidance," it is of the sort that tests the youth to see where he can be useful in the economic machine, chopping off an ear or finger if necessary. No effort is made to find the job that will be useful for him, and there is no chance of trying out useful possibilities. (Why, for instance, is the underprivileged, or the non-bookish, boy not given vocational scholarships, for exploration and training, if the college boy is given aid?) Finally, the job is not presented to the youth as a worthwhile occupation with useful products to be proud of; often in our society the enterprise is not worthwhile, and the products are useless.

It is remarkable how both informed opinion and popular sentiment have insisted that the camp work have exactly contrary characteristics. The product must be publicly useful, manly, and admirable; conservation, planting trees, stocking ponds, etc. have this popular image. To say it wryly, the CCC jobs, like the WPA, were not allowed to compete with private "enterprise"; that is, they could not work for profits and be useless, but had to fall back on the worth of the products. One hears touching tales of the CCC boy returning 25 years later with his own son to point with pride to the park-pavilion he helped build. And indeed, in cases like the Red Rocks amphitheater in the Denver Rockies, he might well be proud, for it is a lovely thing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Further, the notion that work is an "experience" and that skills should be tried out as part of education, is considered advantageous. Variety of work, such as domestic work and field work, is considered an advantage. The work is done cooperatively or in a division of labor arranged by the community; this helps make it one's own work. The youth is paid—typically, the army minimum for enlisted men—only so that he can have spending money; his support is his by right as a member of the community. How strange it is that these excellent things, that the public insists on for work camps, seem to be irrelevant to the ordinary jobs in society!

In all these ways, we can speak of productive work as providing an objective structure to replace the family authority. There is the background of a community of peers, but the work is something more than the interpersonal relations of the camp. It is a real project to grow on, to *project* on, in the real world, to find one's identity and hopefully one's vocation.

(We can see here the structural defect in the street-gang. Being cut off from the adult real world, where the future values are, its enterprises are marginal, and it has to make a structure of its own interpersonal relations: pecking order, enforced loyalty, and finally gang-fighting with its similars.)

III

THERE IS A SHARP DISTINCTION between the meaning of work in the delinquent and the non-delinquent camp. In the delinquent camp, work is a therapeutic discipline, precisely to impose an authority and "reality principle" where just these are lacking, perhaps in the so-called psychopathic personality. Such work must also be useful, not made, work, in order to build self respect, for the youth says, "I have done that, therefore I am." (Naturally I am speaking of good camps, not reformatories, where the work is likely to be either punishment or slave labor.) In a non-delinquent camp, however, the work is an end in itself, as process and product. The youth does not strengthen his ego against the discipline of work, but "loses himself" and grows into the work, to find himself new and larger on the other side. This entails, of course, programming excellent jobs of work. So far the programmers have not been very inventive; they are bureaucrats and haven't called on inventive people to help them. Even conservation, which is always first rate, has usually not been made cultural and meaningful enough by scientific explanation and experiment led by the neighboring university.

Youth needs counseling and guidance, and here again we can distinguish between delinquent and non-delinquent guidance in terms of the meaning of the work. The disturbed delinquent—let me hasten to say that many committed "delinquents" are by no means disturbed but have gotten into trouble by influence of environment or even simply because society has foolish rules—the problem of a disturbed delinquent is likely to be inability to work at all, for he resists the objective demands of any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

job. He feels inferior and absents himself. A counselor will not then try to get him to work, but will use the lapse to explore his personality. Obviously in a good delinquent-camp, the productive work cannot be the goal, for, temporarily, *not* to do the work may be in the boy's interest. In a work-centered camp, however, counseling is the same as good work-supervision: it springs from the product and the process and aims at discovering further vocation. A young worker may lack interest in the product as worthwhile, and the therapy for this is cultural, giving information, showing meaning and importance. Or a boy may work badly; e.g., a boy who inhibits his aggression and has tight shoulders may not know how to drive a nail with confidence and beauty. The best therapist in such a case may be a master-craftsman, who loves the making, the style. He will not need to explore problems of personality, for they project and heal themselves in the art and craft. After a while, more formal vocational guidance may be added, informing the youth what jobs are available for him in the future, how to get them, where to get further training. Perhaps he will want to return to school, for which he has now discovered his own use.

I have thus in an abstract way brought together the problems of a stage of adolescence with the need for residential camps with a program of real work. Leaving his family and choosing a community of his peers, a youth finds a structure to replace his parents in objectively valuable work, till he finds identity and vocation. So the youth camp is, in type, an institution of normal society.

IV

PARADOXICALLY, THE SUCCESS of a great program of work camps designed for the advantage of youth depends on the worthwhileness of the work-projects for the community at large, since only the community can give objective cultural norms. In principle, the invention of a master program of projects is prior to the location and staffing of camps and provides their context.

How topsy-turvy our thinking is! When we benevolently worry what to do with the millions of drop-outs (35% of the high school population), we start with this "problematic youth" and try to find employment useful for them and useful for society; and perhaps we hit on the idea of forest work camps, postponing for a year the question what they will do when they "return to the community." Surely the normal procedure would be the reverse, to think what we need for a better quality of life and to rejoice that we have these new human resources to help meet the need.

We thus continue the only natural discipline of behavior which consists not of imposing the authority's wishes but of a person's coping with the nature of things, objectively demonstrable.

There used to be an organization called the National Child Labor Committee, to protect youth from being exploited by parents and profiteers of industry. This organization has now changed its name to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

National Committee on Employment of Youth, to protect youth from wasting away unemployed. We are in a unique dilemma. Given our "surplus productivity," we might do well to aim at a large *planned* paid unemployment, as Galbraith has suggested. No politician would dare this proposal, yet to judge from the lax boondoggling and expense-account "production," it seems to be the under-current of public thinking. And there is a general acceptance of the desirability, or at least inevitability, of automation involving unemployment grossly underpaid (by social insurance and dole.) Yet it is also felt that especially for youth and the aged, who are the least employable, unproductive life is a moral and psychological disaster!

Consider our dilemma as a problem of administration and finance. Like any communities, the work camps are multi-purposive. Their advantages are ecological, educational, moral, economic, judicial. Therefore it should be easy to get funds for them from several groups. But of course the opposite is the case: since many will be benefited, nobody is competent to administer or responsible to finance. This difficulty of coping with any multi-purpose enterprise, any community enterprise, is a fair index of the state of our society. In a great city there are a plethora of community problems—housing, delinquency, traffic, schooling, unemployment, etc., etc. These are dealt with by a bewildering maze of departments, but there is no community plan—even though the problems *cannot* be solved in isolation, for the isolated "solution" of one problem (housing) in fact aggravates the other problems (traffic, delinquency). The normal approach, "This is irrefutably a fine thing, so let's get together and do it"—this is precisely infinitely difficult for us. And when by exception a great multi-purpose enterprise like the TVA *is* implemented, with whatever crippling "safeguards," it is a wonder of the age.

V

WE DO NOT INVENT great programs because not enough *mind* is put to the task. It is not to be expected that the Departments of Labor and Interior, or even a county Administrator of Correction, will dream up remarkable work projects. A fine architect might, and might even do it gratis as a patriotic action, but we do not much rely on such men and such motives. Students of architecture at the university might think up something for youth to build; out of fifty of their inventions, one would be both remarkable and feasible. But here the university is not on speaking terms with the government. Or in another genre, a social case-worker might have a most vivid sense of some alteration or installation or service that would make all the difference to a harried family, and that youth could do. (This is the line of Carl May's Youth for Service; e.g., "The boys built a retaining wall at a neighborhood center. They scrubbed the kitchen and painted the bedroom and bath at the home of two elderly sisters.")

Camps have usually been located in a country or forest setting, for conservation, park maintenance, the construction of recreational facili-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ties. But urban conservation and urban renewal are equally important. And most important, to my mind, is that fifty thousand small towns in America are ugly, shapeless, and neglected; they are nowhere to belong to, nothing to be proud of. These will not in fact be improved by private promoters whose notion of a community center is not a green but a super-market. Maybe some of them can be improved by artists and youth.

There is another valuable kind of work, the living theater, where youth can work as builders, stagehands, and actors. To offset the standardized mass-communications, we need hundreds of Little Theaters throughout the country. These would not ordinarily be thought of as work camp projects, but why not?

I am suggesting a very broad spectrum of projects; and this is why. We are at a crisis in America, when we either improve the quality of our life or begin to give up. The idea of work camps as an adventure for all youth, as a normal institution of society, is itself a new quality of life. In such a ferment, of real community, real work, and real goods, bubbling up in every likely and unlikely place, we could tolerate the system we have. I am not sure that the youth "returning to the community" would tolerate it, having known better. But increasingly they do not tolerate it anyway.

An Argument Against

As with most of his recent social criticism, there is something attractive in Paul Goodman's article on youth and work camps. He is one of the few living writers who thinks in terms of concrete human needs and possibilities, rather than from some ideological or institutional premise. Yet I find myself disturbed by his argument and would like to raise a few questions.

1) Goodman remarks that in the CCC camps the discipline was "admittedly too militaristic," and that is probably an understatement. For it seems almost inevitable that in our present society any scheme for work camps in the forests or elsewhere will be controlled and administered by "tough" instructors stressing the dominant social versions of "patriotism" and "manliness." One's memories of the 1930s stir uneasy associations of joy-through-work, authoritarian patterns of life in the camps, and in general a false and semi-military kind of discipline. Such camps, for me at least, have always been connected with a *repressive* style, both socially and in regard to private life. Now I grant that there may be nothing inherent in the idea of work camps that requires them to have such undesirable aspects; but I would contend that if radicals and/or liberals are to advocate their establishment, they had better be prepared to expect that this is the way such camps will turn out in reality.

2) The work camps, again within the present society, inevitably bring with them one or another degree of sexual segregation. At the very time young people should be learning to live with persons of the other sex, they are presumably to be brought together in camps isolated, or somewhat isolated, from towns and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cities. Would this not make for that "later and later sexual maturity" which Goodman rightly describes as a "trap?"

NOW IT IS CERTAINLY TRUE that the young in middle adolescence need to find ways of breaking loose from parental authority—constructive and liberating ways. And it is also true that among young people of that age there is a natural tendency to spend time and live together in groups, somewhat apart from the world of their elders. But isn't that just the point—"somewhat apart?" Ideally I would think that the young in middle adolescence should be allowed a way of bunching together as a sub-community—but not geographically and socially cut off from—the larger community. Young people need ways of association within cities and towns, based on meaningful work and education; but the camps as conceived in our society and as they perhaps must be conceived in our society, provide something quite different.

It may be that one reason I feel uneasy regarding Goodman's proposals has to do with the attitude some of us have held toward work camps ever since the 1930's when the CCC was organized. At that time the CCC camps seemed potentially dangerous equivalents of the youth camps set up in totalitarian societies —and whatever the faults of the family as an institution, it can play a decidedly healthy role as one of the last points of resistance against encroachments of the authoritarian state. Probably we exaggerated the fascistic potential of the camps, but did we simply imagine it for no good reason whatever?

Projects undertaken by the government within a society dedicated to private economy are necessarily stamped by the values of that society. This does not mean, of course, that one should therefore oppose or even be skeptical about all such projects; but one must surely have some sense of their probable outcome. It is a serious dilemma for radicals: should they advocate measures which in the abstract are surely desirable but which, as they know, are likely to be gravely distorted in the context of the present society?

IRVING HOWE

In reply

Irving Howe's second point, on sexual segregation, surprises me. It had never occurred to me that the camps would not be co-ed; a chief use of them would be sexual exploration in favorable circumstances. My conception of them is like a good progressive school but with more concretely practical projects. Such schools exist in our "present" society. Their contrary is not "inevitable."

With the content, but not the spirit, of most of his other remarks, I am in agreement. The dangers of semi-militarism, regimentation, and narrow moral values are real. I doubt, however, that "under socialism" there would not be similar dangers, though with other narrow values. Freedom is not readily accorded to the young; I thought I made clear that these camps must be experiments in self-government, that was the point of the mean size. And therefore I proposed that they should be "sociologically" but *not* geographically somewhat

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

apart. Not only ours but all societies are suspect, and therefore it is wise to hew to the line of the ideal, the normal, the natural, the open-experimental. Otherwise one is soon trapped into choosing the lesser of two evils, as it is called. The practical course for a writer is to assert the best and howl at the "inevitable" distortions of it. This has the advantage of *our* choosing the battleground, rather than always talking in *their* terms.

Irving's image of the CCC probably reflects his own adolescence—Bronx? I was a Washington Heights boy and importantly lived, across the then ferry, in the Interstate Park; or my bicycle flew across the Bronx to City Island. My Scout troop was also a big deal for me, and I would have become a Scoutmaster except that, in the *middle* 30's, the organization began to be semi-militarized. I think Irving is too young to remember that the 20's and early 30's were importantly pacifist and internationalist. Many of the youth are importantly becoming so again, though not on a basis of socialism. As for the *actual* CCC, so far as I observed or have heard, some of the camps were lousy, some were pretty good. His expression "seemed potentially dangerous equivalents" of fascism, reminds me uncomfortably of the CP Popular Front; e.g., in 1936 they supported the Democratic Mayor of Chicago who had just killed 17 workers at Republic Steel, because Landon "might" win and introduce fascism.

IN MY OPINION, we are *now* drifting into a kind of fascism, but it is a fascism-of-the-majority and will not even "seem" regimented or militaristic. It is for this reason that we must assert what is uncompromising and really worthwhile. We want the real pork-chops, but not now money, but animality, utility, community, and freedom.

Finally, Irving's plug for the bourgeois family is strictly for the birds. This hangover is the cause of the suburban flight and, in my city, has resulted in a disastrous *de facto* segregation. The family, as it now works out, *is* our American fascism. We must find a substitute (I do not know one but the *kibbutz* has suggestive ideas). For instance, I am now urging as part of race-integrated and income-mixed public housing the inclusion of voluntary youth-dormitories in the same buildings. These would give the kids a refuge and give the grown-ups also a chance to breathe.

PAUL GOODMAN

Shades of Things to Come . . .

"Washington, Oct. 18 (AP)—A calculating machine's wires became crossed, and the Army in Europe ordered $7,400,000 worth of material it did not need, the General Accounting Office reported today.

"The report to Congress said the Ordinance Supply Management Agency at Orleans, France, ordered last year a total of '$9,400,000 in excess of the then current requirements because of inefficient supply management.'

"The Army, in commenting attached to the report, attributed $7,400,000 of the excess to improper wiring of an electrical accounting machine control panel. But it said the error was caught soon enough so that only $4,000 worth of the material had actually been delivered.'

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EUROPE 1961—NOTES ON THE MARGIN

Lewis Coser

Scandinavia

• Liberals can always be made uneasy when told the "fact" that suicide rates and other indices of social disorganization are very high in the Scandinavian countries under the welfare state. This "fact," it turns out, just isn't one. The Norwegian suicide rate is below the American, and among the lowest in Europe, while the Danish and Swedish rates are, indeed, quite high. Since all these countries have been living under the welfare state for a long time, their different rates can hardly be due to the "softness" of welfare measures. Swedish rates have been about three times as high as Norwegian rates since the beginning of the century, i.e., since long before Socialist parties achieved government power. The Swedish divorce rate is high, though not as high as that of the United States or of . . . Egypt, but the Norwegian rate is quite low. Crime statistics, and statistics of juvenile delinquency tell the same story.

• Youth is said to be bored with and disaffected from the Welfare State. Maybe so, but in the recent Swedish elections the youngest group of voters voted more heavily for the Social Democratic Party than any other age group.

• Much like some American literary critics who deplore the leveling of cultural diversity in America because "there remains nothing to write about," many American visitors deplore the lack of "picturesque" slums in Scandinavia, and go into ecstasies over the smell, dirt, and "character" of Naples or Genoa. The people who live in Scandinavia's garden cities and Italian slums think otherwise. The cultural snobbism of the intelligentsia infuriates me. How right George Orwell was when he wrote that, to the working class, "the belly comes before the soul, not in the scale of value, but in point of time." (Yet I must admit that I was sorry to see the old Marseilles harbor district with its pimps, prostitutes, Arab restaurants, and Greek cafes, replaced by an antiseptic public housing development; these are ambiguities with which one has to live.)

• Increases in productivity need not necessarily be cashed in through increased private consumption. Norwegians tend to prefer increased leisure to increased consumption. The country has made amazing strides in industrialization since the war, and, though living standards have risen, Norwegians still own few television sets, do not go in for conspicuous display in their homes, nor for American-style cars. Instead, they are proud of the fact that offices close at 3:30 P.M. in the Winter, and 3 P.M. in the Summer. After office hours, you can go skiing, or swimming, or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hiking, and the more you indulge in these, the more you feel that increased productivity has indeed "paid off." During the whole Easter week, Oslo is totally deserted—all stores, even milk stores and the like, are closed and "everybody" is in the mountains. Norwegians seem to celebrate more holidays than even Medieval Catholics! This is, of course, most inefficient, but then Norwegians are far from worshiping before the shrine of efficiency. Norway demonstrates that industrialization need not have automatic repercussions on life style; there are options; and they seem to have opted for more leisure rather than for more consumption.

• The politics of Scandinavia tend to be rather unexciting. The welfare state is here to stay and political contentions, though often dressed up in terms of *Weltanschauung,* are in fact mainly over quite marginal issues. This does not please political romantics, and I confess to my share of such romanticism, but then it may be true that happy countries have no politics in the traditional sense. Maybe contentions about cultural matters will increasingly replace those strictly political and economic contentions which were in the forefront before the welfare state. Maybe the "soul" can now come into its right after the "belly" is satisfied.

Yugoslavia

• In Norwegian cities one street is likely to be named after each of Norway's dead kings. In any Yugoslav town or city the most prominent streets are named after Tito, and other assorted dignitaries of the regime. There is no cafe, restaurant, or store in all of Yugoslavia which doesn't prominently display a picture of Tito, complete with more decorations stuck on his chest than even Goering ever wore. And certain radicals still feel that Yugoslav "socialism" is, somehow, more "like the real thing" than the Scandinavian variety.

• My eight-year-old son remarked after a few hours in Yugoslavia, "Why do they have so many policemen here?" And indeed, I have never seen so many "cops" anywhere in the world as in Yugoslavia. One almost feels that a favorite means of resorbing unemployment is to put the unemployables into the police force. The Yugoslavs are masters of Newspeak; they call their police a "militia." But, while the term has traditionally referred to citizens doing part-time duty, to men who, in Adam Smith's words, "join in some measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they may happen to carry," the Yugoslav militia is, of course, a full-time police force. They are full-time, though hardly trained, professionals—many of them ignorant country louts unable to read, but lording it over the population with a profound conviction of their importance.

• I cannot remember having been lied to so openly, and with so much apparent good conscience as in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav officials, and many of her intellectuals, are inordinately proud of the fact that they stood up to Stalin—and got away with it. They now feel that this courageous stand gives them a license denied to those other satellites who showed no similar courage. Hence they seem not at all reluctant to ideologize simple questions of fact in a manner which seems more reminiscent of Stalinism than of Khrushchevism. The director of a major research institute in Belgrade told me that "in Yugoslavia there is no problem of alcoholism." Yet on pay day, and not only on pay day, you

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have to be very careful driving through city or village streets for fear of hitting drunks who stumble all over the place. The same man told me that Workers' Control operated splendidly all over the country; in fact, though in some of the Croatian and Slovenian areas such control has indeed a measure of reality, it is window dressing in the rest of the country. (I do not say this in a spirit of negativism; I don't know myself how it could work in certain Bosnian factories where the labor force consists of recent rural newcomers to the city who, more often than not, hardly know how to read and write.)

• Oriental sloth can be infuriating, but so can be the red tape of a Western bureaucracy. The combination of the two in Yugoslavia is well-nigh unbearable. One can become accustomed to the need of greasing palms before one gets service, but when one has to face an officialdom given to dilatoriness and "passing the buck" in the best manner of the French Prefecture de Police *after* one has greased palms, even the most levelheaded is apt to lose patience. My wife talked to about fifteen different officials for several hours in order to persuade them to issue us a ticket for the transportation of our car on a certain steamer on the Adriatic coast. Most of them felt that she would have to wait several months! She finally "persuaded" the captain of the ship to take us on board the very same day . . .

• Yugoslavia is rapidly industrializing, as is the rest of Europe. It will gradually acquire characteristics very similar to those of the rest of the industrialized world; political superstructures seem much less important in this respect than underlying economic forces. But, in the meantime, whenever someone tells you that Yugoslav "socialism" is somehow more admirable that the Scandinavian variety, tell him to spend a week in Sarajewo, and a week in Bergen, Norway, and then report back.

• Literature and the arts are quite free in Yugoslavia, but the newspapers are unbelievably dreary, spouting the requisite ideological platitudes in the required pompous manner. You can innovate in painting, but not in political discourse. There is a good deal of innovation in the field of economic management and planning, but hardly in political life. The New Class is willing to experiment in regard to economic, but hardly in respect to political means. Milovan Djilas has now been set free—several of his non-political books written in prison will soon be published here—but he has no way whatever to express his social-democratic convictions in public. In fact, it would seem to me that he is slowly being forgotten by the younger generation, since he is never mentioned in public. Yugoslav memory-holes are quite efficient. Many old partisan fighters now have high office in the government. But I met others standing sadly on the sidelines, remnants of an earlier, more heroic age, regaling youngsters with tales of their exploits, or strumming partisan songs on battered guitars to an audience of successful youngsters from the New Class.

Germany

• The *Wirtschaftswunder* is indeed a miracle. The capacity to rebuild cities, which only ten or fifteen years ago were mainly rubble, into modernistic replicas of Main Street is amazing. Most German cities have an energy, a drive and bustle that reminds one forcibly of certain Midwestern cities. The people are well-dressed,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and, quite evidently, never had it so good. The automobile has become as much a part of everyday life as in the United States—though automobile ownership per capita is still lower.

The *nouveaux riches* whom one encounters everywhere are as vulgar and ostentatious as in any other country, but I have never seen so many fat men in my life. The German upper class looks as if it had collectively tried to imitate the Georg Grosz cartoons of the twenties. Here life follows art. Those innumerable porcine faces with fat cigars clamped between gold-capped teeth have a nightmarish quality. It almost seems as if, when other badges of status have been devaluated, the German upper class went in for conspicuous display of fatty tissue.

• The German students I met at several universities were refreshing. Open, eager to learn, willing to understand foreign ways. Yet they are also still exceedingly stiff, lack the spontaneity which would be taken for granted on any American campus. They literally freeze to attention when confronting a foreign or domestic "Herr Professor." I also sometimes found an almost fawning admiration of foreign ways. This is, perhaps, the price they pay for having gotten rid of the compulsive nationalism of their father. Many of them seem to feel that anything foreign, especially anything American, is *ipso facto* admirable.

• Culturally, Germany is no longer among the pace-setters of Europe. By and large, cultural life is provincial and imitative. Frankfurt, one of the great centers of German intellectual life for many generations, is now a bustling business center, hardly touched any more by the intellectual stimulus that used to come from its University. German theaters flourish, but no important German playwright has come forward since the War. Things do not seem much better in other cultural areas. German scholarship is still quite excellent but there is little that reminds one of the intellectual effervescence of the twenties or early thirties. In the social sciences admiration for the gadgeteering aspect of modern American research goes side by side with the clinging to superannuated theoretical approaches —many leading scholars still feel that there is something "dirty" about psychoanalysis.

• I doubt that a neo-Nazi right-wing will make much headway in the years to come. Contemporary Germany has turned away from ideological politics, be they of the Left or the Right. The danger to German democracy is likely to come from the ascendancy of quite unideological, authoritarian strongmen like Defense Minister Strauss, rather than from fascist agitators. Respectable topdogs in upper management and upper public administration rather than discontented underdogs may attempt to undermine the, as yet, insecure foundations of democracy. Now I fear the fat men rather than the lean.

• Germany is the most de-ideologized country of Western Europe. The labor movement is as pragmatic in its approach as the AFL in Gompers' days. The youth is more interested in motor scooters than in *Weltanschauung*; students think of careers and security rather than of commitment. The small minority of intellectuals still drawn to ideological concerns live in a kind of inner emigration, full of bitterness about *Wirtschaftswunder*, glamor and vulgarity yet unable to provide viable alternatives or Utopian vision.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France

• French intellectuals are still as much given to the discussion of large ideas as they have always been; but they are farther removed from influence on the political life of the country than ever before. They may still carry some weight when, in the tradition of their Dreyfusard ancestors, they make themselves the spokesmen of human rights against arbitrary acts of the men in power (their protest against army terror and tortures in Algeria was impressive and deeply moving), but they do not carry weight in ordinary political affairs. This divorce from the realm of political action has further fostered the perennial French tendency to think in abstractions. Nowhere else did I hear people talk so often and with so much conviction in the shopworn slogans of traditional Marxism: "the mission of the working class," the "progressive" character of "Eastern democracy." The various leftist reviews all have a *déja vu* character; I felt as if a time machine had abolished the years during which I had not been in Paris. I could well have immediately started finishing the "revolutionary analysis," which I had had to interrupt when the Germans marched into Paris . . . and get it published! There are exceptions, of course, our friends around the review *Arguments* among others, but there are few of them.

• France, just like Germany, though perhaps for somewhat different reasons, is apathetic politically. The intellectuals talk, but they find no repercussions in wider circles. The French economy is booming, consumer goods which were a luxury of the few have become accessible to the many. The working class, long a pariah group within but not of the nation, is slowly partaking of the benefits that a budding mass society begins to provide. No wonder that the cadres and the membership of the Socialist and Communist Party contain fewer young people. The Communist Party still can muster an impressive electoral support, but I doubt whether it could mobilize more than 10 per cent of its voters for non-electoral political action. When the government appealed for help in the first two days of the Algerian uprising, only a few thousand men, a disproportionate number from the tiny leftwing Autonomous Socialist Party, came to the fore.

• France is a constitutional monarchy and the majority of the population admires Charles de Gaulle, though distrusting many of his collaborators. The bulk of Frenchmen is disposed to laugh occasionally at de Gaulle and to see him as a slightly ridiculous figure who mistakes the 20th century for the 16th; but the very people who joke about him will tell you in the next breath that, without him, there would have been chaos, military dictatorship, fascism. Freud once wrote that the behavior of primitive races toward their chiefs and kings is controlled by two principles: they must both be guarded and be guarded against. Nothing sums up better the French ambivalence about de Gaulle. Many leftwing intellectuals to whom I talked spent a great deal of time enumerating the errors and crimes of the Gaullist regime—only to abruptly turn around and speculate with horror about what would befall France if de Gaulle were suddenly to disappear. This is not exactly the intellectual atmosphere from which to expect a democratic resurgence in the immediate future.

• The Algerian issue is, of course,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the forefront of discussion among knowledgable observers of the political scene. There is much fear of a new right-wing coup of Salan's men in Algeria, and, perhaps, on the mainland. Yet de Gaulle has a fair chance to get rid of the Algerian mortgage even though at the price of considerable demoralization in the army and right-wing circles. The economic impact of Algerian independence will not be as great as is sometimes feared —provided Algeria still remains open to French capital. But it will take a long time before this national trauma will be erased from French memories. In the meantime, the overwhelming impression I got was that the bulk of Frenchmen are sick and tired of the enormous hemorrhage that the Algerian war has been, both in terms of men and money.

Poland

• Hannah Arendt to the contrary notwithstanding, Poland is a totalitarian country without ideology. I met a number of younger intellectuals who felt it hard to understand why I still bothered with Karl Marx; they saw him simply as the fount of Stalinist mystification. Poland awakened from its nightmare of dogmatic ideology in 1956, and things have never been the same again. Intellectuals and political activists felt that they had been duped, that their eyes had been blinded by a screen of dogmatic assertions and just plain lies and that, from now on, they would be taken in by nobody. The very slogans which French intellectuals still spout with such assurance appear in Poland utterly ridiculous. Even party members voice outrageous heresies with habitual nonchalance. In fact, one can hardly talk of heresies where there is no orthodox Marxist Church.

• You can talk as freely in Poland as you can in New York. You cannot write freely, of course. But censors are not very intelligent men, and, if you use the proper Aesopian language, you can get by with a great deal. The Polish intellectual scene is exceedingly lively and animated. Discussions in cafes and clubs last for hours and are apt to touch a great variety of subjects. Polish theaters play Tennessee Williams, Becket, Ionescu, and Arthur Miller; Polish painting follows the main lines of "Western" abstractionism, though, so far, rather in a derivative fashion.

• The key determinant of Polish politics is not ideology but geography. Were Poland located on the rim of the Russian Empire, rather than squeezed in between East Germany and Russia, its politics would have a very different character. As it is, the regime must continuously engage in a perilous balancing act in which concessions to the Russian masters are counterbalanced by assertions of national independence, be it in the economic, the political, or the cultural field. And the whole edifice can endure only as long as there is a firm, though unspoken, alliance between Party and Church, between Gomulka and the Cardinal.

If someone forced me at gun point to choose between Poland and Yugoslavia as a place to live, I would choose Poland any day. And yet Poland is behind the Iron Curtain, and Yugoslavia is not.

P.S. I have not talked about England, mainly because most readers would be quite familiar with what I have to say. I haven't talked about the war scare because, when I left Europe in mid-September, there was no war scare in Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOTEBOOK

JOURNEY TO THE END OF RIGHT

Irving Howe

Now that our distinguished liberal intellectuals have finished proclaiming "the end of ideology," it begins to seem that we are entering an intensely ideological period in American history.

After living in California only a few months, one discovers that the upsurge on the political right is a more serious matter than anyone in New York or Boston is likely to suppose; that it needs to be examined, in one manifestation, as a new version of conservative ideology, and, in another, as an outbreak of a primitive semi-fascism; and that on the American scene today, at least in this part of the country, it constitutes a force of some energy.

The crackpot side is somewhat frightening. Local newspapers are full of stories about the Minute Men, a secret private "army" supplied with light and medium arms that has been formed to protect the nation against invaders and, perhaps more to the point, residents of rural counties against urban refugees who may be expected to flee the cities after atom bombs are dropped. I say "protect" but they do not hesitate to say "shoot." And so diseased is the moral atmosphere that the "problem" of what to do if someone invades your fallout shelter (one local county has, in utter madness, issued directives on taking care of pets after the attack) is discussed seriously. A good number of respondents to a questionnaire in *The San Francisco Chronicle* report they would not hesitate to shoot neighbors who might invade their shelters. Ah, these red-blooded Americans!

How large or significant groups like the Minute Men are, no one seems to know. But in some respects they are quite different from the fascist shirt-groups of the thirties, for if then the membership was likely to consist of urban flotsam and small-town jetsam, now the *lumpens* drive Buicks and feel they have something worth defending. And the local district attorneys seem more concerned with banning Henry Miller's novels—the fools really think that reading *Tropic of Cancer* could arouse someone sexually!—than in investigating and prosecuting the leaders of these private armies. One of the Minute Men commanders has finally been arrested, but the charge against him was not that he had organized a private guerrilla band, it was that he had failed to register with the police as a sexual pervert. Whatever else, one can count on this country to hold the line to the bitter end, at least in public, against the "menace" of homosexuality.

THE IMPORTANT POINT IS that out here

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the right-wing groups have seized the political initiative. It is they who hold the large rallies, choked with revivalist emotion; it is they who fill the columns of the letters to the editor; it is they who conduct campaigns to vindicate the unspeakable General Walker; it is they who steadily, and with some effect, keep pressuring local school boards. At a large private university a Congressman belonging to the John Birch Society attracted an enormous crowd, and not, I fear, because the students regarded him as a crank or a menace but because they took him as a serious spokesmen for serious views.

To see this right-wing upsurge as a recurrence of McCarthyism would be something of a mistake. It draws, no doubt, on some of the same emotions, and attracts some of the same people, that McCarthy did. But in the East McCarthyism was based primarily on plebeian and lower-middle-class sectors of the population—in Boston, for example, on the numerous Irish Catholic poor. So far as one can tell, however, the Birch Society and its various competitive allies in California seem to attract a segment of the well-to-do, apparently those suburbanites and *nouveaux riches* who are genuinely frightened that Communism—or is it the income tax?—will take away the privileges they have recently acquired and barely learned to enjoy.

McCarthyism made no pretense to a program: it was a sheer outbreak, a curious mixture of spontaneous and calculated sentiment, of paranoia and *ressentiment*. The right-wing groups have their share of that too, and continue McCarthy's tradition of attacking not so much the Communists as the conspiracy of almost everyone else to hand over the country to the Communists. Yet it is noteworthy that even among the Birchers, to say nothing of the more respectable conservatives, there is some effort at developing a coherent political program. McCarthy, I think, had no sense of the political future: what mattered to him was the immediate sensation, the feeling that sufficient unto each day was the smear thereof. But these people do need a program of sorts, because they realize that politically they have a long way to go and that survival will require more than explosions of feeling and fright. That is why one witnesses the quite astonishing spectacle of "study groups"—shades of the Marxist past! —in which some effort is apparently made toward serious study of Communism. And how ironic it is, I might add in passing, that so far only the primitive right has managed to solve the problem of getting people out of their ranch homes and into political activity.

For what the Birch people are trying to do is to build a *movement*. They organize cells. They feed their members propagandistic material, quite as the Communists used to, so that when one meets some of their student members one feels that they are both the best informed and most ignorant people on the campus.

NATIONALLY, I suppose, the far right has no immediate prospect of becoming a serious power. But in many localities the Birch people do serious damage. Functioning with discipline and elan, they pressure school boards and town governments. A little while back I talked to a professor of history who serves as an advisor to a large publishing firm. He described the problem of publishers in states like Texas where a well-organized campaign by the right-wing organizations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has established a virtual censorship over high school textbooks. You can easily imagine the economic stake in keeping the concession to, say, an American history textbook in Texas, and for the publishers this is no easy problem. Such things don't get into the newspapers very often, but they do affect the daily course of American life. And they affect it largely because these days the right-wing groups are just about the only ones that have some fighting spirit and sense of purpose. Too many other people are celebrating the "end of ideology."

•

FROM AN INTELLECTUAL point of view, the right-wing organizations are far less interesting than those conservative students one encounters who look down their patrician noses at the Birch Society. These students, I must confess, are often quite likable. They seem really to care about politics and society, in their own (but sometimes calloused) way; they are well-informed, in the manner of the propagandist; and they cultivate a style of politeness which, even when it has a touch of condescension toward liberals (meaning anyone left of Goldwater), still involves a tacit acceptance of the norms of civilized discussion.

It is amusing and more than a bit disconcerting to discover, in talking to these boys and girls, how ill-prepared one is to cope with them. How much experience have *you* had lately in arguing against a proposal to abolish the income tax? These students come with figures, no doubt pre-packaged, to prove the economic feasibility of doing away with income taxes, quite as young Communists used to come with figures to prove the ineluctable progress of Russian industrialization. And one feels a trifle bewildered at having to think about the kinds of questions they raise. Abolishing the income tax may not be of the twentieth century, but where is it written that people living in a century need necessarily be of it? And while there are, as DISSENT readers surely realize, any number of questions, including some pretty recondite ones, I am prepared to argue, the income tax. . . . Well, I shall have to do some home work.

Many of the conservative students raise issues of a more serious kind, and in their concern for the preservation of personal initiative in a bureaucratic society there is something an intelligent radical ought to accept. I also find myself liking a little the feeling of these students that they speak as men of principle, doomed to be a minority for a long time, but unwilling to go along with the expediency and eclecticism of the liberal establishment. They do not feel themselves oppressed—their economic status could hardly allow them to suppose any such thing; but they do feel themselves harassed, the last of the upright and independent.

OTHER QUALITIES among them are far less attractive. When conservatives like Senator Taft advanced an essentially 19th-century political outlook, it was usually on the assumption that this outlook would satisfy the requirements of both our democratic tradition and a modern quasi-welfare society. Taft still spoke in terms of a common welfare, a responsibility for all citizens. Now, it is noteworthy, that some of the conservative students, though not all, have developed an elitist position so extreme that it leads to a frank contempt for "the masses."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the thirties the son of a rich man still knew something about poverty, and that too was a way of experiencing it. Nowadays we have perfected in this country such an extraordinary skill at brushing every unpleasantness beneath the social rug that many students simply don't believe in the *reality* of the poor. And some of those I have spoken to seem to feel that anyone who fails in our society simply deserves to, and that taking into account the lot of such depressed groups as the Negroes or Puerto Ricans is mere sentimentalism. There is a kind of rationalized hardness of spirit among these conservative students that I find very hard to understand, let alone cope with.

But do they really know what conservatism is? In bits and pieces. They offer tags from Russell Kirk or, more intelligently, Clinton Rossiter; they are quick to invoke the name of Edmund Burke; they admire Senator Goldwater as a man who can give their sentiments rational expression. They have a theory of human nature and a theory of society, or at least shards and fragments of theory. In a word, they are, unexpectedly and late in the day, confirmed ideologists.

A few weeks ago I visited for dinner an eating house run by girl students, and inevitably the talk turned to politics, especially to the assurance and aggressiveness of the conservative minority. One of them, declaring herself a follower of Ayn Rand, told me with utter seriousness that she believed that through an exertion of intelligence and will she could make anything she wished of her life. Total freedom, she seemed to feel, was her birthright as an American. Reflecting a little wryly on the lives I have known, I replied that two things seemed to run counter to her expectations: literature and history. She was taken aback by my remark, but later, while going home and feeling pleased with the incisiveness of my rejoinder, I realized that what I had told her might not be quite so devastating. For what if in America there is indeed emerging the kind of society that can dispense with the wisdom of literature and the lessons of history?

SOCIAL MOBILITY AMONG THE DEAD

(or Posthumous Circulation of Elites)

Sociology has long concentrated on the study of vertical social mobility, that is the movement of persons up or down the social hierarchy. I wish to point out here that the approach to this subject has so far been unduly limited. For reasons of a profound nature, which probably only the sociology of knowledge could fully clarify, these studies have up to this date unduly restricted themselves to mobility patterns among the living. Yet as recent Russian events have made clear, so undue a narrowing of our field of attention leads only to a distortion of vision

What have the recent revelations of Khrushchev and subsequent decisions in Moscow shown if not that a man's social mobility cannot be considered

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terminated by death? Metaphors such as those referring to "eternal rest" are utterly misleading here. When it was recently decided that Stalin's body was no longer to share a social pinnacle among the dead with the body of Lenin but was rather to be downgraded to share high, but no longer top, status with a number of miscellaneous heroes of the Soviet Union on the Kremlin wall, we were given the first empirical proof of a theoretical proposition which can now be advanced with some confidence: *The dead move—up and down.*

In effect, we have already learned that a number of Russian leaders who had been executed for villainous crimes in the thirties are again to move up into the ranks of heroes. One must suppose that their bodies will now be transferred from some obscure burial plot near the cellars of the GPU to a place of high honor in a State Cemetery. Similarly, we can now expect a reverse movement of the bodies of their executioners.

Russian propagandists have often pointed out that theirs is a highly mobile society in which every citizen has an equal chance to attain positions of highest eminence. But they have so far neglected to make hay of the fact that such chances are by no means terminated upon a person's death. Even those who did not do so well while alive might still attain posthumous status—and this may well serve the Russian state as a kind of functional equivalent of obsolete Calvinist notions about salvation and election.

When Pareto advanced the notion of the circulation of the elites he suggested that if, in the selection of members of the elite, there existed free competition, so that each individual could without obstacle rise just as high in the social scale as his talent permitted, the elite could be presumed to include at every moment just those persons best fitted for membership in it. He also noted, however, that this condition is never found in reality, that there exist always obstacles to the free circulation of the elites. Had Pareto not limited himself to the living he might have been able to modify his unduly pessimistic conclusions. Recent Russian events clearly indicate that the posthumous circulation of the elites may serve to rectify distortions and departures from the principle of free social movement Granted that an individual's earthly career may often have been stopped short of his potentialities because of Stalinist terrorism, the anti-party activities of this group or that, and the like. But nothing prevents Russian society, once the personality cult has been overthrown, from rectifying past mistakes so that yesterday's revolutionaries will after death be accorded the honor due their merit. This will thus serve to correct any imperfections of the principle of free socialist competition of talent. And when Western readers will soon learn that Russian gravediggers are kept busy disinterring and reinterring corpses according to new scales of posthumous status, let them not take this to be useless make-work; they are engaged in a most useful social activity: the posthumous circulation of the elites will realize the presumed ideals of the Soviet Union in the afterlife and give renewed point to the old saying that even in the grave you can't find any peace.

L. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIALIST PARTIES

The following article by a leading French socialist intellectual, is reprinted from Les Cahiers de la Republique, with the author's permission. It deals with problems of party structure in France; but we are pleased to present it here because many of its themes have an obvious relevance to other countries as well.—EDITORS

André Philip

Socialist parties in almost every country are today experiencing a crisis which affects their thinking, structure, strategy and tactics. To understand the basic reasons for this, we have to glance at the parties' original nature, their present state and their internal problems.

The Socialist movement began as a revolutionary protest, expressing a desire to build a new society. It linked together, as did the early Christian church, men who expected a revolutionary apocalypse and for whom the Party was their sole reason for being. Such was the case at the beginning of the Labor movement; in Great Britain, Chartism acted as a total movement engrossing all the activities of its militants. Even the Rochdale pioneers, who initiated the first consumers' cooperative, saw in it a means of radically transforming the lives of their members and preparing themselves for an integrated society. Such was also the case in the United States where the Knights of Labor was both a union and political movement. In France, the Utopians of 1848, followed by the early Marxists, similarly sought to encompass the individual's entire being, and Jules Guesde's socialism endeavored to maintain control over the unions.

Today, this conception survives in the Communist party. The CP encompasses man's entire life; its goal is to attain centralized state power so that, finally, it may forcibly transform society from above. To achieve this, any means are good, and individual preoccupations—including one's professed moral values—must be subordinated to the interests of the Party.

But the working class, tired of waiting for the final apocalypse, began to act. At one and the same time, it obtained better conditions within the framework of existing society and began to transform society's structure. As in the creation of the world, autonomous bodies emerged from the primitive socialist universe, increasingly independent of the state and the party and uncommitted to political action. First, unionism declared its independence. Whether it be early British trade-unionism, the AFL, or the French unionism of the Charter of Amiens, the working class declared its hostility to political action. Either it dreamed of a withering away of the state and the administration of industry by means of free workshops, or it was satisfied with exercising pressure on the political scene, rewarding its friends and punishing its enemies.

The party, limited to a narrower political sphere, also has had to modify its methods. Finding it impossible to maintain an attitude of opposition which had grown more and more sterile, it has had to take responsibility in government, either directly — as in Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries—or as part of a coalition

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government. But the party's early structure made difficult the operation of the parliamentary system, especially in a coalition government. Insofar as the party was rigidly dogmatic, it alienated many citizens, and thus could not obtain power except in coalition with other parties. The more sectarian the doctrine, the more necessary was compromise on practical matters. And most of the socialist parties, even when they have maintained some of their revolutionary myths and formulas, have ignored these in their realistic daily activities. Furthermore, party predominance has gradually destroyed the parliamentary system which assumes a government that can command—a government that is responsible to the people's representatives, and which determines general policy. In France before De Gaulle—and even now in Italy and Belgium—the government has verged on a regime of secretariats, where power depends on negotiations among party machines; hence ministerial instability, and the proliferation of crises engendered by a party's congress or executive, without any parliamentary decision-making. *It is this death-grip by the machines which killed parliamentary democracy in France.* At the same time, the more the parties participated in political life, attracting members or sympathizers, the more diverse became their social composition and their currents of opinion. But instead of adapting themselves to this diversity, they became all the more rigid, from a wish to present a monolithic image to the public. Violent struggles have taken place within the party, but once the highest authority made its decision known, the minority was forced to give in, to keep quiet, or even to take part in the majority campaign. Thus men sometimes spoke publicly against their deepest beliefs, or restrained themselves from oral or written expressions of their opinions. But from the moment that *the voter feels that a party leader, no matter who he is, does not say what he thinks but what he has been told to say, he loses all confidence in the party which, to him, has become deceitful.* The mechanical application of discipline has thus engendered in the French Socialist Party first, a series of splits, and then a general disillusionment that has undermined the very bases of democracy.

THE HIGHER STANDARD of living and the growing amount of leisure time have augmented the "privatization of life." Political participation is less intense and more incidental. In the party, union and cooperative alike, there are proportionately fewer members; the enrolled rarely attend meetings and those who make the decisions thus become less and less representative. In effect, the parties no longer represent the masses, but a small group of professionals, capable of providing cadres for a mass movement on the day it comes to life.

Interest in political problems however has not diminished. On the contrary, it is growing and the average citizen is interested increasingly in the great problems of national and international politics. But the emphasis has shifted; the citizen is no longer interested in doctrine, generalities, or philosophies of history, but in concrete problems which demand immediate solution, and he wants to obtain tangible results. Toward this end, the citizen usually joins a number of interest, study or action groups. Professional concerns are expressed by pressure groups, the most important of which are the trade unions. These groups defend the interests of their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

members; but the membership increasingly understands that in the long run, its interests are linked to the economic growth of the entire society, and thus they are led to take positions of a political nature. Throughout the country, educational groups, whose views exercise an increasing influence on public opinion, are growing in the form of clubs, forums, popular education centers. Finally, numerous action groups are formed, uniting men of diverse political origins to attain precise aims on specific matters. Thus, we find citizens involved in the European movement, in committees for secular action, in movements for mass education, in committees for peace in Algeria, etc. Actually, it is generally true that the same people are to be found in most interest, study, and action groups; hence these different groups must have something in common, which first needs to be denoted so that their action can be co-ordinated.

The function of a modern socialist party thus becomes evident. It must be, first of all, a cadre group to be used for study, education, and coordination. It must, in contact with the different groups which gravitate around it and in which its members hold responsible positions, prepare a political program, and at election time present clear-cut choices to the people. New techniques are required for this. The former poster campaigns are almost useless, since voters rarely read posters. Huge meetings, while they have an indispensable ritual value in renewing the faith of believers, do very little to help form opinion. Conferences and debates on specific subjects are more useful, and especially so are study groups held in conjunction with the leadership of various social, economic, and cultural organizations. Finally, during election campaigns, radio and television become essential instruments of contact with the people; thus, it is a *sine qua non* of democracy that the provision of information be an autonomous public service, independent of any government interference.

The party, after having elaborated a program in liaison with these other organizations, will run its candidates, indicating the limited team which will direct the opposition, and, if successful, take over the government. It is essential that these candidates be centrally designated by the party's executive committee because this is the only way to ensure liaison between the party membership and those who will constitute thereafter the parliamentary group. Once constituted, this parliamentary group must inevitably become—like the other economic and social organizations—an autonomous group under the direction of the leader of the parliamentary group, the future prime minister. When he thus has been designated he will be responsible for forming the government and setting forth the political course to be taken, under the control of the entire parliament and he will not let himself be pressured by any external force whatsoever—even that of his own party. The re-establishment of parliamentary democracy presupposes governmental responsibility and the rejection of external intervention by the machines.

THE PARTY IS, then, a permanent institution of popular education, establishing a communication network between responsible politicians and citizens engaged in diverse political activities. Its essential function is to coordinate, through a master program, the activity of diverse groups, or that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of individual members engaged elsewhere in groups with limited aims.

Here a contradiction arises: on the one hand, everybody will identify himself more strongly with his special group's decision than with the decision which the party might make on that particular question. On the other hand, everybody will feel the need to subordinate his own specialized activity to the party program which allows only co-ordinated political activity. Party discipline is subordinated to that of the groups *in special decisions;* it is superior to the groups in co-ordinated action.

This condition entails certain consequences:

First, an effective party must reject all official ideology which might lead to schisms and to the proliferation of sects. Within the party, there must be intellectual life, and hence a permanent confrontation of differing ideologies. There should never be one party ideology.

Secondly, the program of action defines the party; but the party need not be in unanimous agreement on all points of this program—and, in time, it will agree less and less, for the more the party develops, the more it nurtures varieties of interest and diversities of opinion. To be a party member, one need not accept each detailed point in its program, but to accept its general orientation and to have confidence in the action of its parliamentary or governmental leadership—seeking at the same time to guide its action in a direction that one believes to be right.

Thus there would exist, in the modern party, complete freedom of speech; the discipline imposed on the member is in line with the program's general orientation and the fraternal style of necessary discussions; but given a majority decision taken on a programmatic point or a tactical means for its implementation, each man must be free to maintain his point of view in public—at the same time letting it be known that the majority decision is, for the moment, the official party position which will be supported by its executive organs and its parliamentary group.

It is on this last matter that party discipline, on the other hand, should be extremely strict; the group is autonomous, but autonomous only in its choice of means to apply the program since it is to further this program that the deputies have been elected. In other respects, each parliamentarian, while remaining as a member free to express his opinion everywhere except on the Assembly's rostrum, must vote for the body directing the opposition; that body which under the direction of its leader—one day to be the government—is responsible for interpreting and applying the program.

Such seems to me to be the requirements for a modern party, capable of functioning in a renovated democracy and restoring liberty in our country. Have no illusions; if the parties retain old dogmatic formulae, no one will follow them, and we will not extricate ourselves from the current crisis. In his last televised speech, De Gaulle has called on the French for a direct dialogue between himself and each citizen, while rejecting all intermediaries, and—for the moment—De Gaulle has won. Now it happens that the very definition of democracy is the existence of intermediaries, assuring the exchange of views between the holders of power and the people. But the old intermediaries are discredited to-day. It is our task to create new ones, commanding both moral authority and technical efficiency.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMUNICATIONS

NEW STYLES IN AMERICAN SOCIAL PROTEST

Anne Parsons

In the Fall 1960 DISSENT, Irving Howe and Lewis Coser have aptly seized a political mood which is characteristic of many young Americans and offers the potentiality of a new upsurge of the idea of social protest. However, it is a great shame that this mood and some of its underlying dynamics should be described under the title "New Styles in Fellow-Travelling," particularly given the quite accurate observation that it "has little to do with any interest in Communist ideas or Communist organization." Cynically, one could observe that even socialists may have difficulty in keeping up with the next generation.

Like any political mood, this one takes many different organizational and ideological forms which may have in common nothing more than a crystallized sense of opposition to the status quo. To rephrase a bit Coser and Howe's list insofar as it is relevant to my own views and those of a number of persons I know, these are some of the relevant sources and components.

First and foremost is a very serious concern about the implications of weapons' technology developments and the threat of nuclear war. This concern is not restricted to social protesters; what characterizes the latter is a feeling that the United States has contributed just as much to our present posture on the brink of annihilation as the Soviet Union and so a refusal to believe the current rationalization that all our own weapons' developments have been absolutely necessary because of the Russians. It is this rather than any belief that Communism provides the ultimate utopia that makes us tend towards neutralism. It is not exactly weariness and disillusion with the Cold War—though one can feel that any anti-ideology is by definition a bit wearing—but rather fear of its potential consequences.

Second is the belief that the Soviet bloc has reached a point of stability, or at least is here to stay. We do know enough about history to realize that the Russian Communists did not achieve their present power position by acting like boy-scouts or by playing parlor socialism and we also know that at certain periods in its history, such as the Stalin purges, the Russian regime has gone far beyond the limits any humanitarian can tolerate. We also know that Communist ideology leads to expansionism and that sometimes the methods used for expansion have been far from subtle. At the same time, societies do change and just as capitalism in the advanced industrial countries no longer exploits

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the worker in the way described by Marx in his famous chapter on the working day, we also have the impression that even if it is not yet up to our standards of liberalism, Khrushchev's Russia is a great improvement over Stalin's. Molotov, after all, when he became politically inconvenient was simply given an agricultural post in an obscure part of Siberia and such methods of solving problems have also been used in democracies, and many of the more sensitive and critical intellectuals both in Russia and in the more liberal iron-curtain countries such as Poland seem now to be directing their energies towards pointing out how actual reality departs from Marxist ideals rather than futile attempts to overthrow Communist power. Although some see them that way, such views are by no means equivalent to fellow-travelerism; they may mean simply a pragmatic acceptance of the fact that no society ever really reaches its ideals. Perhaps we are different from earlier "lefts" in that we never really fell for any utopia.

THIRD IS AN EXTREMELY CRITICAL, although not wholly negative, attitude with respect to recent trends in American foreign policy. Too many signs point toward the view that the United States has indeed become a status quo power. One case in point concerns our role in the underdeveloped countries; in a recent reform coup d'etat attempted by an ex-student of the University of Wisconsin in Ethiopia, our diplomatic representatives simply abstained under a directive in Washington to stay neutral while our military representatives participated, of course, on the side of the status quo. The most immediate and important situation is, of course, that in Berlin, where we have seen the United States making a kind of absolute stand as if trying to tempt fate to the limit, while only a few small voices such as those of Senator Mansfield and Walter Lippmann have put forth any proposals more concrete than the general dictum that whatever was in 1945 shall remain so forever. It simply is not a question of giving-in to Communism but of trying to settle a particular problem with the hope of a sensible compromise. Besides, through the past summer one could compare the proclamations of the neutralist countries, so amazingly like those made by Roosevelt at the time when America stood for ideals against pure power politics, with the statements of the American press to the effect that these too represented a giving-in to Communism.

Fourth is a concern about what is going on in American society as the military becomes increasingly prominent as a power force, more and more linked with certain segments of industry via weapons contracts, and increasingly looking for intellectuals to express its views and to help out in its search for an ideology. A man as far from being a political radical as Dwight D. Eisenhower has recently warned us about the power of this military-industrial complex.

The backdrop of the newly awakening social protest movement is provided by the threat of nuclear holocast. If it never occurs, this threat at least will have served the function of having provided the myth of our times; says Kennedy, "it's not an American problem, it's not a Soviet problem, it's a human problem." Like any myth, this one can produce a variety of social views—it is certainly as responsible for current thinking on the extreme right as it is for other points on the political spectrum. For some, it has led to the conclusion

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the United States must take an absolutist stand in the face of any pressure for change, for to do otherwise would be a proof of our lack of will. There may also be a small minority who have concluded that because of the dangers we should simply lie down and let the Russians brainwash us, but one can suspect that the importance of this segment of public opinion has been greatly exaggerated by those for whom it provides a handy projection for their own fear. For a third segment, in which I count myself, it means that it is now more important than ever before to see our very real conflicts with Communism in a pragmatic fashion, directing all the energies of social protest against those who see us as engaged in a life or death struggle.

FROM THE MOOD TO political action can be a big step, or at least it seems that way to those of us who have come of age in a time of widespread distrust of utopian movements and in a time of seemingly dull domestic peace. Howe and Coser criticize us for our lack of historical perspective; but like them we know that social movements of the left as well as the right can become rigid and bureaucratized or even terroristic and this may account for the reluctance of many of us to join them. This is why I have used the word "left" in quotes, for whether or not the new mood of protest will ever give rise to anything so organized is a matter one can question, and even if it does it is difficult to predict what particular form it will take. But the idea of dissent only makes sense in the particular historical perspective in which it is used; after all it originated in a religious context in which people who saw themselves as non-conformists professed a rigid orthodoxy which few intellectuals would find sympathetic today. For this very reason, one can doubt that the mood will throw very many into the arms of the Communist party.

Howe and Coser reply:

We are glad that Miss Parsons has submitted her interesting communication, both for its own sake and for the opportunity it gives us to clarify our views. The title of our article was perhaps ill-chosen, and lifting the few pages of it from the chapter in which it will appear may have created some ambiguities.

It was anything but our intention to engage in a general attack on the new radical generation. On the contrary, and this should have been clear to so sympathetic a DISSENT reader as Miss Parsons, we regard the emergence of this new generation as among the few hopeful events in recent American political life. We were happy to see the spontaneous upsurge among students which led to the Freedom Rides and Lunch Counter demonstrations. We are moved by the efforts of young radicals on and off the campus, in the peace movements, and in the protests against bomb tests and the insanity of so-called Civil Defense. The critical remarks we offered were meant not to denigrate these *activities* but rather to portray certain intellectual *moods* which are sometimes near to, sometimes distant from such radical action among the young.

When Miss Parsons argues for the need to consider foreign policy in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pragmatic terms rather than as moralistic crusades we agree with her. But sometimes she seems to use the term pragmatic in ways that are disturbing. She appears to suggest that if only men engage in right action it might be as well to call a moratorium on theoretical reflection. Many years ago Sidney Hook put the matter well: "There is no wisdom in saying men *must* act. They always do. The point at issue is: what shall they enact and how?" Thus, when we criticized the lack of historical perspective among *some* younger radicals we did so in the spirit of Santayana's remark that "those who have forgotten the past are doomed to repeat it." It seems to us splendid that young people should protest the bomb tests, support the Freedom Rides, etc. But when some of these display a mindless admiration for Castro's totalitarian bravado, then we believe it our duty to criticize, for we remember the somewhat similar admiration of an earlier generation of young radicals for the "future that works" in the Soviet Union. And we also remember the profound collapse of hope, the sheer self-disgust and wasted lives of many radicals of this earlier generation when they finally realized that their gods had failed. If, then, we criticized similar tendencies today, it is from a desire to avoid similar consequences.

WE TRIED TO DESCRIBE a political mood from which a good many different conclusions can be drawn. Obviously, we ourselves share some elements of that mood, and we did not engage in a mere denunciation of it, but warned against a wilful suspension of critical faculties in the name of overriding practical needs and against that tone of *Schwärmerei* which so often accompanies the suspension of critical faculties.

Miss Parsons surely knows that we too oppose the "cold war," we too are discontented with major aspects of American life, we too are extremely critical of American foreign policy. Nor have we been the most recent to say such things. The fact that Khrushchev's Russia differs significantly, and for the better, from Stalin's has also been noted many times in DISSENT: not everything can or needs to be said in each article. But in honesty we feel some disturbance at *her* way of noting the differences between Stalin's and Khrushchev's Russia. To say that Khrushchev's Russia "is not yet up to our standards of liberalism" is certainly a striking instance of understatement. To say that East European intellectuals restrict their opposition "to ways in which actual reality departs from Marxist ideals" is, first to raise the question, how does Miss Parsons know? how can she be certain that if they had freedom these intellectuals might not, as in Poland and Hungary, speak in quite other terms?, and, second, is unwittingly to indicate that the ground for opposing the Communist regimes remains a *fundamental* one, namely that of a democratic opposition.

Where we do differ from some people who share something of the political mood we described is in our insistence that intellectual clarity, precision of thought, remains a necessity for which we should strive, no matter how urgent is the other imperative of action on concrete political issues. If pragmatism is meant by Miss Parsons to suggest a moratorium on intellectual distinctions in the name of our perilous times, we cannot go along with that. John Dewey, who knew something about pragmatism, wrote: "While the solution has to be reached by action based on personal choice, theory can enlighten and guide

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

choice and action by revealing alternatives, and by bringing to light what is entailed when we choose one alternative rather than another."

We agree with Miss Parsons that in the realm of power politics the search for compromise on specific issues is necessary; but this is not at all the same as accepting a gradual blurring of intellectual and moral issues. It may be necessary to make a "deal" with Khrushchev here or there, if only in order to avoid a world war. But to pass over the anti-libertarian features of Khrushchev's Russia, or Castro's Cuba, because to do so would "increase understanding" is not befitting intellectuals or any other kind of serious people. We owe it to our many friends behind the Iron Curtain to speak clearly, never to relent in our criticism of those denials of human rights concerning which they must keep silence. There is really no insuperable reason why it should not be possible for us to criticize denials of liberty and acts of inhumanity either here or in Russia, in the colonies of the West or the satellites of the East. It would be as wrong to be "morally neutral" about Castro's infringements of human dignity as to be "morally neutral" about the John Birch Society. And that, in a word, is what we were trying to say to those young radical friends with whom we have so much in common.

OUR FATHER
Who art in Heaven
Hallowed be Thy Bomb.
Thy Kingdom come.
Thy Missiles be made on Earth,
As They are in Heaven.
Give us this day our Conventional Weapons,
And forgive us our Civil Defence,
As we forgive Them
Who defend Themselves against us.
Lead us not in Nuclear Disarmament,
And deliver us from Peace Conferences,
For Thine the Deterrent
And the Four Minute Warning,
For ever
And
Ever...
AMEN.

—CHRISTOPHER LOGUE
From *The Twentieth Century*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS

"And Where Will I Get a Malted?"*

ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR, by Herman Kahn, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961. Index. xx + 668 pp. $10.

"He was always sleepy. And always ready to sleep. Everywhere. At the biggest mass meetings, at all the concerts, at every important convention, he could be seen asleep.

"And he slept in every conceivable and inconceivable pose. He slept with his elbows in the air and his hands behind his head. He slept standing up, leaning against himself so that he shouldn't fall down. He slept in the theater, in the streets, in the synagogue. Wherever he went, his eyes would drip with sleep.

"Neighbors used to say that he had already slept through seven big fires, and once, at a really big fire, he was carried out of his bed, still asleep, and put down on the sidewalk. In this way he slept for several hours until a patrol wagon came along and took him away.

"It was said that when he was standing under the wedding canopy and reciting the vows 'Thou art to me . . .' he fell asleep at the word 'sanctified,' and they had to beat him over the head with brass pestles for several hours to wake him up. And then he slowly said the next word and again fell asleep.

"We mention all this so that you may believe the following story about our hero.

"Once, when he went to sleep, he slept and slept and slept; but in his sleep it seemed to him that he heard thunder in the streets and his bed was shaking somewhat; so he thought in his sleep that it was raining outside, and as a result his sleep became still more delicious. He wrapped himself up in his quilt and in his warmth.

"When he awoke he saw a strange void: his wife was no longer there, his bed was no longer there, his quilt was no longer there. He wanted to look through the window, but there was no window through which to look. He wanted to run down the three flights and yell, 'Help!' but there were no stairs on which to run and no air in which to yell. And when he wanted merely to go out of doors, he saw that there was no out of doors. Evaporated!

"For a while he stood there in confusion, unable to comprehend what had happened. But afterward he bethought himself: I'll go to sleep. He saw, however, that there was no longer any earth on which to sleep. Only

* This story—"The Man Who Slept Through the End of the World," written by the Yiddish writer Moishe Nadir and translated by Irving Howe—is reprinted with permission from *A Treasury of Yiddish Stories,* Viking Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

then did he raise two fingers to his forehead and reflect: Apparently I've slept through the end of the world. Isn't that a fine how-do-you-do?

"He became depressed. No more world, he thought. What will I do without a world? Where will I go to work, how will I make a living, especially now that the cost of living is so high and a dozen eggs cost a dollar twenty and who knows if they're even fresh, and besides, what will happen to the five dollars the gas company owes me, And where has my wife gone off to? Is it possible that she too has disappeared with the world, and with the thirty dollars' pay I had in my pockets? And she isn't by nature the kind that disappears, he thought to himself.

"And what will I do if I want to sleep? On what will I stretch out if there isn't any world? And maybe my back will ache? And who'll finish the bundle of work in the shop? And suppose I want a glass of malted, where will I get it?

"Eh, he thought, have you ever seen anything like it? A man should fall asleep with the world under his head and wake up without it!

"As our hero stood there in his underwear, wondering what to do, a thought occurred to him: To hell with it! So there isn't any world! Who needs it anyway? Disappeared is disappeared: I might as well go to the movies and kill some time. But to his astonishment he saw that, together with the world, the movies had also disappeared.

"A pretty mess I've made here, thought our hero and began smoothing his mustache. A pretty mess I've made here, falling asleep! If I hadn't slept so soundly, he taunted himself, I would have disappeared along with everything else. This way I'm unfortunate, and where will I get a malted? I love a glass in the morning. And my wife? Who knows with whom she's disappeared? If it's with that presser from the top floor, I'll murder her, so help me God.

"Who knows how late it is?"

"With these words our hero wanted to look at his watch but couldn't find it. He searched with both hands in the left and right pockets of the infinite emptiness but could find nothing to touch.

"I just paid two dollars for a watch and here it's already disappeared, he thought to himself. All right. If the world went under, it went under. That I don't care about. It isn't my world. But the watch! Why should my watch go under? A new watch. Two dollars. It wasn't even wound.

"And where will I find a glass of malted?

"There's nothing better in the morning than a glass of malted. And who knows if my wife . . . I've slept through such a terrible catastrophe. I deserve the worst. Help, help, hee-lp! Where were my brains? Why didn't I keep an eye on the world and my wife? Why did I let them disappear when they were still so young?

"And our hero began to beat his head against the void, but since the void was a very soft one it didn't hurt him and he remained alive to tell this story."

OUR TIMES—Remember that fellow in the Midwest who took his brood into a fallout shelter for a week and then said it would be a fine thing for all of us because you really get to know one another in those close-quarter dungeons?

This week his wife sued him for divorce.

—Paul Sann in the N. Y. *Post*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Tract for Our Times

THE PEACE RACE, by Seymour Melman. Ballantine. 152 pp. 1961. 60¢.

In his eloquent address at the United Nations, President Kennedy warned that if a peace race did not supersede the arms race, our globe might be turned into a flaming funeral pyre. He indicated that the events and the decisions of "the next ten months" could determine the fate of mankind for the next 10,000 years. That was some months ago. Since then (at this writing) we have already made preparations for further atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and Russia has announced an increase in military expenditures—bringing them up to one sixth of the Soviet budget. Every *month* counts and every *year* carries us closer to a point where not even Herman Kahn can find statistical consolation in the whimpering remnants of life that might survive an atomic holocaust.

There is an immediate need for action, for pacification, for international agreement to avert race suicide. And such action as we get drives us faster to our graves, now fashionably designated as "fall-out shelters"—the mere mention of which has so demented our people that many of them have receded from the national consciousness which used to disfigure their imagination to state, local, familial and individual levels of egomania. The current tension is converting us into Hobbesian brutes.

Obviously we have at our disposal more than one means to lose our manhood as well as our civilization. Not the least of these is the general sense of powerlessness that afflicts so large a percentage of the population. Most people who lie awake nights thinking up ways to escape destruction learn not to air their views the next day—for fear of inviting public scorn. Our sophisticated neighbors tend to dismiss any idea for peace as utopian. They sing *Que Sera, Sera* as if it were news. So we clam up and run scared.

This is something Seymour Melman has refused to do—and all honor to him for his courage! Likewise, his passion, his good sense and his integrity.

AT LAST a voice has been raised which cannot be called that of a crank, a cry baby or a fellow traveler. Melman does not propose capitulation to the enemy by unilateral disarmament or by surrender to the doctrine that economic development can be achieved only under totalitarianism. Indeed, in the teeth of much public and official opinion, he argues persuasively as an industrial engineer, that democratic, socialist and humanist means are more *efficient* than those offered by Russia and China.

The book in which Melman unfolds his plan is itself so spare and suggestive that any summary (which we will not undertake) must end with an urgent plea to read the book. Or at least Part II of the book, for Part I, while incontrovertible, is also a familiar recitation of our plight. Part II treats brilliantly, though all too briefly and hurriedly of such matters as: World Industrialization with Freedom, Disarmament Without Depression, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How to Have Peaceful Coexistence—And Win.

A tall order! And no one can claim perfection for the recipe. But, how fine that it should have been concocted at all—when so many "responsible" men turn away in horror or in panic or in resignation. Melman may be wrong, but if so, he will have to be refuted. It will not do to put him down with cool disdain as August Heckscher and others have already tried to do.

Are we or are we not the only Great Power capable of producing guns and butter? Is unemployment a reality in the U.S.? Can it be said that much of our industrial capacity goes unused? Could we supply the infrastructure for emerging nations and see to it that their people were decently fed without cutting arms production by one iota? Could we? Of course. Can anyone else? Of course not. The consequences of this fact—that of our still considerable economic ascendancy—are tremendous. If the U. S. could be brought to convert its own ailing industries to the manufacture of machines and machine tools needed for a start in underdeveloped areas, and if, as Melman proposes, trade unionism were fostered as a base for rational multilateral decision-making, what a boon it would be for us all. And what a solvent of international tension.

SUPPOSING that the solvent worked, our Juggernaut (and *theirs)* would be confronted with massive problems of readjustment. Melman does not dodge these problems. Yet it will be said that his solutions are naive. Just so. But surely the willingness to grapple with them is overdue, and he offers a useful, if breathless, point of departure. Who can say that as the statistical probability of extinction mounts, peace is better served by crippling the British Labor Party or by distributing pamphlets in Red Square? Wouldn't we rather have our policy makers consider Melman when he writes:

> The cost of the peace race will amount, at maximum, to about 10%, of America's gross national product. A production increase of this size is attainable now, even while carrying the arms burden . . .
>
> *Already strained, the Soviet economy is incapable of the same feat as that of the United States.* The Soviet bloc has no reserves of production capacity. Drastic shortages of housing, food and consumer goods are the price of Soviet armaments.
>
> *The Soviets will be compelled to seek disarmament in order to compete in a peace race.* This is a link between competition for industrialization, a powerful move in its own right, and cooperation for disarmament . . .
>
> *The peace race can be started by the United States solely on its own decision.*

Politicians who flail about for some way to gain the initiative, disregard these propositions at their own, and our, mortal peril. To act upon them would require a great wrench, but no more so than to continue reacting tropismatically to Soviet strategy. An audacious plan could now be set in motion which no Great Power would be able to counter except by pursuing similar ends. There is no way to nullify the uncertain factor of goodwill except by this kind of pressure. Melman and his associates have for some time been working on disarmament and inspection schemes. In his new book Melman recommends phased disarmament beginning now as well as elaborate and expensive inspection to accompany the rational introduction of modern machinery in Asia, Africa

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Latin America. You must judge the details for yourself. It will be hard for you not to be thrilled by the vista.

This is a tract for what remains of our time. It should be inspected with care even by speed-readers who zip through other literature in the White House. BERNARD ROSENBERG

The Tragedy and the Glory

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, by Hugh Thomas. Harper and Brothers. 1961. 720 pp. $8.50.

In broad outline, the popular view of the Spanish Civil War has not been disturbed by historical research. On the establishment of the Republic in 1931 successive governments began to make slow, if belated, efforts to bring Spain into the mainstream of Europe by raising the living level of workers and peasants, by extending educational opportunities for the fifty per cent of the population who were illiterate, and by lossening the grip of the conservative Catholic Church. It was against these meager reforms, instituted by popularly-elected governments, that right-wing forces, frightened by strikes and workers' demonstrations, revolted in 1936. Insured in advance of aid from Mussolini, and later by Hitler, the Spanish rebels, led by Franco and his colleagues, emerged victorious in a crusade of restoration that has left Spanish workers and peasants as impoverished and bitter as they were when the revolt began.

In the course of the Civil War, about 600,000 men, women and children were killed and soldiers on both sides showed reckless courage, anachronistic heroism, cowardice, and mindless cruelty. Few commentators failed to note that the Legion of Moors had been called in to help save Christian Spain.

Mussolini and Hitler, it was said, saw the Civil War as an opportunity to test their bombs and tanks for the greater struggle ahead. Great Britain, under the leadership of Baldwin and Chamberlain, arranged for the non-intervention agreements, fearful of the radicalism of the Republican forces, and transparently clever in hoping to divert the attention of Hitler from continental prizes. The French accepted non-intervention reluctantly, the Americans, under Roosevelt and Hull, more avidly. Despite non-intervention, armaments reached Spain, openly in the case of supplies from Italy and Germany, more circumspectly through France. The major support for the Republicans, six months after the opening of the war, came from the Soviet Union. Stalin, as usual, played his cards close to his chest, permitting enough aid to keep the Republican forces in being, but not enough to deliver a decisive blow.

Republican Spain was not denied the horror of a Soviet purge, although it was thousands of miles from Moscow. Driven by the maniacal Stalinist, André Marty, the NKVD and foreign Communists murdered Socialists, Trotskyists and Anarchists behind the lines.

ALL THIS is contained in Hugh Thomas' extraordinary *The Spanish Civil War*, written by a thirty-year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

old historian with the detachment of a modern scholar describing the Napoleonic campaigns. Nothing is too slight to bear inclusion—it seems there were 3,000 men of Jewish origin in the International brigades, for example—without losing sight of the necessity of fitting all the facts into the broader depiction of the conflict. Thomas' work has been criticized by a number of Republican exiles, who have cited a series of minor errors and have been particularly disturbed by Thomas' copious use of Franquist sources in citing atrocities committed by the Republicans. Thomas has undoubtedly been fascinated by the material contained in the thirty-five volume *Historia de la Cruzada Espanola*, published in Madrid between 1940-43. *The Spanish Civil War* may well be the first work, written from a viewpoint sympathetic to the Republican side, which has made such wide use of Nationalist documents. Thomas' tolerance falters somewhat, however, in dealing with the Anarchists whose leaders, with some exceptions, come off badly at his hands.

Even so comprehensive a volume cannot include everything, and it remains perhaps to add a word about the dedicated anti-Communist and his attitude toward the Spanish Civil War. By 1936, when the Civil War began, the non-Stalinist, whatever his radical faith, was already on the way to the conviction that the Soviet system would take its place among the major tyrannies of history. However strident in asserting his own belief in socialism, the anti-Stalinist had the nagging fear that the dynamics of the times were in the grasp of the Communists primarily because, as a cliché of the time had it, the Communists had the "real estate" — the Soviet Union. Against the actual power of the Soviet state, with its psychological emanations and its more mundane corruptive power, anti-Stalinists were at a permanent disadvantage. *They* were condemned for insisting that democracy and freedom were essential elements in socialism.

During the Spanish Civil War, the American anti-Communist had an opportunity to sample the anguish of Camus, albeit prematurely and vicariously. He could wholeheartedly identify with the socialist and democratic forces that gave the Spanish Civil War a revolutionary character. He could condemn the pusillanimous attitude of the Western countries for their refusal to help the Republicans. But the Soviet role created a dilemma for the non-Communists. Even when they marched with Communists to demand lifting of the embargo, or raised funds for medical supplies, the anti-Stalinists knew in their hearts that betrayal was in the making. What would Stalin, who had begun his massive purges in 1936, do in case of a Republican victory in Spain?

These doubts, conscious or not, did not quell the passion that anti-Stalinists were prepared to pour into the Spanish cause. The tragedy and glory of the Spanish Republican cause belong to the anonymous Spanish worker and peasant. The faith they aroused was justified at the time—and by history—even as it was realized that totalitarians using the catch-phrases of democracy would besmirch that faith for the Spanish democrats and those who supported them.

HERMAN SINGER

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS

Constructive

Editors:

I wish to compliment you on the Summer, 1961 issue of DISSENT. It is a constructive, revealing, often startling portrait of a city written by men and women who care about both its present and future. I was especially impressed by "Harlem, My Harlem" by Claude Brown. "The Village Beat Scene" by Ned Polsky, and Daniel M. Friedenberg's excellent "Real Estate Confidential."

My one criticism of "New York, N. Y." is that it appears to be a bit one-sided in its presentation. However, I don't believe it misses the mark by very far, if, indeed, it misses at all. You label DISSENT a "Quarterly of Socialist Opinion." I am not a Socialist but am always ready to listen, debate and to learn. Please keep up the good work.

The Next Step? . . .

Editors:

You will find enclosed a money order for 2 years at $5. I am a devoted subscriber of the far right wing but yours is the only really mentally stimulating publication of this type.

Your truly,

J. K. R.

Justice for Kennan

Editors:

Mr. Pachter's attack on Kennan not only is vicious but unprofessional too. With great pomp Mr. Pachter writes "a historian must have his facts right" and then takes Kennan to task for giving Friedrich Ebert the title "chancellor." Well, here are the "facts": on November 9, 1918, the Emperor William II fled and left the government in the hands of Prince Max von Baden, his last Chancellor. The latter then invited Ebert to form a government, while Schneidemann outside was proclaiming the Republic. Ebert assumed the title "Reichskanzler" but had to abandon it on the following day, because the Independent Socialists would not join the government unless it was called "Council of People's Commissars" and Ebert's title was changed to "chairman." Thus Ebert was indeed the first Chancellor of the Republic, as George Kennan has written.

HENRI RABASSEIRE

Henry Pachter replies: I stand corrected, but I still maintain that in explaining who Ebert was, it is more relevant to introduce him as "Germany's first president." If Mr. Rabasseire is to be technical, I might reply: formally the Kaiser did not abdicate until November 28 and according to the old Constitution, he alone could nominate a Chancellor. The action of Prince Max was either illegal, and then Ebert was not Chancellor, or it was legal, and then Ebert was not the first Chancellor of the Republic but the last Chancellor of the Monarchy. To the Republic he was its first and only chairman of the council of people's commissars, until his elevation to the Presidency on February 11, 1919.

It's Later Than You Think

WANT TO SLOW DOWN? Here's the cutest, most novel paperweight you've ever seen. Looks like polished granite, but it's just a heavy, realistic miniature tombstone in hydrocal . . . embellished with a provocative chisel-carved saying, 4¾" high with weighted base. Nifty gift for anyone with a desk!

☐ 3631—Tomb Paperweight $1

—From a Mail Order Catalogue

This Item Is Dated . . . July 21, 1839.

Minister Repnin fell in one day from the heights of power into the most profound obscurity; nobody dares remember him, nobody dares even believe in his life, not his present life but his past life. . . . That is why Russia does not know today if the minister who governed it yesterday existed."

—From an entry in the *Journal* of the French Marquis de ustine who was in Russia in the 1930s.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CUMULATIVE INDEX—1960–1961

[Volume VII: Pages 1–104, Winter 1960; 105–216, Spring 1960; 217–316, Summer 1960; 317–412, Autumn 1960. Volume VIII: Pages 1–104, Winter 1961; 105–216, Spring 1961; 217–424, Summer 1961; 425–520, Autumn 1961.]

INDEX BY TITLE

The Addict and the Law—*Edwin M. Schur* ..... VIII 43
After the Election — *Michael Walzer* ..... VIII 3
Against Nuclear Testing — *Irving Howe* ..... VIII 427
Albert Camus—*Nicola Chiaromonte* ..... VII 266
Alexander Herzen....Ancester in Defeat—*George Woodcock* .. VII 71
Are Workers Middle Class?—*S. M. Miller & Frank Riessman* VIII 507
Arms Control: The New Defeatism—*Seymour Melman* . VIII 116
Banning Cars from Manhattan —*Percival & Paul Goodman* VIII 304
"Bastard" Capitalism — *Ralph Samuel* ..... VII 319
Beyond Liberalism: Some Proposals for the Sixties — *Michael Reagan* ..... VII 377
The Brave New World for Scientists—*Edward Speyer* ..... VIII 126
British Labor in 1960—*Stanley Plastrik* ..... VII 16
The Campus Radical in 1960 —*Arthur Mitzman* ..... VII 142
Can the U. S. Reconvert to Peace?—*Ben B. Seligman* ... VII 12
Can Unions Be Democratic? Some Are!—*H. W. Benson*.. VIII 207
The Case for Delinquency—*Edouard Roditi* ..... VII 152
The City: A Poem — *Robert Nichols* ..... VIII 219
Classless Education in a Class Society?—*H. Brand, and a reply by Michael Walzer* .... VII 86
The Common Harvestman — *Margaret Halsey* ..... VIII 420
"Communitas" and Its Impact on City Planning — *Herbert J. Gans* ..... VIII 326
Concentration, Centralization and Control—*James O'Connor* VII 355
The Conventions of the Mad—*T. J. Ross* ..... VIII 502
The Cost of Freedom Rides—*William Goldsmith* ..... VIII 499
A Cup of Coffee and a Seat—*Michael Walzer* ..... VII 111
Debasement of a Tradition—*T. J. Ross* ..... VII 395
Democracy in the New Nations —*Asoka Mehta* ..... VII 271
Economic Development and Political Stability in India—*Bert F. Hoselitz & Myron Weiner* ..... VIII 172
The Economics of World Tension—*Thomas Balogh* ..... VII 180
An Economic View of Negro African Independence—*Daniel M. Friedenberg* ..... VII 188
The Electoral College—*John P. Roche* ..... VIII 197
Fashionable Fallacies About Unions—*David Carper* ..... VIII 106
A Foreign Policy — *Henry Pachter* ..... VIII 6
France: A Nation in Agony—*Paul Parisot* ..... VIII 86
The G. S.—*Henry Pachter* .... VIII 429
George Kennan: The Perils of History — *Henry M. Pachter* VIII 473
Going Underground in Massachusetts — *Stephan Thernstrom* ..... VIII 123
Growing Up Absurd — *Paul Goodman* ..... VII 121
Harlem, My Harlem — *Claude Brown* ..... VIII 378
Harlem Today — *Michael Harrington* ..... VIII 371
The Idea of Resistance — *Michael Walzer* ..... VII 369
The Idea of Revolution—*Tom Kahn and a reply by Michael Walzer* ..... VII 180
Ideology and the Beau Geste—*Daniel Bell, and a reply by Dennis Wrong* ..... VIII 75
Imagination and Dreams in Foreign Aid —*Eugene Burdick, and a reply by Joseph Buttinger* ..... VII 79
In Place of a Hero — *Michael Walzer* ..... VII 156
The Insanity of Realism—*Robert P. Wolff* ..... VIII 120
A Journey to Cuba—*Daniel M. Friedenberg* ..... VII 279

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Juvenile Delinquent and the Mythic Hero — *Harry Slochower* ..... VIII 413
Language and Technological Society—*Herbert Marcuse* .. VIII 66
Liberalism and Lassitude — *Emanuel Geltman* ..... VII 25
Lincoln Center, Emporium of the Arts — *Percival Goodman* VIII 333
The Mama of Us All—*Jerry Tallmer* ..... VIII 398
Marginal Industries, Low Wages and High Risks—*Gus Tyler* VIII 321
Metaphysical Stalinism—*Lionel Abel* ..... VIII 137
Migratory Agricultural Labor —*Herbert Hill* ..... VII 244
A Mind's Turnings — *Irving Howe* ..... VII 31
The New Pacifism — *Stephan Thernstrom* ..... VII 373
New Styles in Fellow Traveling—*Irving Howe and Lewis Coser* ..... VIII 496
New York City: A Remembrance—*Lionel Abel* ..... VIII 251
New York Could Die—*Edward T. Chase* ..... VIII 297
New York in the Thirties — *Irving Howe* ..... VIII 241
Notes on New York Housing— *Ernest van den Haag* ..... VIII 277
Notes on the U. S. Political Economy—*H. Brand* ..... VIII 107
Obstacle Course to Mecca: Jazz in New York — *Nat Hentoff* VIII 386
Off-Broadway, 1960—*Mary Otis* VIII 392
On Socialist Realism — *Anonymous* ..... VII 39
Paradoxes of Foreign Aid — *Henry Pachter* ..... VII 167
The Person Alone — *Barbara Probst Solomon* ..... VIII 404
The Politics of the New Negro —*Michael Walzer* ..... VII 235
The Politics of Virtue, or, the New Tammany—*Mary Perot Nichols* ..... VIII 366
Poverty and Destitution — *Dorothy Day* ..... VIII 233
Poverty in the United States— *H. Brand* ..... VII 334
A Program for the Nation— *Norman Mailer* ..... VII 67
Public at Both Ends — *Christopher Amos* ..... VIII 480
Public Housing: Tenants and Troubles—*Mike Miller and Carl Werthman* ..... VIII 282
A Puerto Rican in New York —*Eileen Diaz* ..... VIII 383
Real Estate Confidential—*Daniel M. Friedenberg* ..... VIII 260
Reflections on the End of Ideology—*Dennis H. Wrong* ... VII 286
Reflections on the Welfare State —*Ignazio Silone* ..... VIII 185
Return to India—1960—*Stanley Plastrik* ..... VIII 28
The Rigged Society — No. 1 — *Murray Hausknecht* ..... VII 3
Tht Rigged Society — No. 2 — *Jay Bentham and Bernard Rosenberg* ..... VII 5
Robert Moses, Glutton for Power—*Fred J. Cook* ..... VIII 312
Schlesinger and the New Deal —*Jacob Cohen* ..... VIII 461
"She Thought the Russians Was Coming" — Norman *Mailer* ..... VIII 408
The So-Called Berlin Question —*"Berliner"* ..... VIII 441
Socialism Abroad: The Revisionist Debate—*Stanley Plastrik* ..... VII 292
Socialism and Apathy — *Lewis Coser* ..... VIII 24
Socialism and Culture—*Richard Wollheim* ..... VIII 491
The Socialist Dilemma in Europe—*Stuart Hughes* ..... VIII 432
"Socialist Realism": An Introduction—*Czeslaw Milosz* .... VII 362
The State vs. The Student—*L. D. Reddick* ..... VII 219
Steel Strikes as Lockouts — *James O'Connor* ..... VII 9
A Symposium on TV — *Irving Howe, Bernard Rosenberg, Murray Hausknecht, Ernest van den Haag, Dwight Macdonald* ..... VII 296
Thoughts on "Prosperous" Communism—*Lewis Coser* .. VII 21
The Three Faces of New York —*Daniel Bell* ..... VIII 222
Towards Total Disarmament— *Norman Thomas* ..... VII 165
The Triumph of Primitivism— *John P. Roche* ..... VIII 16
Trouble in Auto—*Frank Marguart* ..... VIII 112
The Two Sides of Castro's Cuba—*Edward Friedman & Richard Kraus* ..... VIII 53

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U-2 and Its Repercussions — *Anonymous* ..... VII 313
The University: Everybody's Gold Mine — *Barbara Probst Solomon* ..... VII 137
A View from the Left — *Norman Birnbaum* ..... VIII 11
The Village—*Marc D. Schleifer* VIII 360
The Village Beat Scene: Summer 1960—*Ned Polsky* ..... VIII 339
"We Are Not Afraid" — *Ellsworth Janifer* ..... VII 229
West Coast Waterfront—*Harvey Swados* ..... VIII 448
The West Village: Let There Be Blight—*Stephen Zoll* .... VIII 289
The White Jew—*Jane Hayman* VIII 191

INDEX BY AUTHOR

Abel, Lionel — *Metaphysical Stalinism* ..... VIII 137
New York City: A Remembrance ..... VIII 251
Amos, Christopher — *Public at Both Ends* ..... VIII 480
Anonymous—*On Socialist Realism* ..... VII 39
Balogh, Thomas — *The Economics of World Tension* VII 180
Bell, *Daniel—Ideology and the Beau Geste* ..... VIII 75
The Three Faces of New York ..... VIII 222
Benson, H. W. — *Can Unions De Democratic? Some Are!* VIII 207
Bentham, Jay (with Bernard Rosenberg)—*The Rigged Society* ..... VII 5
Birnbaum, Norman — *A View from the Left* .....VIII 11
Brand, H.—*Classless Education in a Class Society?* ..... VII 86
Notes on the U. S. Political Economy ..... VIII 107
Poverty in the United States VII 334
Brown, Claude — *Harlem, My Harlem* ..... VIII 378
Burdick, Eugene — *Imagination and Dreams in Foreign Aid* VII 79
Buttinger, Joseph—*Imagination and Dreams in Foreign Aid (A Reply)* ..... VII 79
Carper, David — *Fashionable Fallacies About Unions* .... VIII 106
Chase, Edward T.—*New York Could Die* ..... VIII 297
Chiaromonte, Nicola — *Albert Camus* ..... VII 266
Cohen, Jacob—*Schlesinger and The New Deal* ..... VIII 461
Cook, Fred J.—*Robert Moses, Glutton for Power* ..... VIII 312
New Styles in Fellow Traveling ..... VIII 496
Coser, Lewis — *Socialism and Apathy* ..... VIII 24
Thoughts on "Prosperous" Communism ..... VII 21
Day, Dorothy — *Poverty and Destitution* ..... VIII 233
Diaz, Eileen—*A Puerto Rican in New York* ..... VIII 383
Friedenberg, Daniel—*An Economic View of Negro African Independence* ..... VII 188
A Journey to Cuba ..... VII 279
Real Estate Confidential ... VIII 260
Friedman, Edward (with Richard Kraus)—*The Two Sides of Castro's Cuba* ..... VIII 53
Friedman, Neil — *Geist, Guise and Guitar* ..... VII 151
Gans, Herbert J.—*"Communitas" and Its Impact on City Planning* ..... VIII 326
Geltman, Emanuel — *Liberalism and Lassitude* ..... VII 25
Gibson, William—*Students and Faculty* ..... VII 232
Goldsmith, William—*The Cost of Freedom Rides* ..... VIII 499
Goodman, Paul — *Growing Up Absurd* ..... VII 121
Goodman, Percival — *Lincoln Center, Emporium of the Arts* ..... VIII 333
Goodman, Percival and Paul—*Banning Cars from Manhattan* ..... VIII 304
Halsey, Margaret — *The Common Harvestman* ..... VIII 420
Harper, Frank — *California's Death Penalty Fight* ..... VIII 99
Harrington, Michael — *Harlem Today* ..... VIII 371
Hausknecht, Murray—*The Rigged Society* ..... VII 3
A Symposium on TV ..... VII 296
Hayman, Jane—*The White Jew* VIII 191
Hentoff, Nat—*Obstacle Course to Mecca: Jazz in New York* VIII 386
Hill, Herbert—*Migratory Agricultural Labor* ..... VII 244
Hoselitz, Bert F. (with Myron Weiner3—*Economic Develop-*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment and Political Stability in India ..... VIII 172
Howe, Irving—*Against Nuclear Testing* ..... VIII 427
A Mind's Turnings ..... VII 31
New Styles in Fellow Traveling (With L. Coser) ..... VIII 496
New York in the Thirties .. VIII 241
A Symposium on TV ..... VII 296
Hughes, Stuart — *The Socialist Dilemma in Europe* ..... VIII 432
Janifer, Ellsworth — *"We Are Not Afraid"* ..... VII 229
Kahn, Tom—*The Idea of Revolution* ..... VIII 180
Kennedy, X. J. — *Who Killed King Kong?* ..... VII 213
Larner, Jeremy — *Saving the Elephant* ..... VII 311
Macdonald, Dwight—*A Symposium on TV* ..... VII 296
Mailer, Norman — *A Program for the Nation* ..... VII 67
"She Thought the Russians Was Coming" ..... VIII 408
Marcuse, Herbert — *Language and Technological Society* .. VIII 66
Marquart, Frank — *Trouble in Auto* ..... VIII 112
Mehta, Asoka — *Democracy in the New Nations* ..... VII 271
Melman, Seymour—*Arms Control: The New Defeatism* .. VIII 116
Miller, Mike (with Carl Werthman) — *Public Housing: Tenants and Troubles* ..... VIII 282
Miller, S. M. (with Frank Reissmann) — *Are Workers Middle Class?* ..... VIII 507
Milosz, Czeslaw — *"Socialist Realism": An Introduction* VII 362
Mitzman, Arthur—*The Campus Radical in 1960* ..... VII 142
Murray, Ed—*The Beatnik* ... VII 148
Nichols, Mary Perot—*The Politics of Virtue, or, The New Tammany* ..... VIII 366
Nichols, Robert—*The City: A Poem* ..... VIII 219
O'Connor, James—*Steel Strikes as Lockouts* ..... VII 9
Concentration, Centralization, and Control ..... VII 355
Otis, Mary—*Off-Broadway,1960* VIII 392
Pachter, Henry M.—*A Foreign Policy* ..... VIII 6
The G. S. ..... VIII 429
George Kennan: The Perils of History ..... VIII 473
Paradoxes of Foreign Aid .. VII 167
Parisot, Paul—*France: A Nation in Agony* ..... VIII 86
Plastrik, Stanley—*British Labor in 1960* ..... VII 16
Return to India—1960 ..... VIII 28
Return to India—Part II... VIII 153
Socialism Abroad: The Revisionist Debate ..... VII 292
Polsky, Ned—*The Village Beat Scene: Summer 1960* ..... VIII 339
Reagan, Michael—*Beyond Liberalism: Some Proposals for the Sixties* ..... VII 377
Reddick, L. D.—*The State vs. The Student* ..... VII 219
Reissman, Frank (with S. M. Miller)—*Are Workers Middle Class?* ..... VIII 507
Roche, John P.—*The Electoral College* ..... VIII 197
The Triumph of Primitivism ..... VIII 16
Roditi, Edouard—*The Case for Delinquency* ..... VII 152
Rosenberg, Bernard (with Jay Bentham)—*The Rigged Society* ..... VII 5
A Symposium on TV ..... VII 296
Rosenberg, Harold—*Prediction —A Poem* ..... VII 388
Ross, T. J.—*The Conventions of the Mad* ..... VIII 502
Debasement of a Tradition VII 395
Samuel, Ralph — *"Bastard" Capitalism* ..... VII 319
Schleifer, Marc D.—*The Village* VIII 360
Schur, Edwin M.—*The Addict and the Law* ..... VIII 43
Seligman, Ben B.—*Can the U.S. Reconvert to Peace?* ..... VII 12
Silone, Ignazio—*Reflections on the Welfare State* ..... VIII 185
Slochower, Harry—*The Juvenile Delinquent and the Mythic Hero* ..... VIII 413
Solomon. Barbara Probst—*The Person Alone* ..... VIII 404
The University: Everybody's Gold Mine ..... VII 137
Speyer, Edward — *The Brave New World for Scientists* .. VIII 126
Swados, Harvey — *West-Coast Waterfront* ..... VIII 448
Tallmer, Jerry—*The Mama of Us All* ..... VIII 398
Thernstrom, Stephan — *Going*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Underground in Massachusetts ..... VIII 123
The New Pacifism ..... VII 373
Thomas, Norman — *Towards Total Disarmament* ..... VII 163
Tyler, Gus — *Marginal Industries, Low Wages and High Risks* ..... VIII 321
Van den Haag, Ernest — *Notes on New York Housing* .... VIII 277
A Symposium on TV ..... VII 296
Walzer, Michael — *After the Election* ..... VIII 3
A Cup of Coffee and a Seat VII 111
The Idea of Resistance ... VII 369
In Place of a Hero ..... VII 156
The Politics of the New Negro ..... VII 235
Weiner, Myron (with Bert F. Hoselitz) — *Economic Development and Political Stability in India* ..... VIII 172
Werthman, Carl (with Mike Miller) — *Public Housing: Tenants and Troubles* ..... VIII 282
Wolff, Robert P.—*The Insanity of Realism* ..... VIII 120
Wollheim, Richard — *Socialism and Culture* ..... VIII 491
Woodcock, George—*Alexander Herzen—Ancestor in Defeat* VII 71
Wrong, Dennis H.—*Reflections on the End of Ideology* ... VII 286
Zoll, Stephen—*The West Village: Let There Be Blight*.. VIII 289

BOOKS REVIEWED

Advertisements for Myself by Norman Mailer. (Robert A. Bone)* ..... VII 389
The Alienated Voter by Murray B. Levin. (William J. Newman) ..... VIII 213
The Americans. Photographs by Robert Frank. Introduction by Jack Kerouac. (Donald Gutierrez) ..... VIII 515
Aspects of Revolt by Max Nomad. (Herman Singer) .... VII 90
The Beat of Life by Barbara Probst Solomon. (Judith Walzer) ..... VIII 97
Beyond the Welfare State by Gunnar Myrdal. (Ben B. Seligman) ..... VII 404
Concepts of Liberty by Isaiah Berlin. (David Spitz) ..... VIII 78
Crusader Without Violence by L. D. Reddick. (L. M.) .... VII 310
The Eclipse of Community by Maurice R. Stein. (Paul Goodman) ..... VII 307
The Futilitarian Society by William J. Newman. (Michael D. Reagan) ..... VIII 514
Growing Up Absurd by Paul Goodman. (David Sachs) ... VIII 93
The Jewish Labor Bund, A Pictorial History. (Irving Howe) ..... VII 92
The Limits of Freedom by David Fellman. (David Spitz) VIII 78
Listen, Yankee, by C. Wright Mills. (Daniel M. Friedenberg) ..... VIII 61
The Politics of Mass Society by William Kornhauser. (William J. Newman) ..... VII 303
Resistance, Rebellion and Death by Albert Camus. (Irving Howe) ..... VIII 210
The Rise of the Meritocracy by Michael Young. (Dennis H. Wrong) ..... VII 207
Social Mobility in Industrial Society by Seymour Lipset and Reinhard Bendix. (Stephan Thernstrom) ..... VII 470
The Stages of Economic Growth by W. W. Rostow. (Henry Pachter) ..... VII 400
The War in Algeria by Jules Roy. (S. P.) ..... VIII 215
Weekend in Dinlock by Clancy Sigal. (S. P.) ..... VIII 215

*Reviewer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Statement Required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as Amended by the Acts of March 3, 1933, July 2, 1946 and June 11, 1960 (74 Stat. 208) Showing the Ownership, Management, and Circulation of DISSENT, published quarterly at New York, N. Y. for October 1, 1961.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher: Walter Goldwater, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.; Editor: None; Managing Editor, None; Business Manager: Stanley Plastrik, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given): Walter Goldwater, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: None.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

5. The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was: 2,328.

STANLEY PLASTRIK
Business Manager

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 16th day of October, 1961.

IRVING LIGHT
Notary Public

(My Commission expires March 10, 1963.)

☞ "The most illuminating diagnosis I have seen of the predicament of the writer in the Soviet society."
—*Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.*

☞ "Should be required reading for every American."
—*Allen Tate*

On Socialist Realism

By ABRAM TERTZ

A bold attack on the very foundation of all Soviet art—socialist realism. Written anonymously behind the Iron Curtain by the author of *The Trial Begins.* $2.95, now at your bookstore

PANTHEON

In the Spring DISSENT:

THE YOUNG RADICALS

A Symposium with: Roger Hagan . . . Stoughton Lynd . . . Julian Mayfield . . . Stephan Thernstrom . . . Robert Paul Wolff . . . Barbara Probst Solomon.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Look, Ma—No Taboos!



This is to introduce you to the *Realist*, a unique magazine of social criticism and satire. Following are the highlights of four recent (and available) issues. . . .

ARTICLES:

Henry Morgan discusses socialized medicine; William Worthy describes a Washington conference on "The American Character"; Lenny Bruce indulges in a stream-of-consciousness about the contraceptive industry; Donald M. Fiene reports on the censorship history of J. D. Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye.*

INTERVIEWS:

Impolite question-&-answer sessions with such diverse personalities as Nazi George Lincoln Rockwell and comedian Dick Gregory.

SATIRE:

The Fallout Shelter Key Club Plan; *Psychita* (wherein *Psycho* meets *Lolita*); The Fine Art of Prisoner-Trading; New Wives' Tales for Old; Under the Counter Intelligence.

DOCUMENTS:

Franco's Prisoners Speak (letters smuggled out of Spanish prisons); Caryl Chessman on Religion (a long philosophical letter he wrote to his old Sunday School teacher shortly before his execution); Department of Unintentional Satire (what happened when a *Realist* reader tried to find out if Young Americans for Freedom is a subversive organization.

The four issues described above cost $1.
They're yours free with a subscription.
Rates: $3 for 10 issues; $5 for 20 issues.

Also available from the *Realist:* the book *Impolite Interviews,* $4—with Lenny Bruce, Dr. Albert Ellis, Henry Morgan, Alan Watts, Jean Shepherd, Richard Kern, Jules Feiffer, Hugh Hefner.

The Realist, Dept. D 225 Lafayette Street New York 12, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED